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Abstract
Talking about Appearances:
Experience, Evaluation, and Evidence in Discourse
by
Rachel Etta Rudolph
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
Professor John MacFarlane, Co-chair
Professor Seth Yalcin, Co-chair
When we say that a dress looks blue, or that a musical instrument sounds off-
key, or that a soup smells like it contains nutmeg, what do we communicate?
With claims about appearances like these we seem to communicate both
about the objective world and about our subjective experience. This comes
out in two puzzling features of appearance claims.
Faultless disagreement arises when speakers disagree, and yet neither
seems to be mistaken. Speakers may faultlessly disagree about appearances,
for instance if one holds that a dress ‘looks blue’, and the other that it
doesn’t. There is a felt incompatibility here, just as with disagreement over
objective claims. But assuming the speakers have different visual experi-
ences of the dress, neither seems to be mistaken. Which appearance claim a
speaker correctly makes depends not just on the objective world, but on their
subjective experience as well. Faultless disagreement thus precludes viewing
appearance claims as straightforwardly objective or subjective.
The acquaintance inference is the inference from an utterance to the con-
clusion that the speaker has relevant first-hand acquaintance. For instance,
if a speaker says that the dress looks blue, one will infer that they have seen
it. The utterance is infelicitous if they haven’t. However, this inference is not
an ordinary entailment. Just because I haven’t seen the dress, doesn’t mean
it doesn’t look blue. Again, this phenomenon precludes taking appearance
claims to be straightforwardly objective or subjective.
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I defend an expressivist analysis of appearance claims, on which they
are used to express speakers’ experiential states. On this view, faultless
disagreement arises when speakers express incompatible experiential states,
while nonetheless expressing experiential states they are in fact in. And the
acquaintance inferences arises because when a speaker makes an appearance
claim, one can infer that they are in an experiential state of the sort expressed
by the utterance.
My analysis covers not only appearance language, but experiential lan-
guage more generally, which encompasses both appearance language and the
evaluative language of personal taste (e.g. ‘tasty’, ‘interesting’). Indeed, both
faultless disagreement and the acquaintance inference have been associated
primarily with evaluative vocabulary. I argue, however, that these features
are not especially associated with evaluative language. The language of per-
sonal taste falls in the intersection of the evaluative and the experiential;
but these puzzling features are due to experientiality. The investigation of
appearance language is crucial for identifying the source of these features,
for it includes claims that are experiential but not evaluative.
Appearance discourse also offers insight into epistemic notions, like ad-
equacy of evidence. This comes out in my investigation of the acquain-
tance inference with appearance claims, which examines behavior with no
analogue in the more widely-discussed evaluative cases. Some appearance
claims (e.g. ‘Tom looks like he’s cooking’) require acquaintance with a spe-
cific stimulus (Tom), while others (e.g. ‘Tom looks like he’s well organized’)
just require acquaintance with something evidentially-relevant (like Tom’s
clutter-free office). Making use of experimental work, I argue that these
two forms of acquaintance inference display our sensitivity, in discourse, to
fine-grained evidential distinctions, for instance between transient properties
(like cooking) and standing ones (like being well-organized). Appearance
claims can thus serve to express our evidence. This integrates smoothly with
the expressivist analysis I offer, as experience is a source of evidence about
the world. Thus, in expressing experiential states, we can at the same time
express our evidence.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The challenge: objectivity and subjectivity in ap-
pearance talk
When we say that a dress looks blue, or that a musical instrument sounds off-
key, or that a soup smells like it contains nutmeg, what do we communicate?
With claims about appearances like these we seem to communicate both
about the objective world and about our subjective experience.1 This comes
out in two puzzling features of appearance claims: faultless disagreement,
and the acquaintance inference. Each of these poses a challenge to viewing
appearance claims, like (1), either on the model of straightforwardly objective
claims, as in (2-a), or on the model of explicitly subjective ones, as in (2-b).
(1) The soup smells like it contains nutmeg.
(2) a. The soup contains nutmeg.
b. The soup smells to me like it contains nutmeg.
Subjective experience figures in simple unrelativized claims about ap-
pearances, like (1), in a unique way. Consider, first, cases of faultless dis-
agreement, where speakers disagree, and yet neither seems to be mistaken.
Speakers may faultlessly disagree about appearances, as in (3), for instance:
(3) A and B are both looking at a dress, but have different experiences
of its color.
1Appearance claims, for my purposes, are those with the main verbs ‘look’, ‘sound’,
‘smell’, ‘taste’, ‘feel’, and ‘seem’.
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A: The dress looks blue.
B: No, it doesn’t.
There is a felt incompatibility here, just as with disagreement over ordinary
objective claims. But assuming the speakers have different visual experi-
ences of the dress, neither seems to be mistaken. Which appearance claim a
speaker correctly makes depends not just on the objective world, but on their
subjective experience of it. Having a certain visual experience of the dress
seems to secure each speaker’s claim that the dress looks a certain color. This
differs from the role of such experience when it comes to an objective claim,
say that the dress is blue. If speakers disagree about whether the dress is
blue, one of them is simply mistaken (assuming the dress is all one color) —
though each might have decent grounds for their claim, given their visual ex-
periences. Visual experiences often justify objective claims, but they do not
make them faultless in the sense that they make appearance claims faultless.
To put it another way, there is a felt sufficiency of a certain visual expe-
rience, when it comes to making a corresponding appearance claim. Having
a visual experience in which the dress looks blue to you is all you need to
be faultless in saying that the dress looks blue. In this respect, the simple
appearance claim is similar to an explicitly subjective claim, say that the
dress looks blue to you. But faultless disagreement also precludes viewing
appearance claims as equivalent with such subjective reports. For with those
claims, there is no felt incompatibility, as we see by the infelicity (signaled
by ‘#’) of the expression of disagreement in (4).
(4) A: The dress looks blue to me.
# B: No, it doesn’t look blue to me.
Cases of faultless disagreement about appearances make vivid the felt suffi-
ciency of a certain perceptual experience with respect to appearance claims.
It’s what makes it seem like both speakers are in a sense “getting things
right.” In this respect, the simple appearance claims are of a piece with
the explicitly subjective ones. And yet, that is not enough to do away with
the felt incompatibility between the appearance claims. In this respect, the
simple appearance claims are of a piece with objective ones. The challenge
posed by faultless disagreement is to make sense of the role of experience
in appearance discourse in a way that allows for this seemingly two-faced
behavior of simple unrelativized appearance claims.
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The puzzling role of experience in appearance discourse also comes out
through the acquaintance inference: the inference from an utterance to the
conclusion that the speaker has some relevant first-hand acquaintance. For
instance, if a speaker says that the dress looks blue, one will infer that they
have seen it, as shown in (5). That this inference is licensed is brought out by
the infelicity of the utterance when it’s made clear that the speaker doesn’t
have the relevant acquaintance, as in (6).
(5) A: The dress looks blue.  A has seen the dress.
(6) #The dress looks blue, but I haven’t seen it.
Initially, the acquaintance inference may seem to support a view of appear-
ance claims on which they are similar to explicitly subjective reports.
(7) A: The dress looks blue to me.  A has seen the dress.
(8) #The dress looks blue to me, but I haven’t seen it.
Indeed, if anything, the data points in (7)–(8) are even clearer than in the
simple appearance ones, in (5)–(6). Both may be described as revealing a felt
necessity of experience when it comes to making the corresponding claims.
But the necessity of experience with unrelativized appearance claims is im-
portantly different from the phenomenon with the explicitly subjective ones.
Without the given experience, the subjective claims cannot be true. The
dress can’t look blue to me if I’ve never seen it. It is part of the truth-
conditions of the subjective claim that someone has had the given visual
experience. This isn’t the case with the bare appearance claims. Just be-
cause I haven’t seen the dress, doesn’t mean it can’t look blue, after all. In
this respect, the appearance claims are similar to ordinary objective ones —
where, for instance, the dress being blue doesn’t depend on anyone seeing it.
But again, the appearance claims are also distinct from the objective ones,
in that with objective claims there is no felt necessity of a given kind of ex-
perience at all, as shown in (9), which is not infelicitous in the way that (8)
is.
(9) The dress is blue, but I haven’t seen it.
The challenge posed by the acquaintance inference, then, is to make sense
of the felt necessity of experience when it comes to making simple appear-
ance claims (making good on their difference with straightforwardly objec-
3
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tive claims), but in a way that doesn’t build that experience into the truth-
conditions of the claims (making good on their difference with explicitly
subjective claims).
Both faultless disagreement and the acquaintance inference thus bring out
the unique behavior of simple appearance claims. They present challenges
for assimilating these claims to either ordinary objective claims or explicitly
subjective ones.
1.2 Preview of solution: expressing experiences
I address both challenges through an expressivist analysis of appearance
claims. On this view, appearance claims are used to express speakers’ expe-
riential states, though they are not used to assert that one is in such states.
Faultless disagreement then arises when speakers express incompatible expe-
riential states, while nonetheless expressing experiential states they are in.
And the acquaintance inferences arises because an expression of an experi-
ential state is insincere if the speaker is not in fact in that state. Thus, when
a speaker makes an appearance claim, one is licensed to infer that they are
in an experiential state of the sort expressed by the utterance.
Appearance language is also of interest for reasons that go beyond its own
puzzling features. Examination of appearance language is crucial for better
understanding debates that have been going on in philosophy of language
and linguistics surrounding another type of vocabulary, namely predicates
of personal taste, like ‘tasty’ and ‘interesting’. Predicates of personal taste
are different from (at least some) appearance predicates in that they are
evaluative. But they are similar to appearance predicates in the way they
implicate subjective experience. Indeed, both faultless disagreement and the
acquaintance inference have been associated in previous literature primarily
with evaluative vocabulary, like predicates of personal taste, as well as aes-
thetic adjectives, like ‘beautiful’. While this has led many to associate these
features with evaluation, my approach suggests this to be misguided. The
experiential expressivism that I develop accounts for faultless disagreement
and the acquaintance inference with all experiential language: a class that
encompasses both appearance language and the evaluative language of per-
sonal tastes. The language of personal taste falls in the intersection of the
evaluative and the experiential; but these puzzling features are due to expe-
rientiality. The investigation of appearance language is crucial for identifying
the source of these features, for it includes claims that are experiential but
4
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not evaluative. At the same time, however, we can understand why evalu-
ative language was a tempting foil in this area. Experiential reactions are
often the basis of evaluative claims, and different such reactions in different
people are often the basis for their differing evaluations.
Appearance discourse is also a window through which to examine how
we communicate about our evidence. Many appearance claims, such as (10),
communicate that one has appearance-based evidence for some state of af-
fairs.
(10) A: John looks like he’s tired.
 A has visual evidence that John is tired.
This function of expressing our evidence also integrates smoothly with the
expressivist analysis I offer. Experience is, after all, a source of evidence
about the world. Thus, in expressing experiential states, we can at the same
time express our evidence.
Overall, I present a view according to which the experiential meaning of
both predicates of personal taste and appearance predicates is the source of
their puzzling behavior, in the form of faultless disagreement and the ac-
quaintance inference. Simple claims of both kinds serve to express features
of speakers’ experiences of the world. But the various roles that such ex-
perience plays for us — including as a basis of evaluation and as a source
of evidence — have the result that this behavior can take on quite different
appearances (if you will) in different cases. Variety in the use of appearance
language and the language of personal taste is real; but experientiality pro-
vides a unifying core, on the basis of which that variety can be systematically
understood.
1.3 Overview of chapters
I will turn next, in Chapter 2 (adapted from Rudolph 2018), to a discussion
focusing primarily on faultless disagreement. I will show that disagreement
about appearances can have just the same markers of faultless disagreement
as the better-known cases of disagreement about matters of personal taste.
Moreover, I argue that the source of faultless disagreement in cases about
both appearances and personal tastes is the role of experience in these areas
of discourse, rather than anything special about evaluation. Thus, the main
goal of this chapter is to unify the discussion of faultless disagreement across
all cases involving experiential language — a category that includes both the
5
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evaluative language of personal taste as well as the not necessarily evaluative
language of appearances.
In addition to this, the discussion of faultless disagreement about appear-
ances accomplishes two further goals towards developing my overall picture
of appearance discourse. First, it includes an overview of faultless disagree-
ment across a variety of appearance cases. This reveals appearance language
to share features not only with the language of personal taste, but also with
epistemic and comparative vocabulary. And second, it offers an opportunity
to take stock of the theoretical options for accounting for faultless disagree-
ment about both personal tastes and appearances.
In Chapter 3 (adapted from Rudolph 2019a,b), I turn to the acquain-
tance inference with appearance claims. In simple cases, the acquaintance
inferences of claims about personal tastes and appearances seem exactly par-
allel. However, once we recognize the greater complexity allowed by appear-
ance reports, we see novel and challenging behavior emerge — behavior with
no analogue in claims about personal tastes. For instance, some appearance
claims, like (11), require acquaintance with a specific stimulus (in this case,
Tom).
(11) Tom seems like he’s cooking.
Others, however, like (12), just require acquaintance with something evidentially-
relevant (like Tom’s clutter-free office).
(12) Tom seems like he’s well-organized.
Thus, this chapter connects the discussion of the acquaintance inference from
philosophy and linguistics with a different debate in linguistics over the so-
called “perceptual source” (or what said to be perceived) in copy raising con-
structions.2 I show, with the help of experimental results, that the two main
approaches to the perceptual source from previous literature are inadequate,
and I propose a new one, which takes seriously the role of the appearance
reports in question for communicating about our perceptual evidence. I also
2These are constructions, of which both (11) and (12) are examples, where the ap-
pearance verb has an embedded ‘like’-clause that contains a pronoun (or “copy”) that
corefers with the matrix subject, as illustrated in (i).
(i) Tom seems like he’s cooking.
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show that the contrast between the acquaintance inferences in (11) and (12)
displays our sensitivity, in discourse, to fine-grained evidential distinctions,
for instance between transient properties (like cooking) and standing ones
(like being well-organized).
The discussion in Chapter 3 remains neutral about the origins or source
of the acquaintance inference. There, I take the acquaintance inference for
granted, and explore its more fine-grained behavior: how the precise acquain-
tance requirements differ importantly across different appearance reports. In
Chapter 4, I turn to the more foundational question of the source of the
acquaintance inferences of appearance reports. After reviewing major past
approaches, I opt for an expressivist analysis according to which appearance
reports, and indeed all experiential claims, are used to express features of
speakers’ experiential states. Moreover, I hold that the expressivist analysis
does the best holistic job of accounting for both the acquaintance inference
and faultless disagreement.
Predicates of personal taste are not the only evaluative terms that have
been proposed to give rise to faultless disagreement and the acquaintance
inference. Aesthetic and moral language also arguably display them in some
form. I thus conclude in Chapter 5 by considering how the experiential ap-
proach I’ve developed for experiential language — which includes predicates
of personal taste, but not all evaluative vocabulary — interacts with possible
views about evaluative language more broadly.
7
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Experience, evaluation, and
evidence in disagreement
Speakers disagree about things all the time. Remembering some event dif-
ferently from you, I might claim that it took place on a Tuesday, while you
claim it was a Wednesday. We might have no way to check who is right. But
nothing about ordinary thought or language leads us to doubt that there is
an objective truth of the matter. One of us is just getting things wrong.
Disagreements about matters of personal taste often feel different. After
we’ve both tried some coconut cake, I might claim that it’s tasty, while
you claim that it’s gross. If we’re both basing these claims on our differing
gustatory experiences of the cake, it’s dissatisfying to insist that one of us is
just getting things wrong. And yet there is a conflict. What I assert, you
reject. We might “agree to disagree,” but we do, nonetheless, disagree.
Let us call disagreements fitting this description cases of faultless dis-
agreement (where this label is understood to carry no implications about
how theoretically to account for such cases). Faultless disagreement makes
it seem like truth in the domain in question is not absolute, but instead
can vary from perspective to perspective. It’s not just that we can’t check
whether the cake is in fact tasty; rather, we’re inclined to say that from my
perspective, it’s true that it is, while from yours, it’s false.
The same conclusion can be reached based on cases of faultless retraction,
where a speaker must take back an earlier claim, which was nonetheless made
without mistake. When I was a child, I insisted that coconut was gross. I
now think it’s delicious. While I take back my earlier claim, it’s odd to
say that I was mistaken in making it. After all, my gustatory experience of
8
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coconut at the time was of just the right kind to support the claim that it’s
gross. It’s natural to think that from my past perspective, it was true that
it was gross, while from my current perspective, it’s false.
I will call faultless disagreement and faultless retraction relativist effects,
as both pull us away from an absolute view of truth about the claims involved.
Do relativist effects in discourse about matters of personal taste show that
truth about personal taste is not absolute? This question has been the sub-
ject of much debate by theorists in philosophy of language and linguistics in
recent years. I do not weigh in on this debate in this chapter. Rather, I focus
on the related but less-discussed question of what aspect of the meaning of
the terms involved underlies their apparently relativist behavior. What kind
of difference in perspective are these terms sensitive to, when they give rise
to faultless disagreement and retraction?
There is a tendency to associate the seemingly variable truth of claims
about personal taste with variation in speakers’ evaluative standards.1 But
while these sorts of claims are certainly evaluative, this is not the only dis-
tinctive thing about them. They are, more specifically, evaluative claims
made on the basis of a certain experiential response. Speakers’ evaluations
differ; but this, at least often, has its source in their different experiences
of the stimulus in question. Can we isolate the effects of this experience-
dependence, from effects due properly to evaluative differences? Luckily, the
English language includes terms that allow us to do precisely this.
The term at the center of discussion about relativist effects in discourse
about personal taste, ‘tasty’, is, after all, synonymous with the complex
expression, ‘tastes good’. To the extent that the former gives rise to relativist
effects, the latter does too, and presumably for the very same reason. So,
we may ask, are relativist effects with ‘tastes good’ due to something about
‘tastes’, something about ‘good’, or something about their combination?2
On its own, the appearance verb, ‘tastes’, does no evaluative work. It can
be combined with any number of adjectives (to form predicates like ‘tastes
1Ko¨lbel (2002) treats personal taste and aesthetic claims together in this respect.
Lasersohn (2005) and MacFarlane (2014) don’t commit to doing so, but wonder whether
weightier evaluative terms, like aesthetic and moral predicates, also call for relativist treat-
ment, recognizing that this would be a significant philosophical consequence. That some-
thing about evaluation is to blame for relativist effects with predicates of personal taste
is also reinforced by a tradition of relativism about evaluative judgments about morality,
found for example in Harman 1975.
2See MacFarlane 2014, p. 142.
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vegan’, ‘tastes rotten’, etc.), and the result is not an evaluative predicate,
unless the adjective on its own is. We are thus led to the question of whether
appearance predicates generally — predicates not only about how things
taste, but also about how they look, smell, sound, and feel — give rise to
relativist effects, even when not combined with any evaluative vocabulary.3
I have two main goals in this chapter. First, on the basis of relativist
effects in discourse about appearances, I argue that such effects in discourse
about evaluative matters of personal taste are due to the experientiality of
the vocabulary in question, and not to anything special about evaluation.
Second, I offer an overview of relativist effects in discourse about appear-
ances, a domain so far under-discussed in the recent semantics literature
surrounding relative truth. I do this by distinguishing varieties of faultless
disagreement about appearances, showing how, depending on the case, it
displays similar characteristics to faultless disagreement in other domains —
not only in discourse about matters of taste, but also in discourse involving
epistemic modal and comparative constructions.
The plan for this chapter is as follows. In §2.1, I show that relativist
effects arise with appearance predicates, just as they do with the more famil-
iar evaluative predicates of personal taste. In §2.2, I discuss how prominent
approaches to these effects with predicates of personal taste may be extended
to appearance predicates as well. The parallel behavior of appearance predi-
cates and predicates of personal taste raises the possibility, discussed in §2.3,
that relativist effects in all of these cases have their source in variation in sub-
jective experience, rather than anything special about evaluation. This idea
is bolstered by the existence of a distinctive class of experiential predicates,
which includes both appearance predicates and predicates of personal taste.
However, the hypothesis that all relativist effects with experiential predicates
are due to variation in subjective experience requires some refinement, par-
ticularly once we recognize the variety of uses to which appearance predicates
can be put, and the variety of situations in which faultless disagreement with
them can arise. This variety is the subject of §2.4. In §2.4.1–2.4.2, I show
that appearance predicates can give rise to faultless disagreement for reasons
other than variation in qualitative experience, but still in a way that tracks
differences in experience more broadly. Indeed, in these cases, appearance
3Recall that appearance predicates, for my purposes, are any predicates formed from
a verb of sensory appearance (‘tastes’, ‘looks’, ‘smells’, ‘sounds’, ‘feels’, and ‘seems’),
together with a complement. Examples include the already-mentioned ‘tastes good’ and
‘tastes vegan’, as well as predicates like ‘looks red’ and ‘sounds like a frog’.
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predicates can give rise to faultless disagreement in part for reasons that are
also responsible for faultless disagreement in other, non-experiential cases —
more specifically, with epistemic and comparative language. Then, in §2.4.3,
I argue that there is nonetheless a restricted class of experiential predicates,
which includes predicates of personal taste, for which qualitative experiential
variation remains the most plausible source of relativist effects. Thus, there
is no need to look to anything special about evaluation to find the source of
relativist effects in discourse about matters of personal taste.
2.1 Relativist effects in two domains
In this section, I show that appearance language gives rise to relativist effects.
I do so by presenting relativist effects in the more widely-discussed domain of
personal taste (§2.1.1), and showing that appearance language behaves in just
the same way (§2.1.2).4 This approach will allow us to see that appearance
predicates carry the same interest as predicates of personal taste, as far as
the debate about relative truth is concerned, while remaining neutral about
what particular theoretical approach may best capture the behavior.
To emphasize: What I say about relativist effects in this chapter will
not settle whether they in fact call for a relativist analysis, or whether they
can instead be accounted for adequately within other approaches, such as
contextualism,5 expressivism,6 or objectivism.7,8 (In §2.2, I will review how
these major approaches can account for the observed behavior.) I use the
terms “faultless disagreement,” “faultless retraction,” and “relativist effects”
to label the sort of behavior that, for better or for worse, has motivated
theorists to adopt a relativist notion of truth.9 The present investigation
into relativist effects in discourse about appearances holds interest even for
4In discussing these effects with predicates of personal taste, I draw on previous
literature, including: Ko¨lbel 2004; Lasersohn 2005, 2016; Stephenson 2007; Egan 2010;
MacFarlane 2014.
5See e.g. Pearson 2013; Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Sundell 2011; Cappelen and
Hawthorne 2009; Stojanovic 2007; Glanzberg 2007; Zeman 2017; Zakkou 2019a,b.
6See discussion in MacFarlane 2014, §7.3.
7See e.g. Anthony 2016; Wyatt 2018.
8Stojanovic (2017a) gives a nice overview of the state of the debate.
9See Eriksson and Tiozzo 2016; Palmira 2015; MacFarlane 2014, Chapter 6 for dis-
cussion of different, more theory-laden, ways of characterizing the behavior. Though I
am indebted to MacFarlane’s work in this area, I disregard his advice to stop using the
label “faultless disagreement” altogether. I believe that it remains useful for capturing an
intuitively distinctive kind of disagreement.
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those who reject relativism as the way to account for them; for there still
remains the question of what the difference is between the expressions giving
rise to these effects, as compared with ordinary context-sensitive or clearly
objectivist expressions, with which (as we’ll see shortly) no such effects arise.
My interest in this chapter is in the sources of the discourse effects that lie
behind the debates over relative truth and its alternatives.
2.1.1 Personal tastes
Consider the following dialogue, by now standard in discussions about pred-
icates of personal taste:
(1) Aline and Bob have both tried the same cake. Aline enjoyed it, but
Bob didn’t.
a. Aline: This cake is tasty.
b. Bob: No, it’s not tasty!
Aline and Bob seem to be in disagreement here: they disagree about whether
the cake is tasty. And yet, this disagreement doesn’t seem quite the same
as another sort of disagreement Aline and Bob might have, over an ordinary
factual matter, as in the following:
(2) a. Aline: This cake is vegan.
b. Bob: No, it’s not vegan!
Here, Aline and Bob disagree about whether the cake is vegan. Furthermore,
one of them must clearly be mistaken about what the cake is like. Either
it’s vegan or not, and once the truth of the matter comes out, one of them
will have to admit that they were wrong. But the dispute about taste in (1)
seems different. There, it’s tempting to say that so long as each speaker is
basing their claim sincerely on how they experience the cake, there’s a sense
in which neither is mistaken. The contrast with the purely factual case is
brought out in the following:
(3) a. As far as its taste suggests, this cake is vegan; but maybe it isn’t
(actually) vegan.
b. ?As far as its taste suggests, this cake is tasty; but maybe it isn’t
(actually) tasty.
No matter one’s evidence or experience, it is appropriate to express uncer-
tainty about a purely factual matter, like the cake being vegan. By contrast,
12
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given a certain experience of the cake, it becomes very odd to express un-
certainty about whether the cake is tasty. This is the intuition behind the
faultlessness side of faultless disagreement.10
Perhaps, then, in saying the cake is tasty, Aline is really just saying that
it’s tasty to her. And similarly, Bob is just saying that it isn’t tasty to him.
This would easily make sense of the intuition that neither is mistaken, and
the contrast between (3-a) and (3-b). But now we risk losing the intuition
that the exchange nonetheless involves a disagreement. For the dispute about
taste in (1) is also different from an exchange in which each speaker explicitly
relativizes their claim, as in the following:
(4) Context as in (1).
a. Aline: This cake is tasty to me.
b. #Bob: No, it’s not tasty to me!
Two features distinguish our original disagreement about taste in (1) from
this one. First, the disagreement about taste in (1) licenses explicit markers
of denial, like ‘No’, in a way that the exchange in (4) does not (as indicated
by the ‘#’ mark). Second, this comes along with a difference in the attitudes
it is appropriate for speakers to have towards the various claims in these two
cases. Consider, for instance, what reactions are appropriate for an outside
observer overhearing the dialogues. An observer overhearing (4) can easily
take both Aline and Bob to be making accurate claims — indeed, she ought
to think this, so long as she thinks both of them are being sincere. By
contrast, an observer overhearing the dispute in (1), can’t view both claims
to be accurate: cannot take the cake both to be accurately described as
‘tasty’ and as ‘not tasty’. This fills out the disagreement side of faultless
disagreement.
Faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste is thus a phe-
nomenon distinct from both purely factual disagreement, as in (2), and cases
involving ordinary context-sensitive expressions (e.g. ‘me’), as in (4). Purely
factual cases involve disagreement, but not faultlessness; while explicitly rel-
10MacFarlane (2014, p. 4) gives the following assertion conditions for ‘tasty’ : “If you
know first-hand how something tastes, call it ‘tasty’ just in case its flavor is pleasing to
you, and ‘not tasty’ just in case its flavor is not pleasing to you.” Group-based contextu-
alists, like Pearson (2013), and objectivists, like Anthony (2016), somewhat downplay this
entitlement, but the contrast between the previous two sentences stands. The contrast
between (1-a) and (2-a) can be captured, even if we only take the oddness of claims like
(3-b) to be present as a default.
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ativized cases involve faultlessness, but not disagreement.
Faultless retraction of taste claims — where a speaker must take back a
claim that was made faultlessly — can be characterized similarly. Here is a
case adapted from MacFarlane 2014:
(5) a. It’s 1975 and John is a child. He likes fish sticks.
John: Fish sticks are tasty.
b. It’s 2010 and John is grown up. His tastes have changed and he
no longer likes fish sticks.
John: I take it back, fish sticks aren’t tasty.
The faultlessness here is essentially the same as what we saw above, in the
case of interpersonal faultless disagreement. John’s experience in 1975 is such
that expression of uncertainty about the tastiness of the fish sticks would not
have been appropriate, making his assertion in (5-a) faultless in a sense that
has no analogue in a purely factual case. For instance, if John’s parents
chose to misinform him about the constitution of fish sticks in order to trick
him into eating them, we might take his claim that fish sticks are vegetarian
to have been reasonable in many ways. But still the contrast remains that
uncertainty about whether the fish sticks are vegetarian is coherent in the
face of all this evidence, in a way that uncertainty about whether they’re
tasty, given a certain experience, is not.
Perhaps, then, as a child, John really just meant that fish stick were tasty
to him then. But this fails to make sense of the call for retraction at the later
time.
(6) a. It’s 1975 and John is a child. He likes fish sticks.
John: Fish sticks are tasty to me now.
b. It’s 2010 and John is grown up. His tastes have changed and he
no longer likes fish sticks.
# John: I take it back, fish sticks aren’t tasty to me now.
Just as in the case of disagreement, we can distinguish the retraction present
in discourse about personal taste by two features. First, explicit retraction
(‘I take it back’) is felicitous in (5) in a way that it isn’t in the explicitly
relativized case in (6). And, second, this comes along with a difference in
what attitude adult John should take towards his childhood claims. As an
adult, John should have no trouble viewing his sincere childhood claim in
(6-a) to be accurate. By contrast, he cannot at the later time view his
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childhood claim in (5-a) to be accurate.
2.1.2 Appearances
Now, we’re ready to show that faultless disagreement and retraction also
arise in discourse about appearances. Consider the following two examples
of disagreement about appearances:11
(7) Alex and Briana are looking at the same dress, but have different
experiences of its color.12
a. Alex: That dress looks blue and black.
b. Briana: No, it looks white and gold!
(8) Alex and Briana both tasted the same cake. Alex rarely eats vegan
food and really notices when baked goods lack ingredients like butter
and eggs; Briana is more used to vegan food, so their lack doesn’t
strike her as much.
a. Alex: That cake tastes vegan.
b. Briana: No, it doesn’t taste vegan!
These are cases of faultless disagreement, just as identified in discourse about
personal taste above. First, the disagreement side. In both cases, the lin-
guistic denial, ‘No’, is felicitous, and an observer can’t view both claims as
accurate — can’t view as accurate both that the dress looks blue and black,
and that it looks white and gold (assuming, of course, that it’s just two col-
ors); or that the cake both tastes vegan and fails to taste vegan. And just as
with the case of ‘tasty’ above, we can contrast the patterns of disagreement
in (7) and (8) with what we would get in the nearby explicitly relativized
cases, where the speakers make explicit to whom things appear the way they
do.
(9) Context as in (7).
a. Alex: That dress looks blue and black to me.
b. #Briana: No, it looks white and gold to me!13
11To avoid repetition, I just give cases with ‘tastes’ and ‘looks’ for now. But we could
also easily find cases with ‘smells’, ‘feels’, ‘sounds’, and ‘seems’; and my claims about
appearance language are to be understood to apply to predicates formed with all of these
verbs.
12This situation is similar to one many people experienced in early 2015; see,
e.g. Wikipedia 2017.
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In (9), not only is the explicit denial infelicitous, but an observer could also
easily take both speakers’ claims to be accurate. Thus, there is no disagree-
ment in the sense we’ve identified in the disagreements about appearances
in (7) and (8), as well as in the original disagreement about personal taste
in (1).
Second, the faultlessness side. Just as with sincere assertions about per-
sonal taste, sincere assertions about appearances are faultless in a sense that
has no analogue with purely factual assertions that are merely well-supported
by evidence.
(10) a. As far as its taste suggests, this cake is vegan; but maybe it isn’t
(actually) vegan.
b. ?As far as its taste suggests, this cake tastes vegan; but maybe
it doesn’t (actually) taste vegan.
As noted above, any experience or evidence you like about the cake still
allows for the felicitous expression of uncertainty about whether it’s vegan,
for example, as illustrated in (10-a) (a repetition of (3-a) above). By contrast,
given a certain experience of the cake, the appearance claim — that it ‘tastes
vegan’— is not appropriately doubted. This is why the claim in (10-b) is
odd in a way that (10-a) is not. Thus, the same features of faultlessness and
disagreement that we found in disagreement about matters of personal taste
are found in disagreement about appearance too.
Cases of faultless retraction with appearances are expected when how
something appears to a speaker changes over time. Again, I offer two cases:
(11) a. Jana has just come inside from bright sunlight and looks at a
jacket.
Jana: That jacket looks black.
b. Later, her eyes have adjusted to the light inside.
Jana: I take it back, the jacket looks blue.
(12) a. Admir tastes a cake and finds it dense and oily.
13Note that even the possibility of modification by prepositional phrases like ‘to me’
marks a commonality between taste predicates and appearance predicates, that they don’t
share with factual predicates:
(i) #That dress is blue and black to me.
I return to this in the following section.
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Admir: This cake tastes vegan.
b. Admir’s friend has by now given him samples of a variety of
other cakes, teaching him to discern the taste of butter from
oil. He tastes the original cake again, and with his more refined
powers of discrimination detects some buttery flavor.
Admir: Never mind, this cake doesn’t taste vegan.
The call for retraction is the same here as what we found in the case with
personal taste in (5). In contrast to an explicitly relativized variant, the
changes in experience expressed in (11) and (12) felicitously allow taking back
the earlier claim. And this comes along with not being able to view both
earlier and later claims to be accurate. Finally, the faultlessness is just as we
saw in the discussion of faultless disagreement: given the speaker’s experience
at the time of assertion, the expression of uncertainty about the appearance
claim would have been inappropriate (whereas it always remains appropriate
with purely factual claims, however well-supported by the evidence they may
be).
This empirical discussion shows that the relativist effects previously iden-
tified in discourse about matters of personal taste also show up in discourse
about appearances, even in the absence of any evaluative expressions.14 One
upshot of this is that the range of relativist effects is broader than previously
discussed, and that appearance language deserves a place alongside expres-
sions like predicates of personal taste in the semantic debates over departures
from traditional objectivist semantics.15 In short, we may disagree faultlessly,
and have to retract faultlessly-made claims, not only about whether things
14Some theorists, particularly in linguistics (e.g. Rett (2014)), understand evaluative
expressions very broadly, to include all gradable adjectives. The idea is there’s a sense in
which, even in judging that someone is tall, say, one makes an evaluation, namely that
their height is sufficient for them to count as ‘tall’. So, to be clear: for my purposes,
evaluative expressions are to be understood more narrowly, to include just those (such as
predicates of personal taste, as well as moral and aesthetic predicates) that have valenced
or normative meanings.
15Others have recognized a connection here too. Pearson (2013, p. 118) notes that
first-hand experience effects (which I’ll discuss in the next section, and much more in later
chapters) with taste predicates also show up with ‘seems’, and Ninan (2014, p. 291) points
out that this extends to all appearance verbs. Doran (2015) discusses the semantics of copy
raising constructions, such as in (i), where the appearance verb has a ‘like’-complement
that contains a pronoun that corefers with the main subject.
(i) Tom looks like he’s cooking.
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are tasty, but also about how things taste, and how they look, feel, smell,
and sound. To the extent that truth relativism is motivated for claims about
personal tastes, it’s equally motivated for claims about appearances; and to
the extent that relativist effects with predicates of personal taste may be
captured in other theoretical frameworks, the same goes for appearance lan-
guage — as I review next, in §2.2. But investigation into relativist effects
with appearance language holds interest beyond merely adding another class
of expressions to the discussion. In §2.3 I will turn to the question of what
relativist effects in appearance discourse might reveal about the sources of
such effects in discourse more broadly.
2.2 Capturing relativist effects
The relativist effects discussed above have been taken to motivate semantic
relativism applied to predicates of personal taste. Given that these effects
I’ll discuss a case of disagreement about appearances from her thesis in §2.4.1 below, and
much more about copy raising cases in the following chapters. However, the variety of uses
of appearance language that concern me in this chapter don’t come out just by considering
copy raising cases. For instance, no copy raising appearance report is equivalent to a claim
using a predicate of personal taste. While (ii-a) and (ii-b) can be used equivalently, (ii-c)
is not equivalent with either.
(ii) a. The cake is tasty.
b. The cake tastes good.
c. The cake tastes like it’s good.
Brogaard (2013) considers and rejects the idea that ‘seems’ displays relativist behavior.
She writes:
Suppose we both hear on the radio that there will be a hurricane in our
area. ‘It seems that our home will be flooded,’ I say. You reply that it
does not seem that way. If we are equally rational, one of us has evidence
not available to the other, for example, evidence that the radio station is
notoriously unreliable. In this case, then, we disagree about facts about the
situation. (Brogaard, 2013, p. 223)
This is inconclusive, however. First, it’s not obvious in this case that if neither of us is
irrational, then we must disagree about facts of the situation. But even granting that,
disagreement about facts of the situation doesn’t preclude faultless disagreement. This
is clear from cases of faultless disagreement involving epistemic terms, like ‘might’ and
‘probably’. I discuss the comparison between appearance and epistemic vocabulary in
§2.4.1.
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arise with appearance predicates as well, these predicates should also come in
for scrutiny in the debate over relativism and its alternatives. The broad aim
of this section is thus to situate appearance language in this debate. I begin,
in §2.2.1, by sketching the sort of relativist analysis of taste predicates that
the relativist effects have motivated, and showing how it could be extended
cover appearance predicates as well. In §2.2.2, I step back and consider what
general form an analysis must have if it’s to capture faultless disagreement
and faultless retraction. As I’ve already mentioned, relativism is not the
only style of analysis that has this form (hence my emphasis that the label
“relativist effect” does not commit me to semantic relativism). In §§2.2.3–
2.2.5, I consider how contextualist, expressivist, and objectivist alternatives
could also take this general form, and so could also capture the relativist
effects with taste and appearance predicates. (In Chapter 4, I will break my
neutrality amongst these approaches, giving reasons to think that a version
of expressivism does the best holistic job of capturing what is puzzling and
distinctive about this type of language.
2.2.1 Relativism
Relativism about predicates of personal taste involves two key claims.16 First,
the extensions of predicates of personal taste, like ‘tasty’, are sensitive to a
standard of taste, s.17
(13) [[tasty]]s = λx.x is tasty according to s
The idea is that given different standards of taste, different things may count
as ‘tasty’.
To complete the relativist picture, we have to say what determines the
standard of taste relevant for determining the truth of sentences uttered in
contexts. This brings us to the second relativist claim: that the standard
relevant for determining truth in context is determined by the context in
which the claim is being assessed, and not by the context in which it was
made. We assume that the standard of taste is determined broadly by the
tastes of the agent of the context — so when we’re dealing with a context
in which a claim is being assessed, it’s the assessor’s tastes that go into
determining the standard. The result is that if Bob doesn’t enjoy the cake,
16My presentation of relativism follows MacFarlane 2014. For similar views, see also
Ko¨lbel 2002; Lasersohn 2005; Stephenson 2007; Egan 2010.
17For legibility, I leave out representation of sensitivity to a context, as well as other
parameters plausibly needed for interpretation, like a world and time.
19
Chapter 2. Experience, evaluation, and evidence in disagreement
and so has a standard that doesn’t count the cake tasty, then Aline’s claim
that the cake is tasty is false as assessed by him — no matter that she
herself, who made the utterance, enjoyed the cake, and has a standard that
does count it tasty.
This relativist account makes sense of faultless disagreement and faultless
retraction if we make the further plausible claims that (a) when making an
assertion, one should say things that are true as uttered and assessed at one’s
own present context, (b) one disagrees with claims that are false as assessed
from one’s own present context,18 and (c) one should retract claims that are
false as assessed from one’s own present context.
The relativist analysis thus captures faultless disagreement and retraction
in terms of the truth of the claims involving predicates of personal taste.
Again, assuming your standard of taste is fixed broadly by the foods you
enjoy and dislike, then your sincere taste claims are faultless in the sense
that they are guaranteed to be true — at least as assessed from your own
context. Note that this still leaves some room fallibility, given that not all of
one’s experiences of foods should be given equal weight in determining one’s
standard of taste. For instance, experiences one has right after brushing teeth
should be discounted. And the cross-contextual relations of disagreement and
retraction are captured by the difference in the truth of the taste claims, as
assessed from a context other than the one in which it was uttered.
Extending the relativist analysis to appearance language will again re-
quire two main claims. First, appearance verbs, like ‘tastes’, ‘looks’, etc. are
assigned semantic values that are sensitive to a standard, which I’ll call an
experiential standard, still labeled s.
(14) [[looks]]s = λP.λx.x looks to s as if P (x)
For present purposes, the idea is simply that just as claims about what’s
tasty have truth values relative to a standard, which can vary from person
to person depending what foods they like, so claims about how things taste
(look, etc.) have truth values relative to some standard, which can also vary
across contexts, depending on the appearances objects present to people in
their experience. For example, the dress may look white and gold according
to Alex’s experiential standard, because of the visual experience he has upon
looking at it, but look blue and black according to Briana’s, because of her
18And indeed, in a dispute like (1), both speakers’ claims can’t be assessed true from
any one context, thus capturing the attitude of an observer discussed above.
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different visual experience.
To complete the relativist picture, we add the second claim: that the
standard relevant for determining the truth of an appearance claim is that of
the context of assessment. So if the dress looks white and gold to Alex but
not to Briana, then his claim that the dress looks white and gold is false, as
assessed by her.
Given this framework, we can account for faultless disagreement and fault-
less retraction with appearances in the same way as for matters of taste. The
faultlessness is due to each speaker making a true claim assessed at their own
context, by their own experiential standard; the disagreement is due to each
speaker making a claim that is false as assessed by the other; and retraction
is required, when the speaker’s earlier claim is false as assessed from their
present context.
2.2.2 A recipe for relativist effects
Relativism accounts for the relativist effects in a kind of brute way. Of
course, this will only be plausible when supplemented with a story about
why it makes sense for certain kinds of expressions to give rise to relative
truth, given their use in communication.19 But semantic relativism is not
the only view that can account for the relativist effects. Many theorists
with other more traditional approaches have been resourceful in arguing that
cases of faultless disagreement (and, to a lesser extent, faultless retraction),
like those I discussed in §2.1, don’t in fact lend support to relativism.20
Before considering how some of these approaches could extend to appearance
language in the following subsections, it will be useful to pause and think
about what general form a theory must take, if it’s to be able to say something
about the relativist effects that isn’t completely dismissive.21
19Such stories are given, for example, in MacFarlane 2014, Chapter 12 and Lasersohn
2016, Chapter 11.
20See Stojanovic 2007 and Palmira 2015, among others.
21For example, Glanzberg (2007) is inclined to say that the apparently conflicting intu-
itions of disagreement and faultlessness just never arise together. But this is unsatisfactory,
given how compelling certain cases have seemed to so many people. And, as I’ll discuss
in the next subsection, contextualist views like Glanzberg’s do have resources to capture
faultless disagreement, as I’ve characterized it above. Wyatt (2018) distinguishes between
“corrective” and “upholding” approaches to faultless disagreement, where the former, but
not the latter, seek to explain away the mere appearance of faultless disagreement. But on
the way I am thinking about the phenomenon, faultless disagreement is just an empirical
data point, and so any adequate theory must be able to “uphold” it.
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Generally, relativist effects with predicates of personal taste and appear-
ance predicates motivate an analysis that vindicates the following two claims.
(i) The acceptability of claims with these predicates depends on experi-
ence.
(ii) The relevant experience for determining this acceptability is not simply
the speaker’s.
Part (i) of this characterization captures the faultlessness intuitions discussed
in §2.1, while (ii) captures the disagreement and retraction intuitions.
Alternative analyses of the target expressions can now be approached by
considering how they all take this general form, though in different ways.
Relativism, for instance, fulfills (i) by taking the truth of the claims in ques-
tion to vary depending on a standard that is determined broadly by how a
subject experiences things. And it fulfills (ii) by taking it to be the assessor’s
standard, and not the speaker’s, that is relevant for determining truth in
context.
In the next three subsections, I will show how contextualism, expres-
sivism, and objectivism can also take this general form, and so may also be
able to adequately account for the relativist effects. And I’ll discuss how
such approaches, previously developed for predicates of personal taste, could
be extended to appearance predicates.
2.2.3 Contextualism
Contextualist approaches to predicates of personal taste broadly aim to sub-
sume them into the class of more familiar context-sensitive expressions, like
‘local’ or ‘now’. A simple solipsistic version of contextualism just takes ‘The
cake is tasty’ and ‘The cake is tasty to me’ to mean the same thing, given
the same context of utterance. This kind of view fulfills (i), and so accounts
for the faultlessness of sincere claims of personal taste. It does so by taking
the claims to be about the tastes of the speaker. However, the bane of this
kind of contextualism is that it faces a serious challenge from disagreement
and retraction — or we might say generally, cross-contextual differences in
assessment. After all, if you say you’re at a local bar and I know you’re in
a different city from me, I won’t take myself to disagree with you because
you’re at a bar that isn’t local to me. Or if I say ‘It’s dark now’ at 10 pm, I
won’t feel any pressure to retract my claim the next morning at 8 am when
it isn’t dark anymore. The problem for contextualism is that it seems to
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have the result that the apparently conflicting taste claims made by different
people, or by the same person at different times, are not in fact incompati-
ble; and so it’s mysterious why we should feel the intuitions of disagreement
or retraction. After all, we feel no such intuitions in the cases involving
contextual variation in location or time.
Contextualists have been resourceful in addressing this problem with
cross-contextual assessment, however. There have been two main approaches,
which involve different ways of satisfying part (ii) of the general characteri-
zation from §2.2.2 — that is, different ways of making it such that it’s not
just the experiences of the speaker that matter for the acceptability of claims
of personal taste. I will briefly outline each approach and consider how it
could apply to appearance claims.
First, the contextualist can keep the solipsistic content for taste claims,
and so keep the view that the truth of such claims depends only on the
tastes of the speaker, but hold that the acceptability of the claim to another
person, or to the same person at a later time, depends on more than just its
truth. On this approach, we get cases of disagreement and retraction without
incompatible content. In an idea that traces back to some early versions
of non-cognitivism in metaethics (e.g. Stevenson 1937), the disagreement
between speakers over matters of taste could be due to differences in attitudes
other than beliefs literally expressed by their claims (Huvenes, 2014). Indeed,
such attitudes are often enough to make speakers feel like they’re disagreeing,
as in (15).
(15) Aline and Bob have both tried the same cake. Aline enjoyed it, but
Bob didn’t.
a. Aline: I like this cake.
b. Bob: Seriously?! I don’t like it at all!
Though the beliefs literally expressed here do not conflict, there is a dis-
agreement in some sense. Thus, the first part of this strategy for saving
disagreement for contextualists, employed for instance in Sundell 2011, is
to explain the sense of conflict as disagreement in attitude something like
in (15). However, this can’t be the end of the story, because disagreement in
attitude like this isn’t generally enough to license explicit markers of denial,
like ‘No’ or ‘You’re wrong’, and these are perfectly felicitous in disagreement
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about taste.22
(16) a. Aline: I like this cake.
b. #Bob: You’re wrong, I don’t like it at all!
So the second part of this line of defense is to account for the felicity of lin-
guistic denial by recourse to “metalinguistic disagreement” (see e.g. Plunkett
and Sundell 2013). Such disagreement is due to divergences in the use of lan-
guage, rather than to incompatible propositional contents literally expressed
in the disagreement, and yet nonetheless systematically licenses linguistic
denial. For example, one kind of metalinguistic disagreement discussed by
Sundell (2011) is “manner disagreement,” as in (17), where we see the felic-
itous use of denial ‘No’ to express disagreement.
(17) a. Aman won the game 40-zero.
b. No, he won 40-love. (Sundell, 2011, p. 276)
The particular kind of metalinguistic disagreement that Sundell takes to be
realized in many disputes about taste is “context disagreement.”23 The idea
can be illustrated by distinguishing two ways we might disagree over, for
example, whether Bianca is rich.24
(18) a. Bianca is rich.
b. No, she isn’t rich.
This dispute could be driven by our differing beliefs about how much money
Bianca has, even if we broadly agree on how much money someone has to
have to count as rich. In this case, we would have ordinary nonmetalinguisic
disagreement over incompatible contents. But, presuming ‘rich’ is a context-
sensitive predicate, we could also be having a different sort of dispute. We
might both know how much money Bianca has, but disagree about what
counts as rich — that is, we might disagree about how the contextually de-
termined standard for richness should be set in this case. Given the standard
we each have in mind, we might both have true beliefs about whether she’s
‘rich’. But we disagree, because each of us thinks the other’s standard is
22See also Lo´pez de Sa 2015 on the difference between accounting for the existence of
disagreement, and for the expression of (existent) disagreement.
23Silk (2016) takes a similar approach, though he objects to the term “metalinguis-
tic” (see p. 164, note 9).
24Based on cases discussed in Barker 2002; Richard 2004, among others.
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not the right one to use. We disagree about what linguistic context to be
in. Sundell (2011) holds that something similar is going on in many disputes
about taste.25 Both speakers could be saying something true according to
their own standards (and self-aware disputants can even acknowledge that),
but they disagree over what is the right standard to have.
Notice that the kind of negotiation that would likely take place in context
disagreement looks very similar to what the relativist predicts. In both cases,
the speakers would be trying, as far as possible, to change the standard
of their interlocutor: to change their tastes, or change what they like and
dislike. It’s just that in the contextualist’s case, but not the relativist’s,
we start out with two claims that can both be accurate, even as assessed
from a single context.26 So the choice between this contextualist picture and
the relativist one seems to rest on our judgment about the possible joint
accuracy (as assessed from a single context) of apparently conflicting taste
claims — a choice that I think must be made at least in part based on
general theoretical considerations, for instance, about the role of truth in
norms governing language use, and not just intuitions about cases.
The metalinguistic move is quite powerful for the contextualist. Although
it has mainly been used to save disagreement, it can plausibly save retrac-
25See also Barker 2013. Of course, in disputes about taste, the contextual feature that
is disputed is not just the cutoff for the application of the gradable adjective — or at least
it doesn’t have to be. We can see this from the fact that faultless disagreement about
taste can persist over comparative claims, as in (i); whereas disagreement in (ii) cannot
be faultless.
(i) May be faultless
a. The chocolate cake is tastier than the carrot cake.
b. No, the carrot cake is tastier than the chocolate cake.
(ii) Cannot be faultless
a. Bianca is richer than Carl.
b. No, Carl is richer than Bianca.
This is to say that the ordering of items on a scale of tastiness must vary across con-
texts. This is accounted for as “mapping subjectivity” in Fleisher 2013, and “perspective-
sensitivity” in Silk 2016.
26We might ask why anyone should be motivated to change someone’s mind away from
something they recognize is true. But surely we do this all the time. You don’t like Sam
and I want you to come to like him. It’s not that I think your claim that you don’t like
him isn’t true, but I might still have lots of reason to try to get you to a perspective from
which it no longer would be.
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tion as well — thus securing all the relativist effects within a non-relativist
framework. The metalinguistic view of retraction would hold that one should
retract an earlier claim, if one now has a standard that makes it false, even
if one recognizes that it was true, given the context in which it was origi-
nally made. In effect, retraction becomes a way to signal that one no longer
endorses the standard that one had at the time of the original claim, just as
disagreeing with someone can signal that one does not endorse their standard.
This contextualist approach could also be applied to appearance language.
We would take the truth of appearance claims to depend only on the experi-
ences of the speaker, but make sense of both disagreement and retraction as
targeting the experiential standard at work in the original utterance. So, for
example, Alex and Briana, arguing in (7) over what colors the dress looks to
be, should be understood to argue about what experiential standard is the
appropriate one to have. And when Jana retracts her claim, in (11), that
the dress looks black, after her eyes are adjusted, she’s signaling that she no
longer has an experiential standard that would make that true.
Before moving on to the second main contextualist approach, I would
like to flag a potential difference in how this framework applies to appear-
ance language, compared with the language of personal taste. In making
sense of disagreement about personal taste, we talked of disagreement in at-
titude and negotiation of standards. These ideas don’t as clearly come up
in disagreement about appearances. After all, if the dress looks white and
gold to me, there seems to be little hope of you negotiating me over to seeing
it otherwise. But I don’t think we should take negotiation to be a neces-
sary feature of metalinguistic disagreement. There can be true disagreement
over standards, not only in the appearance cases, but also in the taste cases,
where there’s no room to bring the other over to one’s standard.27 Moreover,
once we consider appearance cases that don’t just have to do with the colors
things look to be, a kind of negotiation often reemerges. When Aline and
Bob disagree over whether the cake tastes vegan, for example, we could eas-
ily see them drawing each other’s attention to various features of the cake’s
27See Egan 2010 on the importance of distinguishing the fruitfulness of a dispute from
its being a true case of disagreement (though he’s working in a different framework).
Kennedy and Willer (2016) also helpfully distinguish between decisions about the use of
terms that can appropriately be settled by stipulation (e.g. what standard to use for the
application of the term ‘rich’) and those that cannot (e.g. whether to count something
‘tasty’). While this is an important distinction, disagreement over both kinds of cases can
be accounted for within the same general approach.
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taste, thus trying to bring the other around to experiencing it in a different
way (to having a different experiential standard) — just as someone trying
to convince a friend that some new food is tasty might try to get them to
experience it in different ways.
Group contextualism is a second style of contextualism that has been
offered for predicates of personal taste. On this approach, taken by Pear-
son (2013) and (partially) by Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009), the truth of
claims about personal taste doesn’t just depend on the tastes of the speaker,
but on the tastes of some group appropriately related to the speaker. It thus
straightforwardly fulfills part (ii) of our recipe for relativist effects, namely,
not having the acceptability of the claims depend solely on the experiences of
the speaker. This allows for a more standard account of cross-contextual as-
sessments than the solipsistic contextualism plus metalinguistic disagreement
package discussed above. Here, the speakers’ claims in cases of disagreement
are straightforwardly incompatible, so long as the relevant groups overlap.
And similarly, in cases of retraction (though the authors mentioned don’t
discuss it), the earlier and later claims will be incompatible for the same
reason.
In giving this account of cross-contextual assessment, group contextual-
ists face a renewed challenge with faultlessness, or part (i) of the recipe. Why
should my experiences secure my taste claim, if the claim depends on tastes
other my own? Pearson (2013) addresses this worry by arguing that one’s
experiences are really only sufficient in this way when they’re normal for the
group — thus somewhat restricting the scope of faultlessness. (In this re-
spect, group contextualism is similar to objectivism, which I’ll discuss below
in §2.2.5.) I will not attempt to adjudicate this issue here, since it doesn’t
bear directly on the project of bringing appearance language onto the scene.
But in ultimately deciding on an analysis of these expressions, it will have
to be carefully considered.
Group contextualism can quite straightforwardly be extended from pred-
icates like ‘tasty’ to ones like ‘tastes vegan’ or ‘looks blue’. Appearance
claims involving the latter will be taken to be true or false depending on the
perceptual experiences of some group of individuals appropriately related to
the speaker. In many cases, this approach seems if anything more plausible
for appearance language than the language of personal taste. For instance,
it’s quite plausible that when we talk about appearances, we mean to be
implicating those that have broadly similar perceptual capacities as we do,
so that things would appear basically the same to them, if in the same cir-
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cumstances.28 For instance, in considering what colors things look to be,
we are not very inclined to take there to be genuine disagreement between
color-blind people and people with normal color vision. And the group con-
textualist can easily capture this by taking the relevant groups in these cases
to be disjoint.
Some theorists, like Glanzberg (2007); Stephenson (2007); Cappelen and
Hawthorne (2009), make room for some mix of contextualist (and, in Stephen-
son’s case, relativist) approaches: taking some taste claims to implicate only
the speaker, some a group, still others the assessor. Such a view can be
applied to appearance language as easily as the non-mixed views can. This
flexible approach can seem appealing, given that it readily allows for a kind
of variety that does seem to be present in discourse about personal taste and
appearances.29 However, this is less of a theory and more of a statement
that “anything goes” — which threatens both not to be explanatory, and to
overgenerate the sorts of interpretations that should be available. (This is
a main criticism that Pearson (2013) levels against Stephenson (2007), for
instance.)
2.2.4 Expressivism
Expressivism about some area of discourse takes the meaning of claims in that
domain to be explained, in the first instance, not by their truth-conditional
content, but rather by the state of mind that speakers express with those
claims. So, for instance, metaethical expressivism takes the meaning of moral
claims to be explained primarily through their function of expressing speak-
ers’ states of mind, such as approval or disapproval, or of accepting some
system of norms, or of planning to do certain things in certain hypothetical
scenarios.30 Extended to the language of personal taste, one could similarly
take claims about tastiness and so on, in the first instance, to express one’s
state of mind of having a certain standard of taste. And extended further
to appearance language, one could take appearance claims to express one’s
28A similar view is also defended by Moltmann (2010), based on the generic ‘one’, used
for instance in:
(i) One can see the painting from the entrance.
29Stojanovic (2007) points out how different possible acceptable continuations of dis-
putes about personal taste show that in some cases, the speaker seems only to be reporting
on their own experiences, while in others, they also seem to place demands on their inter-
locutors.
30See e.g. Ayer 1936; Blackburn 1998; Gibbard 1990, 2003.
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state of mind of having a certain experiential standard, as introduced above
in §2.2.1. There are number of ways to develop this view further, depending
on how one understands the experiential standards in question (in Chapter 4,
for instance, I’ll consider it both in terms of what experiences one actually
has, and in terms of what experiences one is disposed to have).
Expressivism is in a good position to fulfill part (i) of the recipe for rela-
tivist effects. If what experiential standard one has is a function of how one
experiences (or is disposed to experience) various stimuli, and if experiential
claims express one’s possession of a certain experiential standard, then we
can see why having certain experiences oneself would be enough to secure
the claims in question so as to make them faultless.31 Solipsistic contextu-
alism took taste an appearance claims to assert that one has an experience
of a certain kind. Expressivism rejects this, but instead takes the claims
to express something about one’s experience without building this into the
literal content of the claim. But this is just as good for explaining the sense
of faultlessness that attaches to sincere experiential claims.32
31Indeed, MacFarlane (2014, §7.3), in discussing expressivism about personal tastes
on the model of Gibbard (2003)’s plan expressivism, notes that a main difference between
this view and relativism is that the expressivist takes believing that something is tasty
and liking its taste to be the very same state of mind, whereas the relativist allows for
a gap between them. The lack of gap for the expressivist makes faultlessness automatic,
though of course, the relativist can capture it as well. A close tie between having certain
experiences and being able to sincerely make an experiential claim is also very relevant for
thinking about the acquaintance inference, as I’ll return to in Chapter 4. See also Franze´n
2018.
32Some of the theorists mentioned in connection to contextualism in §2.2.3 have views
that are very close to expressivism. For instance, one can take “negotiating tastes” (Barker,
2013), say, to amount to expressing one’s adoption of certain standards, and disputes about
taste to aim at coordinating on such non-factual parameters. Indeed, the expressivist ac-
count of vague terms in MacFarlane 2016 draws on the approach in Barker 2002, but
emphasizes that the negotiation of standards must be viewed not as reducing uncertainty
about the world, but rather as reducing indecision about what standard to adopt. Simi-
larly, there is an expressivist view of taste discourse based on ideas in Barker 2013, where
negotiation of tastes likewise doesn’t reduce worldly uncertainty but rather coordinates
on experiential reactions. Interestingly, though, the idea of “indecision” — apt when it
comes to understanding various options being open for the thresholds of vague terms like
‘rich’ or ‘tall’ — is less apt when it comes to understanding various options for ordering
items according to tastiness being open. This is, I believe, related to the distinction be-
tween matters that can be settled by stipulation and those that cannot (Kennedy and
Willer, 2016) — the latter are the cases where one’s assessment bears an important tie to
experience.
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Moreover, it puts the expressivist in a different and potentially better
position when it comes to fulfilling part (ii) of our recipe. We saw that the
solipsistic contextualist had to appeal to disagreement other than between
literally expressed contents — as the literally expressed contents in dialogues
like (1) and (7) are not in fact in conflict according to the contextualist. So
they instead appeal to disagreement in other attitudes. The expressivist can
just directly explain disagreement in those terms. Experiential standards can
be in conflict (just as planning states can be, for Gibbard). And speakers
don’t accept an experiential standard just because their interlocutor possesses
and sincerely expresses it.
2.2.5 Objectivism
An objectivist approach to predicates of personal taste assimilates them to
ordinary factual predicates, whose meanings and extensions are invariant
across different standards or perspectives. Such an approach easily fulfills
part (ii) of the general characterization from §2.2.2, and so, like group con-
textualism, easily accounts for disagreement and retraction. Its challenge is
with faultlessness and part (i) of the recipe for relativist effects. In what
sense, for an objectivist, does the acceptability of taste claims depend cru-
cially on experience? Like group contextualists, objectivists tend to downplay
this dependence. Still, to capture the contrast between taste predicates and
more obviously factual ones, like ‘vegan’, the objectivist should be able to
say something about why experience seems to play a more central role in the
use of the former than the latter. Here, the objectivist can simply claim an
epistemic role for experience (Wyatt, 2018). But of course, experience can
play an epistemic role in warranting claims that things have more obviously
factual properties, too. The objectivist should say something to explain why
we take the link to be tighter between a certain kind of experience and the
possession of the properties denoted by predicates of taste. One option here,
suggested by the discussion in Ninan 2014, is that not only does a certain
experience give good evidence for the taste claim, but this kind of evidence is
also necessary for being able to warrantedly make the claim. This necessity
is suggested by the oddness of the following.
(19) #This cake is tasty, but I haven’t tried it.
Why there should be this special evidential link between experience and
properties like tastiness is an open question. But to the extent that it is con-
sistent with the properties nonetheless being factual, this link may go some
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way to explaining, as part of an objectivist picture, why there’s nonetheless
a contrast between the role for experience with respect to discourse about
personal taste, as opposed to more prosaically factual discourse. The idea
is that if there’s a certain kind of evidence that is necessary for making a
certain claim, then having that evidence makes you faultless in the sense
illustrated in §2.1.33 This makes it possible for an objectivist about matters
of personal taste to fulfill part (i) in the characterization of what a theory
must be like to capture relativist effects.34
An objectivist view of this kind could equally be applied to appearance
predicates. Moreover, we see the same motivation showing up in this domain,
for the necessity of experience in making the relevant kind of claim.
(20) a. #This cake tastes vegan, but I haven’t tried it.
b. #This dress looks blue and black, but I haven’t seen it.
Thus, this behavior could equally figure in an epistemic account of fault-
lessness about appearances, as it could in such an account about matters
of personal taste. Again, many details remain to be worked out. But my
goal here is simply to show that the same styles of account can make sense
of relativist effects in both domains, and, more generally, to suggest that we
should view appearance language as within the scope of the semantic debates
that have so far largely focused on predicates of personal taste.
2.3 Experiential language
In §2.1, I illustrated relativist effects with appearance language, even in the
absence of any evaluative language. This is relevant to the issue, raised
in the introduction, about the source of relativist effects with predicates of
personal taste. As noted there, the synonymy of ‘tasty’ and ‘tastes good’
raises the question, posed by MacFarlane (2014), about whether we should
33How do we make the leap from necessity, which is what is illustrated in (19), to the
felt sufficiency that lies behind the faultlessness intuition? One idea is that not only is the
experience a necessary piece of evidence, but that it trumps (at least as a default) other
sources of evidence about the properties in question.
34Anthony (2016) also defends an objectivist view, and argues that faultlessness ought
not to be a target for semantic theorizing at all. However, his argument depends on a
substantially different understanding of faultlessness from the one I’m relying on here, and
one that I think doesn’t quite get at the heart of the issue concerning faultless disagree-
ment. More specifically, he takes faultlessness to require that the two speakers don’t view
each other as mistaken, while my characterization allows this.
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locate the source of relativist effects with ‘tastes good’ in something about
‘tastes’, something about ‘good’, or something about their combination. The
cases of faultless disagreement and faultless retraction with predicates like
‘tastes vegan’ and ‘looks white and gold’ show that appearance language on
its own gives rise to these effects — since the effects are clearly not present
with factual predicates like ‘vegan’ and ‘white and gold’ on their own. Thus,
it’s an open possibility that relativist effects with both predicates of personal
taste and appearance predicates have nothing to do with evaluation, and
everything to do with the role of subjective experience in their interpretation
or use.
Bylinina (2017) and Stojanovic (2017b) identify a class of experiential
predicates. These predicates are interpreted relative to an experiencer ar-
gument, which may be left implicit, as in (21-a), or made explicit in an
experiencer prepositional phrase headed by ‘to’ or ‘for’, as in (21-b).
(21) a. This cake is tasty.
b. This cake is tasty to/for Sam.
I remain neutral about the precise semantic contribution of experiencer prepo-
sitional phrases, and whether we should in fact take there to an implicit expe-
riencer argument in sentences like (21-a). The key point I wish to take from
these theorists is that predicates of personal taste are experiential, whereas
other evaluative predicates, for example moral ones, are not.
Taking the licensing of experiencer prepositional phrases as a diagnostic
for experiential predicates, it’s clear that appearance predicates are expe-
riential as well. Indeed, the contrast between bare cases, like (22-a), and
relativized ones, like (22-b), was key in the illustration of relativist effects in
the previous section.
(22) a. That cake tastes vegan.
b. That cake tastes vegan to Sam.
Bylinina further observes that experiential predicates give rise to a first-
hand experience requirement, or acquaintance inference, in utterances of un-
embedded sentences. This requirement comes out in the observation that
utterances as in (23) are deviant.
(23) #This cake is tasty, but I’ve never tasted it.
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Precisely the same requirement is present with appearance predicates, some-
thing that is noted in previous discussion of the requirement in Pearson 2013
and Ninan 2014.35
(24) a. #That cake tastes vegan, but I’ve never tasted it.
b. #That dress looks white, but I’ve never seen it.
Not only do predicates of personal taste and appearance predicates both
give rise to relativist effects, but both are also experiential. Might the rela-
tivist effects then be traceable to the role of experience in the use of these
predicates? Indeed, it seems fairly intuitive that these predicates give rise
to faultless disagreement and faultless retraction precisely because speakers’
experiences differ, and can change over time. Thus, I would like to frame the
following:
Subjective experience hypothesis Relativist effects with ex-
periential predicates are due to variation in subjective experience
across perspectives.
If the subjective experience hypothesis is correct, then when faultless dis-
agreement arises with predicates of personal taste and appearance predicates,
it’s because the speakers have different subjective experiences of the stimulus;
and when faultless retraction arises with these predicates, it’s because the
speaker’s subjective experience of the stimulus has changed over time. This
would not rule out that the perspectives also differ in other ways. For in-
stance, based on different subjective experiences, speakers may also be led to
different evaluations of some subject matter. The key point of the hypoth-
esis, however, is that the relativist effects with experiential predicates are
explained by the difference in experience. On this picture, experiential and
evaluative predicates form distinct but overlapping classes, with predicates
of personal taste falling into the intersection. According to the subjective
experience hypothesis, relativist effects arise due to the experiential.
35Note that in various embedded contexts, as in (i), the acquaintance inference is not
present (it is “obviated”, as described in Anand and Korotkova 2018).
(i) a. If the cake is tasty, I’ll try some (I haven’t yet).
b. The cake might be tasty (I still haven’t tried it).
This pattern of obviation is parallel for sentences with predicates of personal taste and
appearance predicates.
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This possibility is significant for determining the scope of relativist effects
in natural language. If it’s right, theorists shouldn’t jump from the recog-
nition of relativist effects with predicates of personal taste to the view that
all evaluative language must behave relativistically; nor need they worry, if
they opt for a relativist analysis of experiential language, that they will need
to abandon objectivism for weighty evaluative language, for instance about
morality. Note that the hypothesis does nothing to rule out independently
recognizing faultless disagreement about non-experiential evaluative matters
(as I’ll discuss more in Chapter 5). It simply carves up the space in a new
way, one that doesn’t bias us in towards assuming that puzzling behavior
with taste predicates is due to their evaluative meaning.
On the flip side, however, looking at things in the way I’ve suggested
also raises some new potential challenges for the relativist. Now, they have a
whole new broader class of expressions — the experiential — for which they
should be able to motivate the relativist approach. But if the comparisons
I have drawn in §2.1 were convincing, this should not be an unwelcome
challenge. Evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the same kind of relativist
behavior exhibited by evaluative predicates of personal taste is also exhibited
by experiential language more broadly.
2.4 Varieties of faultless disagreement
In this section, I will look more closely at a variety of cases of faultless
disagreement with experiential predicates. It will emerge in §§2.4.1–2.4.2 that
the subjective experience hypothesis is questionable, though still tenable, as a
fully general claim about relativist effects in this domain. (I’ll only use cases
of faultless disagreement to illustrate this, though cases of retraction would
do just as well. Indeed, for my purposes, faultless retraction might be thought
of as a special case of faultless disagreement: namely faultless disagreement
with one’s former self.) However, the hypothesis is very plausible, I will
argue in §2.4.3, for a restricted class of experiential predicates, which includes
predicates of personal taste.
2.4.1 Epistemic cases
In a case like the dress dispute, it is quite plausible that the faultless dis-
agreement is due to differing visual experiences of the two speakers. Indeed,
I built this into the description of the case, repeated here, when I used it to
motivate the existence of faultless disagreement about appearances.
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(7) Alex and Briana are looking at the same dress, but have different
experiences of its color.
a. Alex: That dress looks blue and black.
b. Briana: No, it looks white and gold!
But in the second case of faultless disagreement about appearances, repeated
next, the same is not obviously the case.
(8) Alex and Briana both tasted the same cake. Alex rarely eats vegan
food and really notices when baked goods lack ingredients like butter
and eggs; Briana is more used to vegan food, so their lack doesn’t
strike her as much.
a. Alex: That cake tastes vegan.
b. Briana: No, it doesn’t taste vegan!
One could say that in this sort of situation, Alex and Briana’s gustatory
experiences must differ. One might argue that if one of them is picking up
on some flavor more than the other is, then there must be some difference
in their subjective experiences. I don’t want to rule this out. But I don’t
want to rely on it either. It is an issue that will presumably not be answered
just by an examination of discourse about appearances. Just considering the
dialogue, it seems to me an open possibility that as far as we can make sense of
the qualitative identity of experiences, Alex and Briana’s experiences might
be the same. And yet, given their different past experiences and associations
with the flavors, they notice different features of the cake’s flavor, and so
draw different conclusions about the likely properties of the cake.
An example from Doran 2015 makes an even stronger case against a
difference in subjective experience being necessary for faultless disagreement
about appearances.
(25) a. Sam: The man on that bench looks like he’s just been dumped.
b. Sue: Nuh-uh, he looks like he’s got bad stomach cramps.
In describing what might be going on this case, she writes:
Suppose that the man on the bench is a total stranger, and nei-
ther Sam nor Sue will ever get to know what sort of day he was
having. [. . . ] Each speaker seems to be expressing her own im-
pressions of the situation, much like two speakers expressing their
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own gustatory impressions of a particular batch of chili. [. . . ]
Sam’s experiences with the world up until this point will have
led her to form a series of beliefs and associative links pertaining
to observable things in the world and their potential underlying
causes. Perhaps in her experience, people who have recently en-
dured heartbreak typically exhibit whatever facial expression the
man on the bench is currently making. But Sue’s experiences of
the world may be different, and perhaps for her, the man’s ex-
pression is characteristic of abdominal pain. (Doran, 2015, p. 22)
Here, the disagreement between Sam and Sue is explained in a way that
doesn’t seem to require them to have different visual experiences of the man
on the bench. Instead, the two speakers’ different past experiences and asso-
ciations lead them to draw different conclusions based on their visual percep-
tion of the man. In this case, as well as in (8), the differences in perspective
that give rise to the relativist effects don’t seem like they must be differences
in perceptual experience. Rather, the perspectives differ because the speak-
ers’ (possibly alike) experiences have different informational import as to the
likely properties of things.
Some theorists, e.g. Macpherson (2012), have argued that background be-
liefs influence the quality of perceptual experience. More recently, however,
evidence for such cognitive penetration of experience has been cast into doubt
by, e.g. Firestone and Scholl (2016). It is thus probably safest to go forward
under the assumption that, at least in cases like (25), the speakers’ experi-
ences may be qualitatively alike, despite other differences in their cognition.
(Furthermore, as I’ll return to below, my main points can be maintained,
even if cognitive penetration takes place in all of these cases.)
Alternatively, it may be useful to distinguish narrower and broader senses
of “experience.” Experience in the narrow sense stops at what we might think
of as the “immediate outputs of the perceptual module.” This will include
just qualitative features of experience, like color, shape, and certain kinds of
smells and flavors and textures for the senses other than vision. Experience
more broadly can be thought of as the information that the observer takes
in through their perceptual apparatus, and this will often go much beyond
the mere qualitative features.36 I will not attempt to draw a sharp line
between experience in these senses. But I believe it tracks a real and intuitive
36Thanks to Jennifer Matey for comments on this issue.
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distinction, and once we recognize it, then we realize that it is only if we’re
thinking of experience narrowly-construed that it is implausible that there
is an experiential difference in the cases of faultless disagreement in (8) and
(25). If, instead, we think of experience more broadly, as all the deliverances
of one’s perception, then it does seem correct, as the subjective experience
hypothesis states, that the speakers have different experiences in these cases.
In the case of (8), the one has experiences suggesting that the cake is vegan,
and the other does not.
The appearance reports in (7), (8) and (25) give rise to faultless disagree-
ment when speakers experiences support different conclusions about what is
the case. These appearance reports have features that philosophers of per-
ception have previously associated with what they call epistemic uses of ap-
pearance language. Epistemic appearance predicates are used to convey what
appearances suggest about the way things really are.Jackson (1977) writes
that with these uses (of ‘looks’), “I am expressing the fact that a certain body
of visually acquired evidence [. . . ] supports the proposition” (p. 30).37 That
appearance predicates of this sort should give rise to faultless disagreement
is in fact expected, given the similarities between them and information-
sensitive expressions, like epistemic modals and probability adverbs — which
have widely been discussed as giving rise to relativist effects.38 For example,
consider the following case with ‘probably’,39 and compare with the variant
with ‘looks’ in (27), appropriate in just the same context.
(26) Fat Tony is a mobster who has planted evidence of his death at the
docks. Andy and Beth observe the planted evidence. Andy has no
idea that Fat Tony had a motive to fake his death and is convinced
(though not completely certain) that he is dead. Beth, however,
knows that he had such a motive and is suspicious (though doesn’t
rule out that the evidence is genuine).
37See also Chisholm 1957; Brogaard 2014, 2018.
38In the epistemic modal literature, there is debate about the merits of relativist and
non-relativist approaches to dealing with this behavior, just as there is in the literature
on predicates of personal taste. See, e.g., Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011; Dowell
2011; Yalcin 2011; Egan 2007; Egan et al. 2005. Again, my point doesn’t depend on any
particular resolution of the debate. Rather, my concern is with what kind of difference
in perspective gives rise to relativist effects; and in the case of epistemic vocabulary, it is
differences in the information the speakers have.
39The case is adapted from Khoo 2015; Knobe and Yalcin 2014; I change the modal
from ‘might’ to ‘probably’ to create a closer parallel with the appearance case.
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a. Andy: Fat Tony is probably dead.
b. Beth: No, it’s more likely that he faked his death.
[I.e. It isn’t probable that he’s dead.]
(27) Context as in (26).
a. Andy: It looks like Fat Tony is dead.
b. Beth: No, it doesn’t.
Faultless disagreement arises over claims with ‘might’ or ‘probably’, when
the speakers have different total bodies of evidence at their disposal. Sim-
ilarly, faultless disagreement arises over epistemic appearance claims, when
the speakers have different bodies of evidence, acquired through the relevant
sense modality, at their disposal. In cases where all the relevant information
seems to be that acquired through perception, as in the previous examples,
dialogues of both kinds feel appropriate, and roughly equivalent. There is
a difference, however, which I mention briefly in order to further clarify the
comparison being proposed. Non-appearance informational expressions have
been recognized to give rise to what Yalcin (2007) terms epistemic contra-
dictions, as in (28-a) and (28-b). However, epistemic appearance claims, as
in (28-c), give rise to no such contradictions.
(28) a. #Fat Tony might be dead, but he isn’t.
b. #Fat Tony is probably dead, but he isn’t.
c. It looks like Fat Tony is dead, but he isn’t.
This contrast is expected, however, once we recognize that epistemic ap-
pearance claims are based on a restricted body of information — restricted
to that acquired through the relevant sense modality. Traditional epistemic
modals and probability adverbs, by contrast, are based on one’s total body
of information. It’s not coherent to claim that all of one’s information leaves
something open, or makes it probable, while then going on to deny that it’s
the case. However, it can be perfectly coherent to claim that one’s visually-
acquired information makes something probable, while then denying that it’s
the case.
We have thus found one group of cases of faultless disagreement about
appearances — faultless disagreement about epistemic appearances — where
we shouldn’t assume that what differs across the two perspectives is the
narrow, qualitative experiences of the speakers. Instead, what differs seems
to be the informational import of those experiences. Because of this sort
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of case, and more to be discussed shortly, if we maintain the subjective
experience hypothesis, it must be stated carefully, so as not to presume that
the source of relativist effects with all experiential language is differences in
experience in the narrow sense. However, as I’ll argue in §2.4.3, variation in
this narrow kind of subjective experience does remain a plausible source of
relativist effects within a restricted class of experiential predicates.
2.4.2 Comparative cases
There is another type of case that casts doubt on a completely general sub-
jective experience hypothesis, if restricted to narrow experience. Consider,
for instance, the following disagreements about appearances:
(29) Max has put on very realistic face paint for Halloween, to make
himself look like he has some kind of illness. Alicia and Bob both
know it’s just a costume.
a. Alicia: Max looks like he has chicken pox.
b. Bob: No, he looks like he has measles.
(30) Alicia and Bob smell a cheap, synthetically-scented perfume.
a. Alicia: The perfume smells like roses.
b. Bob: No, it smells like lavender.
In these cases, there is no question about the actual properties of things —
it’s uncontroversial that Max has neither the chicken pox nor the measles,
and it’s uncontroversial that no real flowers went into manufacturing the
perfume. The question is rather what the appearances of things are more
or less similar to. Appearance reports uses in this way have been called
comparative. Jackson (1977), for instance, writes that in these cases, ‘It
looks like an F’ seems to mean that it looks the ways Fs normally do (p. 31).40
Two speakers can disagree over comparative judgments like these, without
necessarily having different narrow perceptual experiences of the stimulus in
40 See also Martin 2010 for a detailed account of comparative appearance reports. Note
that “comparative” in this context refers to the idea that these claims involve judgments
of similarity, requiring comparison between the subject and something else. These claims
aren’t comparative in the same was a a sentence like, say, “Mary is taller than John.”
There can, arguably, be comparative claims of this sort with appearance verbs, as in (i).
These are beyond my scope for the moment.
(i) a. This cake tastes more vegan than that one.
b. John looks more angry than (he looks) sad.
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question. They might be focusing on different aspects of the appearances,
or they might differ in which aspects they think are most relevant. Again,
though, this is a difference in experience, construed more broadly. Even if
we see the same scene, if it strikes me as more similar to one thing, and you
as more similar to something else, this is a difference in our experiences in a
general sense.
Again, that faultless disagreement should arise in cases like these is unsur-
prising, even without differences in the narrow subjective experiences of the
speakers. This is because comparative claims of many kinds, about things
other than appearances, also give rise to faultless disagreement. Unlike the
cases with information-sensitive expressions discussed above, cases with com-
parative constructions have not been prominently discussed in the literature
on relativism. But they can clearly be found.
(31) Alvin and Brian observe Dev, whom they know to be an amateur
swimmer, in a competition. Alvin is impressed by his technique,
though Brian can’t help focusing on his mediocre speed.
a. Alvin: Dev swims like a professional.
b. Brian: No, he doesn’t!
Here, the two speakers can be assumed to have the same knowledge of what it
takes to be a professional swimmer and in what ways Dev lives up to and falls
short of this. However, they disagree about how all these factors should be
combined and weighed into a judgment of whether he swims similarly enough
to a professional for the comparative claim in (31-a) to be appropriate.41
In sum, there are cases of relativist effects with experiential language
where the operative difference in perspective is something other than a differ-
ence in narrow subjective experience; so, the subjective experience hypothesis
framed in §2.3 is only plausible as a fully general claim about relativist effects
with experiential language if it is made more specific — to state that it can be
differences in experiences broadly construed that are the source of the effects
in question. In particular, in faultless disagreement involving both compar-
(i-a) is interesting, as it is clearly the appearance verb ‘tastes’ that makes the comparative
acceptable (# ‘This cake is more vegan than that one’). (i-b), however, may just be an
instance of a metalinguistic comparative (see e.g. Embick 2007), given that it does not
allow for the synthetic comparative form (# ‘John looks angrier than sad’).
41Faultless disagreement over comparative claims is plausibly a special case of faultless
disagreement involving multidimensional gradable predicates. See e.g. Silk 2016; Kennedy
2013.
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ative and epistemic appearance claims, it isn’t necessary for the speakers to
have different qualitative experiences (though, of course, they might some-
times). The differences in perspective can instead come down to other things,
like differences in information, or differences in comparative judgments. Just
as such differences can lead to relativist effects in non-experiential cases —
with information-sensitive and comparative claims of other kinds — these
kinds of differences can show up in experiential cases too. Sometimes, differ-
ences in information or comparisons lead to differences in experience, broadly
construed. And in such cases, we get faultless disagreement over epistemic
and comparative appearance claims.
Above, I mentioned the possibility of cognitive penetration of perceptual
experience. If that does happen, then it may be that in all of the cases
discussed in this section, the differences in information or comparative judg-
ments result in differences, even in narrow perceptual experiences. Let me
make two points about this possibility in connection to my aims here. First,
it would do nothing to undermine the claim, which I will argue for in the next
section, that relativist effects with predicates of personal taste come down
to differences in such narrow subjective experience. Second, it would also
leave intact the connection that I have drawn in this section, between certain
uses of appearance predicates and information-sensitive and comparative ex-
pressions. Even if differences in information or comparisons can penetrate
qualitative experience, to give rise to relativist effects that track narrow ex-
periential differences, this would still in an important sense vindicate the
claim that relativist effects with appearance language in these cases have the
same source as relativist effects in non-appearance cases.
In probing the subjective experience hypothesis, we have thus found strik-
ing connections between appearance predicates and other kinds of, non-
experiential, expressions. It makes a lot of sense that appearance claims
should be able to behave similarly to claims involving these other expressions.
Where epistemic modals allow us to make claims sensitive to our information,
there are (epistemic) appearance predicates that allow us to make claims sen-
sitive to our appearance-based information; where comparative constructions
in general allow us to compare things, there are (comparative) appearance
predicates that allow us to compare things with respect to their appearances
in particular. Given that appearances are things we gain information from,
and that we can compare, it makes sense that appearance predicates should
have both of these uses.
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2.4.3 Phenomenal and evaluative cases
Because of the cases discussed in the previous subsection, the subjective ex-
perience hypothesis is not plausible if couched in terms of narrow experience.
Still, I would like now to defend such a narrow version as a claim about rela-
tivist effects within a restricted class of experiential predicates. That is, I will
suggest that for some kinds of claims about appearances, faultless disagree-
ment involving them does require a difference in the qualitative subjective
experiences of the speakers.
A first case of this kind is the dress dispute already mentioned. There, if
the two speakers are faultless in their claims — respectively that the dress
looks blue and black, and that it looks white and gold — then it seems their
visual experiences should differ qualitatively. It is, at the very least, much
harder to point to what else is supposed to differ about their perspectives,
to underlie the disagreement.
Philosophers in the perception literature have identified a third use of
appearance claims, besides the epistemic and the comparative mentioned
above: namely, a phenomenal use. In these cases, the appearance is qualified
or described directly. It is controversial which appearance claims should be
thought of as phenomenal.42 I introduce the term simply in order to have
a label for cases that are importantly different from those considered in the
previous section — and in particular to be different in placing constraints on
the phenomenology of the speakers, when they perceptually experience the
stimulus that they’re talking about. The claims in the dress case plausibly
fit this description, but I will rely on less controversial examples. Consider
the following, for instance:
(32) Ayse and Betty smell some cheese. Ayse finds it overpowering, while
Betty doesn’t.
a. Ayse: The cheese smells strong.
b. Betty: No, it doesn’t.
(33) Alf and Bill taste the same wine. Alf finds it sweet, Bill doesn’t.
a. Alf: The wine tastes sweet.
b. Bill: No, it doesn’t.
42Jackson (1977) takes the main examples to be those ascribing color and shape ap-
pearances, while Martin (2010) believes that those are best thought of as comparative,
while true phenomenal cases involve predicates that can apply primarily to appearances,
such as ‘sweet’ or ‘splendid’, rather than those which primarily apply only to ordinary
objects, such as color predicates.
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What is the source of faultless disagreement about appearances in these
cases? It is extremely natural to say that what differs across the speakers’
perspectives here is how they subjectively experience the stimulus, olfactorily
in (32), and gustatorily in (33). But, one might press: is this kind of difference
really necessary? Above, I held that we shouldn’t rule out that speakers
disagreeing about epistemic or comparative appearances might nonetheless
have qualitatively alike experiences. Could it not also be that the speakers
in these two cases have qualitatively alike experiences, but differ in terms of
whether they find that to be sweet or strong? This possibility is difficult to
make sense of.43 What is it for something to taste sweet to you (to make it
such that a claim as in (33-a) could be faultless) other than for the gustatory
experience to have a certain quality, which is lacking or less prominent in the
experience of someone else (for whom the claim in (33-b) would be faultless)?
And similarly for (32). In these cases, the judgments of the speakers have
their source in the qualities of their perceptual experiences, in such a way
that to faultlessly disagree, their experiences must differ.
This discussion now brings us to appearance predicates that are closest
in meaning to predicates of personal taste — namely, those that are used to
ascribe evaluative properties on the basis of appearances.
(34) Ann and Ben get a whiff of cigar smoke. Ann finds it unpleasant,
while Ben likes it.
a. Ann: That smells gross.
b. Ben: No, it doesn’t!
(35) Aline and Bob have both tried the same cake. Aline enjoyed it, but
43 There is one kind of scenario where speakers might disagree as in (32) and (33) but
without such experiential differences: namely, if they just differ on where they put the
cutoff for counting as sweet or strong. In other words, Ayse and Betty might experience
the odor of the cheese qualitatively identically but while Ayse thinks that smell meets the
threshold for ‘strong’, Betty does not. I am interested in cases where the speakers differ
on more than just this threshold judgment. We could control for this by switching to
disagreement with comparative constructions, as in (i).
(i) a. Ayse: This cheese smells stronger than that one.
b. Betty: No, it doesn’t.
In this sort of case, it is hard to make sense of the possibility that the speakers faultlessly
disagree in virtue of anything other than qualitative differences in their experiences of the
cheese.
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Bob didn’t.
a. Aline: This cake is tastes good.
b. Bob: No, it doesn’t!
I avoided cases like these in arguing for the presence of relativist effects with
appearance language, because in order to do that, it was necessary to factor
out any contribution from evaluative language. Now, however, I turn to them
as further examples of phenomenal appearance claims. To make the asser-
tions in (34) and (35) faultlessly, the speakers must have experiences with a
particular character, either pleasant or unpleasant. And it’s hard to imagine
these cases of faultless disagreement, without taking the speakers’ experi-
ences to differ in this way.44 Again, though, one might press: couldn’t the
two speakers have qualitatively alike experiences, but differ in whether they
find the smell gross, or the taste pleasant? But as with the non-evaluative
phenomenal cases in (32) and (33) above, this possibility is challenging to
make sense of. Rather, the positive or negative assessments in these sorts of
cases seem to be expressing something about the quality of the experience
itself. Whether or not it might be possible to make sense of the faultless dis-
44There are also superficially similar cases, to these as well as to (32) and (33), where
the appearance claims would be epistemic or comparative; and in these cases the appear-
ance claims do not feel equivalent to claims with predicates of personal taste. This would
be the case, for instance, if the speakers were discussing whether some food has spoiled,
and used ‘tastes good’ to mean not something about the pleasant quality of the flavor (as
‘tasty’ must be used!), but rather to mean that the flavor suggests that the food is still
fresh.
There are further superficially similar cases where the appearance claims are phenome-
nal, but the disagreement is not based in differing qualities of the speakers’ experiences.
Two main alternatives are available. First, the disagreement may be due to differences
in what each speaker takes to be the threshold for the application of the predicate — for
instance, what is good-tasting enough to count as tasting good, or sweet enough to count
as tasting sweet? (We could control for this by switching to disagreements over compar-
ative claims, as noted in footnote 43.) Second, it may be due to differences in what each
takes to be the relevant comparison class — for instance, Aline may judge that the cake
tastes good because she’s comparing it to supermarket-bought cakes, whereas Bob judges
that it doesn’t because he’s comparing it to cakes he normally eats at nice parties. Both
of these reasons for faultless disagreement are operative in cases involving gradable adjec-
tives in general, not just experiential predicates (see Barker 2002, as well as references in
footnote 41 above). But these do not exhaust the reasons for faultless disagreement with
phenomenal appearance claims. My question here should be understood to be about the
source of the disagreement in the remaining cases. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on this point.
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agreements in (34) and (35) without such experiential differences, crucially,
there is no pressure to appeal to such a possibility. For we already have
a ready explanation of the presence of faultless disagreement in cases like
these: namely, variation in subjective experience across perspectives. Cases
of relativist effects with evaluative phenomenal appearance predicates lend
no support to the view that relativist effects have their source in evaluation.
In just the same way, there is no reason to tie relativist effects to evalu-
ation in cases involving traditional predicates of personal taste, such as the
much-repeated (1) (equivalent to (35) above):
(1) Aline and Bob have both tried the same cake. Aline enjoyed it, but
Bob didn’t.
a. Aline: This cake is tasty.
b. Bob: No, it’s not tasty!
I cannot definitively rule out that faultless disagreement about phenomenal
appearances or matters of personal taste might be due to differences in per-
spective other than differences in the qualitative subjective experiences of
the speakers. What I do hope to have motivated is that such differences in
experience are an extremely intuitive way to explain why faultless disagree-
ment arises in these cases — and to the point where it is hard to see how to
make sense of the difference across speakers without appeal to this kind of
experiential difference. To the extent that this is the case, it relieves us of
any burden to explain relativist effects in these cases by appeal to the eval-
uative contents of the claims. Once we approach the language of personal
taste via its similarity to the language of appearance, its relativist behav-
ior no longer immediately raises any worry about relativism bleeding into
the whole domain of the evaluative. Rather, relativist effects are naturally
viewed as arising from the fact that these expressions are experiential.
2.5 Summary
Appearance language has received little attention in the semantic debates
surrounding relative truth. I have shown, first, that relativist effects arise
with appearance predicates, just as they do with predicates of personal taste.
Thus, to the extent that relativism is motivated for the latter, it’s equally
motivated for the former. I’ve further shown how investigation of relativist
effects with appearance language can lend insight into the source of relativist
effects with predicates of personal taste. With those appearance predicates
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that are closest in meaning to predicates of personal taste — phenomenal
appearance predicates — the plausible source of relativist effects is variation
in subjective experience across perspectives. I proposed that this role of
experience is the source of relativist effects with predicates of personal taste
too, so that there is no need to appeal to anything special about evaluative
vocabulary to explain these effects.
Along the way, I also illustrated the variety of uses to which appear-
ance language can be put. In addition to the phenomenal examples that are
most relevant to the question about predicates of personal taste, there are
also epistemic and comparative examples. In these cases, however, relativist
effects may be due not only to narrow experiential differences, but also, re-
spectively, to informational differences (on analogy with epistemic modals),
and to differences in comparative judgments (on analogy with other compar-
ative constructions) — things that give rise to differences in experience only if
experience is thought of in a broader way. This variety in uses of appearance
language is unsurprising, given the various ways in which we can be inter-
ested in appearances themselves: they are sources of information about the
appearance-independent world, they can be the objects of comparisons, and
they can also be bearers of evaluative qualities, as pleasant or unpleasant.
So far, then, I hope not only to have provided a new perspective on discourse
about matters of personal taste, by focusing on its experiential rather than
evaluative side, but also to have brought out the interest in investigating the
rich subject of discourse about appearances, which will occupy us more in
the chapters to follow.
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Appearance reports and the
acquaintance inference
3.1 Two types of acquaintance inference
Many assertions can be appropriately made on a variety of grounds. If I
count the students in the introductory logic class and arrive at 110, I can
appropriately assert, ‘110 students were in logic today’. I can also appropri-
ately make that assertion if I was not in class, but you were and you counted
and reported the result to me as 110.
The same can’t clearly be said for assertions about aesthetic matters, or
about matters of personal taste. If I observe the total solar eclipse, I can
later appropriately assert, ‘The eclipse was sublime’. It’s less clear that I can
do this having only heard your description of the eclipse. Similarly, if I try
water-skiing and enjoy it, I can appropriate say, ‘Water-skiing is fun’. But if
I just hear from a friend that water-skiing is fun but haven’t tried it myself,
it would be odd for me to make that assertion.
These kinds of observations about the domains of aesthetics and matters
of taste are old. They go back at least to Kant, who writes in the Critique
of Judgment :1
For even if someone lists all the ingredients of a dish, pointing
out that I have always found each of them agreeable, and goes
on to praise this food [. . . ] I shall be deaf to all these reasons:
1See also Wollheim 1980; Mothersill 1984.
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I shall try the dish on my tongue and palate, and thereby [. . . ]
make my judgment. (Kant, 1790, §33)
More recently, the topic has been taken up by theorists in philosophy and
linguistics interested in the semantics and pragmatics of the language of per-
sonal tastes (Stephenson, 2007; Pearson, 2013; Ninan, 2014). How, they ask,
should our analysis of expressions such as ‘fun’ or ‘tasty’ account for the fact
that simple assertions with them are inappropriate, unless the speaker has
first-hand experience of the relevant subject matter? The target of explana-
tion here is the acquaintance inference: the inference, as illustrated in (1),
from simple assertions with the expressions of interest to the claim that the
speaker has first-hand acquaintance with some relevant stimulus.
(1) A: Water-skiing is fun.  A has tried water-skiing.
That such assertions give rise to the acquaintance inference can also be
shown by the infelicity (denoted by ‘#’), in (2), of the claims when conjoined
with the denial of the relevant kind of acquaintance.
(2) # Water-skiing is fun, but I haven’t tried it.
Assertions about evaluative matters aren’t the only ones to give rise to
the acquaintance inference, however. Appearance reports do so as well, as
illustrated in (3) and (4).
(3) A: Tom seems like he’s cooking.  A has seen Tom.
(4) # Tom seems like he’s cooking, but I haven’t seen him.
While the acquaintance inference with appearance reports has been acknowl-
edged (Pearson, 2013; Ninan, 2014), it has not yet been adequately explored.
The acquaintance inference with appearance reports deserves special inves-
tigation for at least two reasons. One reason, which will be my focus in
Chapter 4, is that the parallel behavior across appearance and taste lan-
guage calls out for a unified explanation. Another, which I take up here,
is that appearance claims give rise to novel acquaintance behavior, with no
clear analogue in the cases with predicates of personal taste, like (1).
To begin, note that appearance reports of different forms can give rise to
importantly different acquaintance inferences, as illustrated in the “absent
cook” case in (5). In this chapter, I’ll be focusing on two forms of reports:
copy raising (CR) reports, as in (5-b), which have a substantive DP matrix
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subject, and an embedded ‘like’-clause that contains a coreferring, or “copy”
pronoun; and expletive subject (ES) reports, as in (5-a), with an expletive,
or null, ‘it’ as matrix subject.
(5) Ann and Ben walk into Tom’s kitchen. There’s no sign of Tom, but
there are various things bubbling away on the stove and ingredients
on the counter, apparently waiting to be used.
a. Ann: It seems like Tom is cooking. (ES)
b. #Ann: Tom seems like he’s cooking.’ (CR)
By contrast, in a context in which Ann and Ben walk into Tom’s kitchen
and see him doing something at the stove, either form of report in (5) is
appropriate (Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012; Rogers, 1972). The claim in (5-a)
thus has a less restrictive acquaintance requirement, compared with (5-b).
To describe this situation, let us define two types of acquaintance inference.
(6) Specific acquaintance inference: the inference that the speaker is
acquainted with a specific individual, as specified in the sentence.
A: Tom seems like he’s cooking.  A has seen Tom.
(7) General acquaintance inference: the inference that the speaker is
acquainted with something of relevance, left unspecified.
A: It seems like Tom is cooking. 6 A has seen Tom
 A has seen something relevant to whether Tom is cooking.
Based on just the previous examples, it is tempting to simply correlate type
of acquaintance inference with surface form of the report — with copy raising
reports giving rise to the specific acquaintance inference, as in (6), and ex-
pletive subject reports only giving rise to the general acquaintance inference,
as in (7).2 And indeed, some linguistic analyses in this domain have taken
this empirical generalization for granted (Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012; Rett
and Hyams, 2014). However, as I will illustrate in more detail below, this
admittedly tempting generalization is incorrect. Consider, for instance, (8),
which we might call the “absent experienced cook” variant on Asudeh and
Toivonen (2012)’s original “absent cook” case from (5) above.
(8) Ann and Ben walk into Tom’s kitchen. They don’t see Tom, but there
2Under the plausible assumption that the individual the embedded claim is about
is always relevant to the truth of that claim, the presence of the specific acquaintance
inference entails the presence of the general one. The reverse, of course, is not the case.
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are vegetables partially chopped on a cutting board, all perfectly even,
and a roast cooling on the counter, delicately seasoned with fresh
herbs.
a. Ann: It seems like Tom is an experienced cook. (ES)
b. Ann: Tom seems like he’s an experienced cook. (CR)
In the scenario as described, both the expletive subject and copy raising
reports are felicitous, even though the speaker, Ann, has not perceived the
referent of the subject, Tom. This thus speaks against the tempting correla-
tion between specific acquaintance inference and copy raising reports.
After reviewing some previous theoretical approaches to copy raising in
§3.2, I turn in §3.3 to show, with the help of experimental work, how the ac-
quaintance inference with copy raising reports is systematically sensitive to
the previously-unrecognized factor of whether the embedded clause contains
a stage-level predicate (roughly, a predicate denoting a transient property,
like cooking) or an individual-level predicate (roughly, a predicate denoting
a more standing property, like being an experienced cook). Moreover, this
behavior makes sense, given the evidential role of appearance reports: their
role of expressing our appearance-based evidence for some claim. The exper-
imental work I present offers a more systematic overall empirical picture of
the acquaintance inferences of appearance reports than has previously been
on offer. In addition to showing the effects of the embedded clause on the ac-
quaintance inferences of ‘seem’-reports (as foreshadowed by the absent cook
cases above), I also probe the effects of different appearance verbs, as well as
different conversational contexts.
In §3.4, I consider the implications of the previous results for extant
proposals about the semantics of appearance reports. More modestly, it fills
a gap in previous theories by identifying which appearance reports get which
of two possible interpretations; more radically, it suggests a shift in what type
of explanation we should be giving for the acquaintance behavior in question.
In §3.5, I consider the relationship between appearance reports in English
and evidential constructions cross-linguistically, and in §3.6 I conclude this
chapter by returning to the acquaintance inference with evaluative assertions
about matters of personal taste, and considering how the conclusions we
have reached about the acquaintance inference with appearance reports may
contribute to our understanding of those earlier cases. I sketch three broad
options: first, that the acquaintance inferences in both categories are to be
explained independently; second, that evidentiality unifies them; and third,
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that experientiality is the common source of the acquaintance inference in
both of them. It is this final option that I favor, and that I will further develop
in Chapter 4, as I believe that it is best able to account not only for the
acquaintance inference, but also for the occurrence of faultless disagreement
in the domains of interest.
3.2 Previous approaches to copy raising
Recent literature on the semantics of copy raising constructions addresses
the question of whether they assign to the matrix subject the role of percep-
tual source (p-source), or “what is perceived in a perceptual event or state”
(Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012, p. 322). Previous approaches fall into two broad
camps: what I call uniform perceptual source analyses, which take all copy
raising subjects to be p-sources, and non-uniform perceptual source analyses,
which take only some copy raising subjects to be p-sources. I review these
approaches in §§3.2.1–3.2.2, showing why neither is fully satisfactory.
3.2.1 Uniform perceptual source analyses
Uniform perceptual source analyses hold that all copy raising matrix subjects
are interpreted as the perceptual source. This approach, in essence, works
into the semantics of copy raising and expletive subject reports the contrast
that we saw above in the absent cook scenario. In other words, copy raising
reports are analyzed so as to predict that the referent of the matrix subject
must be perceived, whereas expletive subject reports are analyzed so as not
to predict that any particular individual must be perceived. This may be
achieved, for example, with the following two semantic values for ‘seem’.
(9) a. [[seemES]] = λp.∃x[perception of x gives evidence that p]
b. [[seemCR]] = λx.λP.[perception of x gives evidence that P (x)]
Analogous clauses can be given for the specific sensory verbs. For instance,
for ‘smell’, we would simply replace “perception” with “olfactory perception.”
Asudeh and Toivonen (2012), as well as Rett and Hyams (2014) believe
that all copy raising reports are unacceptable in contexts where the matrix
subject is not perceived (that is, they all have the specific acquaintance
inference), and hence offer a uniform p-source analysis, on which all copy
raising reports assign the role of p-source to the matrix subject. That is,
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they take all copy raising reports to have a meaning like that in (9-b).3 This
yields the right result in the absent cook case: given that Tom — the referent
of the subject — is not perceived in that scenario, the CR report is false, and
for that reason infelicitous. By contrast, the ES report, employing (9-a), is
true, since there is something the perception of which gives evidence for the
embedded claim, namely, the scene in the kitchen.
Some previous experimental work may seem to lend support to the uni-
form p-source analysis. Rett and Hyams (2014, §4.2) present results showing
that, with the verbs ‘seem’, ‘look’, and ‘sound’, copy raising reports are
highly unacceptable in “indirect contexts,” or contexts in which the refer-
ent of the matrix subject isn’t perceived. Chapman et al. (2015) also find
that whether the speaker directly perceives the copy raising subject is highly
correlated with the acceptability of the report, whereas the acceptability of
expletive subject reports is not affected by perception. The findings in both
studies, however, are a result of combining data from sentences with a va-
riety of different embedded clauses. As we’ll show in §3.3, this method can
mask important differences in the perceptual requirements across different
copy raising reports.
Asudeh and Toivonen (2017) develop the uniform p-source approach fur-
ther, in response to some potential problem cases raised by Landau (2011);
Heycock (1994).
(10) B has just described to A the bizarre noises that B’s car has been
making.
A: Your car sounds like it needs tuning very badly.
(Asudeh and Toivonen, 2017, p. 57)
3Asudeh and Toivonen (2012) treat copy raising reports with ‘seem’ differently from
sentences with the specific sensory verbs. For our purposes, though, the essential feature
of their view is that sentences with the relevant matrix verbs, substantive matrix subjects,
and ‘like’-clauses containing a pronoun that corefers with that subject, are such that the
matrix subject is interpreted as the p-source. For evidence against a sharp distinction
between ‘seem’ and the specific sensory verbs, see Landau (2011, p. 785) and Kim (2014,
pp. 178–180). Asudeh and Toivonen (2012) also do not take the p-source to be a theta-role
assigned to an argument of the verb, but instead to be a “semantic role,” which enters
differently into the analysis, but this will not be material to my discussion. Furthermore,
I omit reference to an experiencer in the semantics, as it will not make a difference to
my claims in this chapter. Rett and Hyams (2014, p. 178) also depart from Asudeh and
Toivonen (2012) in taking the p-source to be part of the not-at-issue content instead of
the asserted content, and in taking the expletive ‘it’ subject to be a pronoun that refers
to an eventuality in a way determined by the context.
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Acknowledging such cases, Asudeh and Toivonen note that the verb ‘sound’
allows for a “roundabout” interpretation, whereby the copy raising construc-
tion ‘X sounds like. . . ’ is felicitous if the speaker has heard a description of X,
even if they have not heard X itself. But, they hold, this does not mean that
the subject is not a p-source. They write that “the sentence is acceptable
because the speaker has received reported evidence about the engine of the
car” (p. 57). They thus advocate a broadening of our understanding of the p-
source, such that something can be the p-source (for a ‘sound’-claim) either
by being auditorally perceived, or by being the subject of an auditorally-
received report. This, they hold, also explains the infelicity, in the context
from (10), of the CR report in (11).
(11) #A: Your mechanic sounds like he needs to tune your car.
(11) is infelicitous because the mechanic is neither auditorally perceived nor
the subject of a description that the speaker has heard. Thus, the mechanic
cannot be the p-source, even on the broader understanding of that role.
Asudeh and Toivonen (2017) do not discuss potential counterexamples
to the uniform p-source analysis with verbs other than ‘sound’. We can,
however, imagine them extending their solution to similar cases with ‘look’
and ‘seem’, as in (12) (modified from a case with ‘sound’ from Landau 2011).
(12) A looks at the posted sheet of exam results and sees Bob’s name
towards the bottom.
a. A: Bob seems like he’s failed the exam.
b. A: Bob looks like he’s failed the exam.
Here, as in (10), one could salvage the uniform p-source analysis by holding
that Bob can be the p-source because a representation of him, on the result
sheet, is the source of evidence for the embedded claim.
Asudeh and Toivonen (2017)’s discussion is in fact neutral between the
view we have just sketched, and a rather different way of broadening the
p-source. We have suggested, on their behalf, that an individual can be a
p-source not only by being perceived itself, but also by being the subject of
a perceived description or representation. But one could instead hold that,
in the appropriate context, a sentence with ‘Bob’, say, as the subject, could
assign the p-source role not to Bob himself, but rather to a representation of
Bob. This might involve, for instance, taking ‘Bob’ to metonymically refer
to his name on the exam sheet.
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However, as we’ll see below, there are other challenge cases for the uni-
form p-source approach. Not all are plausibly captured by broadening our
understanding of the p-source, in either of the ways that might work for (10)
and (12).
3.2.2 Non-uniform perceptual source analyses
The second broad approach to copy raising allows for variability in the in-
terpretation of the matrix subject: sometimes (as in the absent cook case),
it is a perceptual source; other times (as in the car repair case), it is not.
Thus, not all CR reports employ the clause given above in (9-b), repeated
here as (13-a). Some instead employ the clause in (13-b), which yields results
equivalent to the ES version, though it is compositionally different.
(13) a. [[seemCR]] = λx.λP.[perception of x gives evidence that P (x)]
b. [[seemCR′ ]] = λx.λP.∃y[perception of y gives evidence that P (x)]
This is the approach taken by Landau (2011) and Doran (2015).4 Landau
(2011) is motivated by cases like (10) and (12), which we discussed above,
in which copy raising reports are based on descriptions or representations of
the subject. Doran (2015), however, acknowledging that such cases might
be handled by a uniform p-source analysis (e.g. through metonymy), puts
forward an interestingly different counterexample:
(14) A is a skilled musician with a highly trained ear. Through the thin
walls of her apartment, she can hear her neighbor playing the guitar.
The chords sound slightly off, like the guitar is missing a particular
string.
A: The B string sounds like it’s missing. (Doran, 2015, p. 11)
Unlike the cases that Asudeh and Toivonen (2017) can account for by broad-
ening the p-source, it is implausible, in (14), that a representation of the B
string is heard, or that there is any kind of deferred or metonymic reference
going on. It is thus hard to see how an advocate of the uniform p-source
approach could insist that the B string is a p-source in this example. In §3.3
we will add yet more counterexamples to the uniform p-source approach.
Non-uniform p-source approaches are in a sense well-suited to account for
the variable perceptual requirements of copy raising reports. However, they
4Potsdam and Runner (2001) hold a related view, though not couched in terms of the
perceptual source.
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are in an important sense incomplete, without any story about which reports
come along with the p-source interpretation of the subject, and which do not.
Without this, it remains mysterious why CR reports are ever infelicitous due
to lack of perception of the referent of the subject. Why can we not, in
a scenario in which the subject isn’t perceived, just use the non-p-source
interpretation? Such a repair, however, seems unavailable. This is precisely
what made the absent cook case so compelling.
Landau (2011, p. 790) briefly discusses this worry, and suggests that the
claim that the speaker has perceived the referent of the subject is in fact just
a strong implicature. He writes that “usage of CR (and not the expletive
variant) implicates that the matrix subject does participate in the perceptual
event. But this implicature can be overridden.” And he follows up with some
naturally-occurring examples of apparently non-p-source ‘look’-claims. This,
however, does not adequately address the worry. There is no doubt that
some CR ‘look’-reports are felicitous without perception of the subject. But
this doesn’t mean that the inference that the subject is perceived is only
ever an implicature. If it were, then we would expect it also to be cancelable
in the absent cook case. But it seems evidently not to be. Recall that we
introduced the perceptual requirements of CR claims in §3.1 by showing that
it is infelicitous (in at least some cases) to conjoin the given claim with the
denial that one has had the relevant perceptual contact:
(15) #Tom looks like he’s cooking, but I haven’t seen him.
If the p-source requirement is just an implicature, then it remains to be
explained why this implicature so stubbornly resists cancellation in certain
cases, but is easily overridden in others.
To summarize, uniform p-source analyses, which take all CR matrix sub-
jects to be interpreted as p-sources, are simple and systematic. However, they
face a number of troubling counterexamples. Non-uniform p-source analyses
can easily allow for such cases. But for them, it remains to determine more
systematically which CR reports have p-source subjects and which do not.
I’ll pick up with this task in §3.3, presenting experimental results testing the
perceptual requirements of a wide range of CR reports. With that in hand,
I’ll return, in §3.4, to reassess the theoretical options.
Before moving on, though, a quick note about labels is in order. I have
used the label “uniform p-source analysis” for analyses that take all copy
raising matrix subjects to be p-sources; and “non-uniform p-source analysis”
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for those that take some copy raising matrix subjects to be p-sources, and
others not. So far, we have been understanding these views broadly, to apply
to reports with all the verbs of interest: ‘seem’, ‘look’, ‘sound’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’,
and ‘feel’. However, at points it will also be useful to consider more restricted
uniform and non-uniform p-source approaches, as applied to reports with
only one verb. So, a uniform p-source analysis of ‘smell’-reports would have
it that all CR reports with ‘smell’ have p-source matrix subjects. And such
a view is compatible with a non-uniform p-source analysis of ‘seem’-reports.
(Landau (2011), for instance, endorses both of these views.)
3.3 Experimental work
3.3.1 Overview of methods
I conducted a series of experiments testing the acceptability of copy raising
reports in scenarios where the speaker did not perceive the matrix subject.5
Each experiment has two conditions, a copy raising report and its exple-
tive subject variant, both presented in the same scenario. Test subjects —
self-reported native English speakers recruited through Amazon Mechanical
Turk — were asked to rate the acceptability of the utterance in the given
scenario, on a 7-point Likert scale. All experiments used a fully between-
subjects design. Each experiment included a filler question, and two practice
questions that also served as attention checks. A sample stimulus from an
experiment with ‘look’ (used to confirm some data from Asudeh and Toivo-
nen) is given in Fig. 3.1. The CR condition is shown. Other test subjects
would see the same scenario, but with the ES variant (‘It looks like Tom is
cooking’) instead.
5This chapter discuses results of 15 experiments, six conducted in January 2018, and
nine conducted in August 2018. The earlier experiments, summarized below in §3.3.2,
were originally presented in Rudolph 2019a. The later experiments, presented in §§3.3.4–
3.3.6 were originally presented in Rudolph 2019b; preregistration information for these
later experiments can be found at https://aspredicted.org/kk45r.pdf and https:
//aspredicted.org/8r2du.pdf.
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Figure 3.1: Sample experimental stimulus
If the expletive subject version was judged more acceptable than the
copy raising one, to a statistically significant degree, then this is evidence
that the CR report has the requirement that the subject be perceived. On
the other hand, if the ES and CR reports were equally ranked, then that is
evidence that the CR report does not have this requirement (as we assume
that expletive subject reports certainly do not).
3.3.2 ‘Seem’ and the specific with stage-level generalization
Appearance reports with ‘seem’ variably give rise to the specific acquaintance
inference, or only to the general one — and in a way that cannot be explained
just by appeal to the syntactic structures of the reports. To repeat the key
motivating data points:
(16) Absent cook: Ann and Ben walk into Tom’s kitchen. There’s no
sign of Tom, but there are various things bubbling away on the stove
and ingredients on the counter, apparently waiting to be used.
a. Ann: It seems like Tom is cooking. (general)
b. #Ann: Tom seems like he’s cooking. (specific)
(17) Absent experienced cook: Ann and Ben walk into Tom’s kitchen.
They don’t see Tom, but there are vegetables partially chopped on a
cutting board, all perfectly even, and a roast cooling on the counter,
delicately seasoned with fresh herbs.
57
Chapter 3. Appearance reports and the acquaintance inference
a. Ann: It seems like Tom is an experienced cook. (general)
b. Ann: Tom seems like he’s an experienced cook. (general)
What accounts for the different acquaintance inferences across different copy
raising ‘seem’-reports, like (16-b) and (17-b)? I acknowledge there may be
many factors that could potentially influence the acquaintance behavior of
such claims. Here, I offer evidence for one novel generalization:
Specific with stage-level generalization: Copy raising re-
ports with embedded stage-level predicates (SLPs) give rise to the
specific acquaintance inference; those with individual-level predi-
cates (ILPs) give rise only to the general acquaintance inference.
SLPs are predicates that are presumed to hold only transiently of individuals
(you can think of them as holding of “stages” of individuals — hence the label
“stage-level” — but this is a substantive view of the distinction that I take no
stand on here). Examples include ‘cooking’ and ‘upset’. ILPs, by contrast,
are predicates that are presumed to hold of individuals in a more standing
way. Examples include ‘an experienced cook’ and ‘well-organized’.6 To give
a clearer handle on the distinction (and to show its relevance across other
linguistic constructions), I present two common diagnostics.
Bare plural diagnostic: Bare plural subjects of SLPs have existential
interpretations, while bare plural subjects of ILPs have universal or generic
interpretations.
(18) a. Students are cooking. ∃: SLP
b. Students are upset. ∃: SLP
c. Students are experienced cooks. ∀: ILP
d. Students are well-organized. ∀: ILP
Absolute construction diagnostic: Absolute constructions with SLPs
in the antecedent are equivalent to conditionals with ‘if. . . ’ or ‘when. . . ’,
while those with ILPs are equivalent to conditionals with ‘since. . . ’ or ‘given
that. . . ’ (Stump, 1985).
(19) a. Cooking, Tom is happy. ‘if. . . ’: SLP
b. Upset, Tom likes to be alone. ‘if. . . ’: SLP
c. An experienced cook, Tom prefers to eat in. ‘since. . . ’: ILP
6The distinction goes back to Carlson 1977.
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d. Well-organized, Tom is good at his job. ‘since. . . ’: ILP
So, to repeat, the Specific with Stage-Level Generalization states that
copy raising ‘seem’-reports with stage-level predicates (like ‘cooking’ in (16-b))
give rise to the specific acquaintance inference, that the speaker has seen
the individual denoted by the subject, while copy raising ‘seem’-reports with
individual-level predicates (like ‘an experienced cook’ in (17-b)) only give rise
to the general acquaintance inference, that the speaker has seen something
relevant to the truth of the embedded claim.
The Specific with Stage-Level Generalization is supported by new ex-
perimental work comparing seven minimal null subject/copy raising pairs of
sentences — three with embedded stage-level predicates (‘cooking’, ‘upset’,
‘playing outside’), and four with embedded individual-level predicates (‘an
experienced cook’, ‘well-organized’, ‘enjoys arts and crafts’, ‘owns a cat’).
The reports were tested in scenarios where the speaker did not have percep-
tual acquaintance with the individual denoted by the matrix copy raising
subject. We tested the absent cook and absent experienced cook cases given
above, as well as the further scenarios in (20)–(24). The Specific with Stage-
Level Generalization then makes the following predictions: First, with the
pairs with embedded SLPs, there would be a significant difference in accept-
ability between the two report types, with the null subject reports being
rated higher than the copy raising reports. Second, with the pairs with em-
bedded ILPs, there would be no such difference: both copy raising and null
subject reports would be ranked equally, even though the matrix subject was
not perceived.
(20) Sam and Sally glance into their co-worker Beth’s office while she’s out
at a meeting. They see papers in a mess on her desk and crumpled on
the floor. Sam knows that Beth usually keeps her office neat unless
she’s in an especially bad mood.
a. Sam: It seems like Beth is upset.
b. #Sam: Beth seems like she’s upset.
(21) Allie is a five-year-old girl who is having trouble adjusting to kinder-
garten. Her teachers, Karen and Mitch, always encourage her to
play outside during recess, but she usually stays inside crying to go
home. One day during recess, Karen looks around the classroom and
notices that Allie isn’t there.
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a. Karen: It seems like Allie is playing outside.
b. #Karen: Allie seems like she’s playing outside.
(22) Sam and Sally glance into Beth’s office while she’s out at a meeting.
They notice color-coded folders stacked neatly on the desk and a to-
do list written on the whiteboard, with estimated completion times
specified for each task.
a. Sam: It seems like Beth is well-organized.
b. Sam: Beth seems like she’s well-organized.
(23) Karen and Mitch work together at a daycare center. Allie is a four-
year-old who just started coming to the center. One day, Karen
and Mitch are straightening up while the children eat their lunch
in another room. Karen looks at the coloring project that Allie has
been working on all morning, and notices all of the patterns neatly
filled in with creative color combinations.
a. Karen: It seems like Allie enjoys arts and crafts.
b. Karen: Allie seems like she enjoys arts and crafts.
(24) Alice and Ed walk by their new neighbor, Claire’s window one after-
noon. They know Claire is out at work. Through the window, Alice
sees a climbing tree and litter box. She also gets a clear whiff of cat
smell through the open window.
a. Alice: It seems like Claire owns a cat.
b. Alice: Claire seems like she owns a cat.
The results were in line with the predictions of the Specific with Stage-
Level Generalization. In the SLP cases (Fig. 3.2) there was a significant
effect of report type on the ratings of utterance correctness;7 in the ILP
cases (Fig. 3.3), there was no such effect).8
7The results of one-way ANOVA tests are as follows. For the pair with ‘cooking’:
F (1, 111) = 14.81, p < .001 (as homogeneity of variance could not be assumed, we also
report the Welch statistic: F (1, 72.4) = 12.89, p = .001); ‘upset’: F (1, 103.43) = 5.41, p =
.02 (Welch); ‘playing outside’: F (1, 116) = 13.22, p < .001. The smaller effect with ‘upset’
suggests that stative SLPs may tolerate a reading with only the general acquaintance
inference more easily than eventive SLPs. Further tests will be needed to see if this
generalization holds up.
8For the pair with ‘an experienced cook’: F (1, 131) = .91, p = .34; ‘well-organized’:
F (1, 124) = .46, p = .5; ‘enjoys arts and crafts’: F (1, 116) = .75, p = .39; ‘owns a cat’:
F (1, 79.3) = 1.31, p = .26; N = 86.
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Figure 3.2: Mean ratings for ‘seem’-reports: SLPs
3.3.3 Interlude: why the stage-/individual-level contrast?
We have seen evidence that copy raising ‘seem’-reports that embed stage-
level predicates, like ‘cooking’, give rise to the specific inference, that the
speaker is acquainted with the referent of the subject, whereas copy rais-
ing ‘seem’-reports embedding individual-level predicates, like ‘an experienced
cook’, only give rise to the general inference, that the speaker is acquainted
with something or other of relevance to the embedded claim. But why should
these sorts of predicates behave differently in this way? I would like to suggest
in this section that the Specific with Stage-Level Generalization supported
above has a functional rationale. The rationale jumps off from the recog-
nition that ‘seem’-reports have an evidential role: they are used to express
that one has perceptual evidence for some state of affairs, specified in the
embedded clause.
Since stage-level predicates denote properties presumed to hold more
transiently, perception of the individual the claim is about tends to be bet-
ter, more direct evidence than perception of some scene not containing that
individual. For example, perceptual evidence for someone cooking or being
upset will generally be better if it is perception of that person; perception
of some scene that may suggest that the relevant state of affairs holds, but
doesn’t include the individual, will tend to be worse. Thus, it makes sense
for reports embedding SLPs to have a way to mark this distinction in evi-
dential situation. Reserving copy raising reports for the special case of direct
perception of the target individual would do this.
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Figure 3.3: Mean ratings for ‘seem’-reports: ILPs
Individual-level predicates, by contrast, denote properties that individu-
als have in a more standing way. Because of this, there is less of a contrast
between the evidential power of perception of that individual, compared with
perception of some other scene. For example, if the question is whether some-
one is an experienced cook, or well-organized, it matters less what they look
like at the moment. Perception of some scene appropriately related to them
can be just as good, or even better evidence that the embedded claim ob-
tains. Thus, reports with embedded ILPs don’t call for the same contrast
between the two kinds of perceptual evidential situations the speaker may
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be in, and so don’t reserve copy raising reports for just one of them.9,10
This, then, is a sketch of a functional basis for the differing acquaintance
behavior of ‘seem’-reports embedding SLPs and ILPs. In the next section, I
turn to a discussion of how this behavior might be captured within a semantic
analysis of copy raising and null subject constructions.
3.3.4 Extending to ‘look’?
A natural starting hypothesis is that ‘look’ displays essentially the same ac-
quaintance behavior as ‘seem’ does, and that the Specific with Stage-Level
Generalization applies to appearance reports with it as well. The only dif-
ference would be that ‘look’ tends to call for specifically visual acquaintance,
9My claim here about copy raising reports embedding SLPs is similar to what Rett
and Hyams (2014) say about all copy raising reports: holding that they encode “direct
evidentiality,” while null subject reports do not — where the direct evidential component
is that the speaker has perceived the referent of the matrix subject (see esp. pp. 176–179). I
depart from them in holding that we must recognize variability across copy raising reports.
This variability could be captured by denying that direct evidentiality is communicated
by copy raising reports embedding ILPs. Alternatively, it could be captured by holding
that there is variability in what counts as “direct evidence”: that is, perhaps for claims
with ILPs, direct evidence doesn’t have to include the target individual. (These options
correspond, respectively, to the “non-uniform” and “new uniform” approaches to copy
raising that I discuss in the next section.)
We must also be careful about what is meant by “direct evidentiality” here, since ‘seem’-
reports are arguably only appropriate when the speaker has somewhat indirect evidence
for the embedded claim. With rain falling around you, you don’t say that it seems like
it’s raining, but that it is. The term “direct,” as used by Rett and Hyams (2014) in this
context, refers to the direct acquaintance with subject, which is the source of evidence,
not to the directness of the evidence with respect to the embedded claim. See also Asudeh
and Toivonen (2017, §3).
10This style of story makes immediately relevant two types of cases: first, SLPs that
are such that evidence for their application doesn’t seem especially tied to an individual’s
appearance; and second, ILPs that are such that evidence for their application does seem
closely tied to an individual’s appearance. Examples of the former may be stage-level
predicates like ‘missing’ or ‘absent’ — and indeed, Doran (2015, p. 11) gives an example
with ‘missing’ (with the appearance verb ‘sound’) to argue against a uniform analysis for all
copy raising reports. Examples of the latter would be individual-level predicates like ‘tall’
or ‘brunette’. More work is needed to determine to what extent the acquaintance behavior
of copy raising reports tracks a predicate’s status as SLP or ILP itself, as opposed to
tracking something else that just tends to be correlated with these categories of predicates.
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while ‘seem’ also allows for other kinds of perceptual acquaintance.11 Con-
sider, for instance, the case in (25), with the individual-level predicate ‘well-
organized’. Notice that the context is such that the speaker does not perceive
the referent of the copy raising matrix subject.
(25) Sam and Sally glance into Beth’s office while she’s out at a meeting.
They notice color-coded folders stacked neatly on the desk and a to-
do list written on the whiteboard, with estimated completion times
specified for each task.
a. Sam: Beth seems like she’s well-organized.
b. Sam: Beth looks like she’s well-organized.
We tested the copy raising ‘look’-report in (25-b), as compared with its ex-
pletive subject variant, and indeed found no statistically significant effect of
report type on the speaker’s acceptability judgments (Fig. 3.4).12
Figure 3.4: Mean rankings of utterance correctness: ‘look’-reports
11Both ‘seem’ and ‘look’ do, however, allow for uses that arguably don’t require per-
ceptual acquaintance at all, as in, e.g. ‘Plato’s Theory of Forms looks/seems like it’ll be
difficult for the first-year students to understand.’ Still, I think that some meaningful kind
of “acquaintance” is still required; though it could be delicate how exactly to characterize
it. I restrict myself here to appearance reports that clearly report on appearances of things
that can perceived with the senses. That ‘look’ also has a broader use may be tied to the
fact that in Indo-European languages like English, vision is the main source domain for
vocabulary having to do with knowledge and understanding (e.g. ‘I see what you mean’).
Thanks to Line Mikkelson on this point.
12F (1, 99.22) = 2.27, p = .14;N = 102.
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However, with other individual-level predicates, results with ‘look’ di-
verged from those with ‘seem’. With the predicates ‘experienced cook’,
in (26), and ‘owns a cat’, in (27), for instance, copy raising ‘look’-reports
were judged significantly less acceptable than their expletive subject vari-
ants (Fig. 3.5).13
(26) Scenario as in (17).
a. Ann: It looks like Tom is an experienced cook.
b. ?Ann: Tom looks like he’s an experienced cook.
(27) Scenario as in (24).
a. Alice: It looks like Claire owns a cat.
b. ?Alice: Claire looks like she owns a cat.
Figure 3.5: Mean rankings of utterance correctness: more cases with ‘look’
We must thus acknowledge that the specific acquaintance inference is
more persistent with copy raising reports with ‘look’ than with those with
‘seem’. However, the clear case of ‘well-organized’, where the two report types
were equally highly rated, suggests that CR ‘look’-reports can be flexible in
their perceptual requirements in a similar way to ‘seem’-reports.
We also tested the ‘look’ variants with stage-level predicates: the original
case with ‘cooking’ as well as the case with ‘upset’ in (28). In these SLP
cases, the results with ‘look’ were as with ‘seem’, with ES reports rated
13‘Experienced cook’ (N = 128): F (1, 122.1) = 11.46, p = .001; ‘owns a cat’ (N = 87):
F (1, 84.44) = 7.39, p = .008.
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significantly higher than CR ones (Fig. 3.6).14
(28) Scenario as in (20).
a. Sam: It looks like Beth is upset.
b. #Sam: Beth looks like she’s upset.
Figure 3.6: Mean ratings for ‘look’-reports: SLPs
3.3.5 ‘Smell’, ‘taste’, and ‘feel’
Copy raising reports with ‘smell’, ‘taste’, and ‘feel’ invariably require per-
ception of the referent of the matrix subject (Landau, 2011). This holds
regardless of whether the embedded clause contains a stage-level predicate,
as in (29), or an individual-level predicate, as in (30). We experimentally
confirmed this with the ILP case (Fig. 3.7).15
(29) A and B snoop in their housemate C’s room after she’s left for work.
They notice a strong scent of perfume, as though it was sprayed quite
recently.
a. A: It smells like C is wearing perfume today.
b. #A: C smells like she’s wearing perfume today.
14‘cooking’ (N = 92): F (1, 67.08) = 70.54, p < .001; ‘upset’ (N = 117): F (1, 85.66) =
52.79, p < .001.
15F (1, 87) = 81.8, p < .001; N = 89.
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(30) Alice and Ed walk by their new neighbor, Claire’s window one after-
noon. They know Claire is out at work. Through the crack in the
window, Alice gets a clear whiff of cat smell.
a. Alice: It smells like Claire owns a cat.
b. #Alice: Claire smells like she owns a cat.
Figure 3.7: Mean rankings for ‘smell’-reports
Native speaker intuition confirms that ‘taste’ and ‘feel’ pattern with
‘smell’ in this regard. The following cases embed ILPs, but there is no doubt
that the CR reports are infelicitous in the contexts described, where the
subject isn’t perceived. By contrast, the ES reports are fine.
(31) Tom has invited A and B over for a home-cooked dinner. A takes a
bite of mini-quiche appetizer and is impressed by the perfect consis-
tency and delicate seasoning.
a. A: It tastes like Tom is an experienced cook.
b. #A: Tom tastes like he’s an experienced cook.
(32) A and B visit their neighbor, Naomi. A runs her hand over the
armrest on the couch and notices ridges like those that would be
made by scratching claws.
a. A: It feels like Naomi has a cat.
b. #A: Naomi feels like she has a cat.
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3.3.6 ‘Sound’: perception and representation
As we saw in §3.2.2, many theorists have put forward cases with ‘sound’ to
show that not all CR reports require perception of the matrix subject. Here,
we present experimental confirmation that in a context in which a ‘sound’-
report is based on a description or representation, as in (34), the CR report
does not require perception of the subject. However, in a context in which the
report is based on auditory perception, as in (33), the CR report behaves just
like those with ‘smell’, ‘taste’ and ‘feel’, being infelicitous without perception
of the subject (Fig. 3.8). Both cases use the same embedded clause, with the
ILP ‘owns a cat’.16
(33) Alice and Ed walk by their new neighbor, Claire’s window one af-
ternoon. They know Claire is out at work. Alice hears what sounds
like a faint meow coming from inside, followed by the sound of claws
scratching against the floor.
a. Alice: It sounds like Claire owns a cat.
b. #Alice: Claire sounds like she owns a cat.
(34) Ed is telling Alice about his new neighbor, Claire. He mentions that
he saw her carrying in a large climbing tower, as well as bags of kitty
litter.
a. Alice: It sounds like Claire owns a cat.
b. Alice: Claire sounds like she owns a cat.
Note that the variability observed here with ‘sound’ is different from
what we saw with ‘seem’ and ‘look’ above. There, we found CR reports with
different embedded clauses having different perceptual requirements. Here,
by contrast, we see the very same CR ‘sound’-reports, sometimes requiring
perception of the subject, and sometimes not, based on the nature of the
context in which the report is used.
In fact, representation-based uses of CR ‘sound’-reports seem to be ac-
ceptable, regardless of the embedded predicate, as is shown in (35), with the
SLP ‘dancing ballet’.
(35) B is looking through the window into a dance studio. Talking on the
phone to A, he describes what he’s observing.
16In the representational scenario: F (1, 94) = .258, p = .613; N = 96. In the percep-
tual scenario: F (1, 53.1) = 44.44, p < .001; N = 74.
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Figure 3.8: Mean rankings for ‘sound’-reports
a. A: It sounds like they’re dancing ballet.
b. A: They sound like they’re dancing ballet.
Note that ‘seem’ could be substituted in for ‘sound’ in the previous example.
Thus, we should also recognize representation-based uses of ‘seem’, on which
even copy raising reports with embedded SLPs do not require of perception
of the subject. Reports with ‘look’ are arguably the same, with the caveat
that the representation should be visually received, as in (36).
(36) A reads the office hours on their professor, Hannah’s web-page and
notices that the present time is listed.
a. A: It looks like Hannah is in the office now.
b. A: Hannah looks like she’s in the office now.
3.3.7 Summary of empirical landscape
We have found three different sources of variability in the perceptual require-
ments of copy raising reports. First, there is variability due to the matrix
verb. Copy raising reports with ‘smell’, ‘taste’, and ‘feel’ invariably require
perception of the subject, whereas CR reports with ‘seem’, ‘look’, and ‘sound’
do not. (Of course, there is also a difference in what type of perception
these verbs require; but we have been leaving that implicit.) Second, with
‘sound’, ‘seem’, and ‘look’, there is variability due to whether the report is
perception-based or representation-based. In representation-based contexts,
there is no requirement that the subject be perceived; in perception-based
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contexts there is always this requirement with ‘sound’, and sometimes with
‘seem’ and ‘look’. Third, with ‘seem’ and (to a certain extent) ‘look’, there
is variability due to the embedded clause. CR reports with embedded stage-
level predicates tend to require perception of the matrix subject, whereas
those with embedded individual-level predicates tend not to require this.17
While there are likely further empirical subtleties to the acquaintance
inferences of appearance reports, I will work just with what has been laid
out above. The landscape is summarized below in Table 3.1.
3.4 Back to theoretical approaches
As we saw in §3.2, previous approaches to copy raising divide into two broad
camps: uniform perceptual source analyses, which take all CR matrix sub-
jects to be interpreted as perceptual sources, and thus to be necessarily per-
ceived, if the report is to be felicitous; and non-uniform perceptual source
analyses, which take some CR matrix subjects to be p-sources, and oth-
ers not, thus allowing for some CR reports that are felicitous even without
perception of the matrix subject.
3.4.1 Revisiting uniform p-source analyses
Already in §3.2, we saw some troubling counterexamples to a uniform p-
source analysis; and the ‘seem’ and ‘look’ CR reports embedding individual-
17 Further complication to the picture comes from cases with embedded predicates
denoting some kind of absence, like ‘missing’, in Doran (2015)’s B string case in (14).
This seems to be a distinct source of variability due to the embedded clause, not only with
‘sound’-reports, but also with ‘seem’- and ‘look’-reports:
(i) A glances around the classroom and doesn’t see Jim anywhere.
a. A: Jim seems like he’s absent.
b. A: Jim looks like he’s absent.
Note that ‘missing’ and ‘absent’ are stage-level predicates; so this behavior is not captured
by the observation that the perceptual requirement is lifted with embedded individual-level
predicates.
The status of this kind of case with ‘smell’, ‘taste’, and ‘feel’ is somewhat unclear.
(ii) A tastes the soup and it’s extremely bland, as though the cook forgot to include
all the seasoning that the recipe called for.
?A: The salt tastes like it’s missing.
The CR report in (ii) is not completely unacceptable, by contrast with the ‘taste’ example
from (31-b). However, to the extent that it is acceptable, it might be heard as conveying
that there is some salt that is tasted, but that is so faint it’s barely detectable.
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ES CR
seem general SLP: specific
ILP: general
rep-based (SLP/ILP): general
look general SLP: specific
ILP: general(?)
smell, taste, feel general specific
sound general perc-based: specific
rep-based: general
Table 3.1: Overview of acquaintance inference with appearance reports
level predicates from §§3.3.2, 3.3.4 only make this kind of approach more
difficult to maintain. While Asudeh and Toivonen (2017) may broaden their
understanding of the p-source to account for representation-based cases, as
we saw in §3.2.1, this move does not plausibly extend to cases like the absent
experienced cook, in (17). Perceiving the product of Tom’s cooking is not to
perceive a representation or description of Tom; and nor is it plausible that
when we say, ‘Tom seems like he’s an experienced cook’, we somehow use
‘Tom’ to refer in a deferred way to the food that he cooked. I thus conclude
that a general uniform p-source analysis is empirically inadequate. However,
restricted uniform p-source analyses are adequate for ‘smell’, ‘taste’, and
‘feel’. And a restricted uniform p-source analysis for ‘sound’ may also be fine,
provided we take on board some version of Asudeh and Toivonen (2017)’s
suggestion for representational cases.
3.4.2 Revisiting non-uniform p-source analyses
Non-uniform p-source analyses are empirically adequate, given our results.
More specifically, our data support adopting non-uniform analyses at least
for ‘seem’ and ‘look’. Moreover, we have results in hand that allow us to be
more systematic than previous non-uniform p-source theorists about which
reports employ which versions of these verbs. We would hold that the non-p-
source versions of these verbs are more often employed in CR reports, when
these reports embed individual-level predicates.
However, this is not an extremely theoretically satisfying place to land.
We would, in effect, be saying that the two sentences in (37) have different
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semantic structures: the first with a p-source subject, employing clause (38-a)
(repeated from (13-a)), and the second without, employing clause (38-b)
(repeated from (13-b)).
(37) a. Tom seems like he’s cooking.
b. Tom seems like he’s an experienced cook.
(38) a. [[seemCR]] = λx.λP.perception of x gives evidence that P (x)
b. [[seemCR′ ]] = λx.λP.∃y[perception of y gives evidence that P (x)]
Somewhat ironically, it is much more plausible that there are different
semantic structures across perceptual and representational cases with ‘seem’
(or ‘sound’ or ‘look’), like those we saw in §3.3.6. And yet the differences
between those might be accommodated within a uniform p-source analysis.
But the contrasts observed between SLP and ILP cases with ‘seem’ and
‘look’ do not seem to cry out for such an explanation — both kinds of CR
reports are equally based on perception, and whatever difference there is
between them seems not to come down to something about ‘seem’, but rather
to something about the embedded clause. Put another way, the clearest
problem for the uniform p-source approach, and so the clearest motivation
for a non-uniform approach — assuming, as we will question in a moment,
that it’s the only alternative — comes from the ILP-embedding examples
with ‘seem’ and ‘look’, like (37-b). However, of all the potential problem
cases for the uniform approach, these are the least plausibly encompassed by
a non-uniform p-source view.
3.4.3 A new uniform analysis
A non-uniform perceptual source analysis is not the only alternative to an
analysis that takes all CR reports to have p-source subjects. Another alter-
native is that no CR reports have p-source subjects. This amounts, in effect,
to giving up an assumption implicitly endorsed by all of the theorists I have
been citing in this debate: namely, that the acquaintance behavior of the
reports in question should be encoded in the semantics.
Acquaintance/p-source link: The matrix subject of a copy
raising ‘seem’-report is interpreted as the perceptual source if and
only if the report gives rise to the specific acquaintance inference.
Assuming this link, the Specific with Stage-Level Generalization lends sup-
port to a non-uniform analysis of copy raising reports with ‘seem’ and ‘look’.
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This is because the generalization holds that some copy raising reports give
rise to the specific acquaintance inference while others don’t, and hence,
given the Acquaintance/P-Source Link, that some copy raising subjects are
interpreted as p-source while others aren’t. But more significantly, the gen-
eralization offers a systematic answer to the question of which copy raising
reports get interpreted which way — something missing in previous discus-
sion of non-uniform analyses. The p-source interpretation is present, on the
current proposal, when its presence allows us to mark a distinction in percep-
tual evidential situation, and this is the case with ‘seem’-reports embedding
SLPs, but not those embedding ILPs. This is the more modest theoretical
upshot of the Specific with Stage-Level Generalization. It serves to system-
atize variable acquaintance behavior across copy raising reports, and thus to
underwrite a non-uniform analysis, on which some of these reports specify a
p-source, while other don’t.
But, here, we are imagining a more radical reaction: rejecting the Ac-
quaintance/P-Source Link altogether, and accounting for the variable ac-
quaintance behavior in a different way. Rejecting the Acquaintance/P-Source
Link opens up space for a new uniform analysis, on which all copy raising
reports have the same underlying semantic structure, while still not making
incorrect predictions about the acquaintance inferences associated with the
reports. The idea is that ‘seem’ and ‘look’ uniformly assign some role to
their subjects, but it’s not a role that builds in a perceptual requirement.
Instead it’s a more minimal role, which just requires that the subject indi-
vidual be related in an appropriate way to the embedded claim. Call this
role the evidential source (e-source): the source of perceptual evidence. On
such a view, all CR ‘seem’-reports would employ the clause given in (39)
(while CR ‘look’-reports would employ an analogous one, restricted to visual
perception).18
(39) [[seemCR*]] = λx.λP.x is the source of perceptual evidence that P (x)
The e-source is the source of appearance-based evidence. Crucially, what
18I have previously thought of this role as a kind of topic. Topics figure in linguistic
explanations in other cases, appealing to the requirement that the topic of a sentence be
characterized by the rest of the sentence. Consider, for example, the contrast between the
two sentences in (i).
(i) a. People’s Park is dangerous to meet friends in.
b. #Friends are dangerous to meet in People’s Park.
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it takes to be an e-source may vary depending on the claim that the evidence
is supposed to be evidence for. Trivially, Tom can be an evidential source for
the claim that he’s cooking, without being an evidential source one way or
the other for the claim that he’s an experienced cook — say if what he’s doing
is too basic to show the difference. To capture the results of the Specific with
Stage-Level Generalization, however, the important possibility is that what
it takes for Tom to be an e-source for a stage-level claim about him may be
more restricted than what it takes for Tom to be an e-source for an individual-
level claim about him. He can be an e-source for the claim that he’s cooking
only by appearing some way himself; but he can be an e-source for the claim
that he’s an experienced cook also by being appropriately connected with the
scene in the kitchen that suggests as much. More generally, the claim would
be that an individual can only be an e-source for its possession of stage-level
properties by appearing some way itself; whereas it can be an e-source for
its possession of individual-level properties not only by appearing some way
itself, but also by being appropriately connected with some other scene that
appears some way.
Note that on this approach, there are two very different ways for a ‘seem’-
report to lack the specific acquaintance inference. Expletive subject reports
lack this inference, because nothing in particular is singled out as the e-
source. Copy raising reports with embedded ILPs lack this inference too,
but not because no e-source is specified. Rather, they lack the inference,
because something can be an e-source without being perceived.
The new uniform e-source approach thus captures the variable acquain-
(i-a) is fine, since the topic subject, ‘People’s Park’, is characterized by the rest of the
sentence in a reasonable way. By contrast, (i-b) is odd, since the rest of the sentence doesn’t
give a reasonable characterization of ‘friends’. The thought is that copy raising reports
also require a kind of characterization of the matrix subject (and this may be understood
flexibly enough that it doesn’t always require the subject to be perceived). Kim (2014)
thinks of the matrix copy raising subject as a topic, leading to the pragmatic “perceptual
characterization condition” on CR reports that “the matrix subject of the CR construction,
serving as the topic, is ‘perceptually characterized’ by the rest of the utterance” (p. 183).
The new uniform approach I’m suggesting is partly inspired by his work; but it differs
in at least two ways. First, I take the interpretation of the matrix subject as evidential
source or appearance topic to replace its interpretation as the perceptual source; it’s not
clear if Kim would endorse this, given that he talks as if the characterization condition
comes along with the p-source interpretation of the matrix subject (see p. 184). Second, I
employ the minimal nature of the e-source role to explain why some copy raising reports
don’t give rise to the specific acquaintance inference, while Kim uses his topic approach
primarily to explain cases where the specific inference is present.
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tance behavior of copy raising ‘seem’-reports, without positing different se-
mantic structures for surface-alike sentences. The explanation rests on inde-
pendent facts about stage- and individual-level properties, and what it takes
to be sources of evidence for their presence. While this is an important ad-
vantage, the approach also faces some open questions. I will briefly discuss
three.
First, the e-source approach owes more of an explanation for the different
evidential behavior of SLPs and ILPs. The claim is that Tom himself can’t
be the e-source for the claim that he’s cooking, in the absent cook case. Still,
in that scenario, something — say, the scene in the kitchen — must be an
e-source. This is what allows the expletive subject report to be appropriate.
So far, so good. But the e-source approach must say something very different
about the individual-level example (the absent experienced cook case). In
that case, Tom — Tom himself, and not just the scene in the kitchen! — can
be the e-source for the claim that he’s an experienced cook, even if he isn’t
present. This is what is supposed to explain why the CR report embedding
‘an experienced cook’ doesn’t give rise to the specific acquaintance inference.
But why would this be? We would like to have something more to say here.
Second, the e-source approach faces a challenge from ‘seem’-reports with-
out embedded pronouns that co-refer with the subject.
(40) Pavi seems like the baby didn’t sleep last night.
There has been some controversy over the acceptability of such copy free
(CF) reports.19 I hold, following Landau (2011) and Kim (2014), that they
can be acceptable, given the right context. CF reports all give rise to the
specific acquaintance inference. For (40) to be appropriate, the speaker must
have perceived Pavi, perhaps having walked in looking sleep-deprived, or
otherwise showing signs of having been kept up by a baby. Reports like
these pose a challenge for the e-source analysis because there are minimal
pairs of CR and CF reports, with equivalent embedded clauses, but which
differ in their acquaintance requirements.
(41) Context A and B walk by their neighbor, Charlie’s house. A notices
that a ground-floor window has been smashed. The address of the
house is 12 Front Street.
a. A: Charlie seems like he’s been burgled.
19See, e.g., Asudeh and Toivonen 2012, p. 330
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b. #A: Charlie seems like 12 Front Street has been burgled.
The CF report in (41-b) is clearly unacceptable in the context described,
where Charlie himself is not perceived by the speaker. (The report could be
acceptable in a context where Charlie comes in looking distraught, and the
speaker knows that Charlie has two houses, but cares much more about the
house at 12 Front Street.) This is unexpected on the e-source approach. To
the extent that the CR report in (41-a) is acceptable, the e-source analysis
holds that this is because Charlie can be an evidential source for the claim
that he’s been burgled, even if he’s not present. But if he’s the e-source
for that claim, surely he can equally be the e-source for the (known-to-be)
extensionally equivalent claim that 12 Front Street has been burgled. The
e-source analysis seems to be at a loss to explain why CR and CF reports
should have such different acquaintance requirements.20 There is the option
of holding that while CR ‘seem’-reports have e-source matrix subjects, CF
reports have proper p-source subjects. Without more explanation, though,
this would be a somewhat ad hoc move.
Third, an open question for the e-source analysis for ‘seem’ and ‘look’
together is how it accounts for differences between these two verbs. As we
saw in §3.3.4, some ILP-embedding ‘look’-reports retain the requirement of
perceiving the subject much more strongly than ‘seem’-reports with the same
embedded predicates. The e-source analysis can explain some differences
between these verbs, as it requires that the subject in a ‘look’-report be
the source of visual perceptual evidence, whereas the subject in a ‘seem’-
report must just be the source of (general) perceptual evidence. However,
this difference does not readily explain the observed contrasts, given that in
all of the scenarios considered, there was visual evidence for the embedded
claim. Perhaps, then, with ‘look’, we should return to a less radical approach,
and adopt a non-uniform analysis, on which some copy raising subjects are
interpreted as the perceptual source and others are not. The data found
here would go some way towards systematizing the interpretations. With
20Malte Willer (p.c.) notes that (i) is about as awkward as (41-b) in the context
described.
(i) Charlie’s house seems like 12 Front Street has been burgled.
This is unexpected given what I’ve said, and suggests more complications with copy free
cases. It also shows that mere coreference between the matrix subject and embedded DP
isn’t enough to give rise to CR-like behavior.
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embedded stage-level predicates, ‘look’ would always have a p-source subject.
However, with embedded ILPs, some variability would have to be recognized.
The hope would then be that further investigation would help us better
understand what affects the way the acquaintance inference goes in any given
case.
Turn now to ‘smell’, ‘taste’, ‘feel’ and perception-based ‘sound’. Copy
raising reports in all of these cases invariably give rise to the specific ac-
quaintance inference, and are thus infelicitous in contexts where the speaker
is not acquainted with the referent of the matrix subject. If we wanted to
extend the e-source approach to these verbs, we would have to hold that it
is impossible for some individual to be an olfactory, gustatory, etc. source
of evidence for some claim about it, without it appearing some way itself.
This would have the result that the e-source analysis predicts just what a
uniform p-source analysis does, about these cases. The question then is just
why olfactory, gustatory, etc. evidence should work this way, while general
perceptual and visual evidence does not.
If that question cannot be satisfactorily answered, then we should return
to a p-source approach to ‘smell’, ‘taste’, etc. — while, however, retaining for
‘seem’ and ‘look’ whatever account best fit the variability displayed by them.
This would reintroduce some non-uniformity into the picture. But it is a less
troubling kind of non-uniformity than that endorsed by Landau (2011) and
Doran (2015), as it cuts across reports with different verbs. As ‘smell’, ‘taste’,
etc. do display very different acquaintance behavior from ‘seem’ and ‘look’, it
is not theoretically troubling to posit importantly different meanings for the
first class of verb compared with the second. By contrast, it is theoretically
rather troubling to posit different meanings for ‘seem’ to account for the
different acquaintance inferences across copy raising cases, all with that same
verb (like in the “absent cook” vs “absent experienced cook” cases discussed
earlier). Moreover, that appearance verbs in these two groups should have
slightly different meanings in this way is not surprising, given the prominence
in human cognition of visual perception for gathering evidence — a fact
that is very plausibly reflected in language, given that, as Aikhenvald (2004,
Chapter 2) discusses, many languages have designated evidential markers
for claims based on vision, while none have designated evidential markers
for claims based specifically on taste, smell, or touch (though many have a
general marker for non-visual perceptual source of evidence, and some have
77
Chapter 3. Appearance reports and the acquaintance inference
designated auditory markers).21
Finally, we should consider representation-based reports with ‘sound’
(and ‘seem’). Within a broader e-source approach, representation-based uses
of these reports may admit of a fairly straightforward explanation. We said
that an e-source is the source of appearance-based evidence for the embedded
claim. Well, it would be somewhat natural to allow an individual to be an
e-source not only by appearing some way itself, but also by being represented
in a way that is perceptually-received. In other words an individual can be an
e-source either directly, or indirectly, via a representation of it. Then we just
have to ensure that we don’t predict the same flexibility with ‘taste’, ‘smell’
and ‘feel’. This would be done most straightforwardly just by holding onto
the p-source analysis for those, fully perceptual verbs — an option noted in
the previous paragraph.
Alternatively, we might posit an ambiguity in ‘sound’ (and perhaps in
‘seem’ as well). Copy raising ‘sound’ would sometimes have a perceptual
source subject, and sometimes just be interpreted equivalently with its null
subject counterpart. Again, this would reintroduce some non-uniformity into
the picture. Moreover, it would be non-uniformity across reports with the
same appearance verb (and same surface syntax). This is the most potentially
troubling kind of non-uniformity. However, I believe that if it will be justified
anywhere, it will be here: to capture the difference between perceptual and
representational uses of ‘sound’ (and ‘seem’). This is because the contrast
observed, in cases (33) and (34) above, with the predicate ‘owns a cat’, is
so stark as to be safely called categorical. In this respect, it is unlike the
contrast between SLP- and ILP-embedding ‘seem’-reports, which is fuzzier,
and hence calls for a more pragmatically-based explanation, like the uniform
e-source analysis, that can allow for degrees of acceptability.
We can see that there are many theoretical choice points, once we expand
our view to cover appearance reports with the specific sensory verbs, in ad-
dition to ‘seem’. Our ultimate story should be a result of weighing empirical
21Brugman and Macaulay (2015, pp. 227–228) discuss a case that they take to suggest
that a language (Karuk) has a designated auditory evidential but no designated visual
one, which would go against the hierarchy suggested by Aikhenvald 2004; Willett 1988 and
others. For my purposes, the interesting cross-linguistic fact is that vision is very often
distinct from the other specific senses, and that no languages have interesting variation
across ‘smell’, ‘taste’, and ‘feel’. Distinctive behavior of auditory evidentials may show
parallels with English ‘sound’, which is also interestingly different from the other sensory
verbs, as I’ll return to below.
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adequacy and more theoretical considerations, like systematicity. So far, I
believe that the most promising option is as follows:
• ‘seem’, ‘look’: Uniform e-source analysis for all copy raising reports
• ‘smell’, ‘taste’, ‘feel’: Uniform p-source analysis for all copy raising
reports
• ‘sound’: Non-uniform analysis for copy raising reports, with one p-
source version, and another either e-source, or equivalent with null
subject
This may seem more complex than the phenomenon justifies. Let me
make two points to mitigate that worry. First, the data really are quite
puzzling in this domain. We not only see variability in what kind of acquain-
tance copy raising reports of various forms require of the speaker, but we
also see differences in how categorical the requirements are. I believe that
this empirical situation naturally calls for different forms of explanation for
different cases.
Second, viewing appearance reports in English as accomplishing some-
thing similar to evidential constructions in other languages, can help us see
more order in the picture we’ve arrived at. Evidentials are markers of source
of information (as opposed to strength of conviction, as epistemic modals
indicate). Thus many languages have evidential markers for things like in-
ference, perception, hearsay, and so on. Appearance reports indeed serve to
communicate this kind of evidential meaning in English. Most appearance
reports serve to mark a perceptual basis for one’s claim. And as noted above,
many languages have designated evidential markers for general perception,
or visual perception, while none have special distinctions for the other four
sensory modalities. The pattern we’ve found in English is consistent with
this, where we see special behavior for the more general perceptual ‘seem’
and the visual ‘look’, as compared with the other specific sensory verbs.
But we’ve also seen some appearance reports marking a kind of repre-
sentational basis for one’s claim. This was clearest in uses of ‘sound’ based
on a heard description. Here, the function of the ‘sound’ report seems to
map onto something more like a hearsay-based evidential. And indeed, this
is another category that many languages specifically mark out. It thus may
be that ‘sound’ in English serves two importantly different evidential func-
tions, which should be unified with different cross-linguistically-recognized
categories, the first being perceptual, and the second testimonial.
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3.4.4 Summary of theoretical options
The empirical landscape we’ve mapped out is consistent with adopting only
(restricted) uniform analyses for copy raising reports. However, we must
adopt different kinds of uniform analyses for the different matrix verbs: uni-
form p-source analyses for ‘smell’, ‘taste’, ‘feel’, and ‘sound’; and uniform
e-source analyses for ‘seem’ and ‘look’.22
Moreover, we might hold on to some of these theoretical choices, while
questioning others. Let’s consider two possible departures from the sugges-
tions just given.
First, we might adopt a uniform e-source analysis for all appearance verbs.
In this case, we would owe an explanation for why CR reports with ‘smell’,
‘taste’, and ‘feel’ always require perception of the matrix subject, whereas
CR reports with ‘look’ and ‘seem’ do not. Within the e-source approach,
the answer would have to appeal to a difference between, on the one hand,
what it takes to be a source of olfactory, gustatory, or tactile evidence, and,
on the other, what it takes to be a source of visual or general perceptual
evidence. The availability of such an explanation is doubtful, however, given
that a contrast persists between CR reports with ‘seem’ and ‘smell’, even
in a scenario when the evidence is olfactory, as illustrated in (42) (and note
that the ES ‘smell’-report is fine).
(42) A walks into Tom’s kitchen. Tom isn’t there, but A can smell the
soup he’s been cooking and the balance of aromas suggests that it is
expertly-made.
a. A: Tom seems like he’s an experienced cook.
b. #A: Tom smells like he’s an experienced cook.
c. A: It smells like Tom is an experienced cook.
Second, if we doubt that representation-based CR reports with ‘sound’ can
be adequately captured within a uniform p-source analysis, then we might
opt for a non-uniform p-source analysis for ‘sound’-reports. This would in
fact interact with the other choices we’ve made. For if we adopt a non-
uniform analysis for ‘sound’, then there might be some pressure to also adopt
22A remaining question is how this accounts for cases like that of the missing guitar
string, from Doran (2015). How much of a problem these cases are for a uniform p-source
analysis seems to depend on whether the phenomenon is the same with ‘taste’ (say) as
with ‘look’ or ‘sound’. As mentioned in footnote 17, we remain somewhat unclear on this
data.
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one for ‘seem’ and ‘look’, given that they too allow for representation-based
uses. In that case, ‘sound’ would have both a p-source version (analogous to
(38-a)), and a version assigning no role to the subject (analogous to (38-b));
and ‘seem’ and ‘look’ would have both e-source versions (like (39)), and
a version assigning no role to the subject (again, like (38-b)). The latter,
ES-equivalent, versions would be specifically for claims made on the basis of
descriptions or representations. This idea carries some plausibility, given con-
nections between appearance language in English and evidential vocabulary
cross-linguistically — a topic I turn to in the next section.
3.5 Appearance reports and evidentiality
Many theorists have observed that appearance vocabulary in English conveys
evidential information (Rett and Hyams, 2014; Chapman et al., 2015; Asudeh
and Toivonen, 2017). Here I distinguish four facets of this connection to
evidentiality.
First, as I have discussed at length in this chapter, at least some copy
raising appearance reports convey that the speaker’s evidence is from direct
perception of the referent of the matrix subject.
Second, and independently, all of the appearance claims we’ve been dis-
cussing — of both copy raising and expletive subject forms — convey that
the speaker has perceptual evidence (through the relevant sensory modality,
if specified) for the embedded claim. I will discuss this feature of appearance
claims at greater length in Chapter 4, but at this point, let me just note
that this evidential information shares three key features that have been as-
sociated with evidentiality in the literature (see e.g. Korotkova 2016b and
references therein). First, as is often taken to be at least partly definitional
of evidentials, they impose restrictions on the type of evidence the speaker
must have (visual with ‘look’, olfactory with ‘smell’, an so on). Second, they
are as a default speaker-oriented in assertions of unembedded and unmod-
ified sentences. That is, it is the speaker, and not any other subject, who
must have the perceptual evidence in question.23 And third, the evidential
information cannot be directly challenged in conversation. That this holds
for the evidential implications of appearance claims illustrated in (43).
(43) A: It looks like John is tired.
23The analogous observation about predicates of personal taste is that they are by
default “autocentric” (Lasersohn, 2005).
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# B: No, you don’t have visual evidence for that.
Although appearance language in English does not count as a grammati-
cal evidential system in the sense of Aikhenvald 2004; Brugman and Macaulay
2015, it nonetheless serves to communicate information, about source of ev-
idence, that is of the same kind as that communicated through grammatical
evidentiality. And, moreover, it does so in a way that results in this infor-
mation having a similar discourse status. In this respect, appearance verbs
in English and grammatical evidentials in other languages both differ from
expressions like ‘I heard. . . ’ where the speaker having a certain kind of ev-
idence becomes part of the literal content of the resulting sentence — only
anchored to the speaker because of the pronoun ‘I’, and targetable by a direct
challenge (‘No, you didn’t hear that’).24
Furthermore, there is at least a preference for this to be only indirect
evidence for the embedded claim. When the truth of the embedded claim is
completely evident, requiring no inference, then the bare assertion would be
more appropriate than the appearance claim:
(44) A is standing in the pouring rain.
a. A: It’s raining.
b. ?A: It looks like it’s raining.
In this respect, appearance verbs behave somewhat similarly to epistemic
‘must’ (Chapman et al., 2015; von Fintel and Gillies, 2010). However, though
some theorists build an indirectness requirement into the semantics of ‘must’,
it seems merely to be a pragmatic preference in the case of appearance re-
ports.
Third, some theorists have proposed that the reason why appearance
claims give rise to perceptual requirements, or the acquaintance inference in
the first place is that they communicate a commitment to direct evidential-
24Of course, it is odd to challenge a speaker about what they heard, given that there is
often a presumption that they would be better informed about this than their interlocutor.
But this kind of oddness does not call for any special linguistic explanation. (Though
compare Korotkova 2016a.)
82
Chapter 3. Appearance reports and the acquaintance inference
ity.25 This is consistent with the previous point, as the suggestion here is that
with an appearance report, we convey commitment to direct evidence for the
claim (say) that Tom looks like he’s cooking, whereas the previous point was
that we convey that we have only indirect evidence for the claim that he’s
cooking. I will return to this approach in §4.5.1, where I will consider how
it compares to my own expressivist strategy for predicting the acquaintance
inferences of appearance reports.
Fourth, the pattern that we have seen emerge with copy raising appear-
ance reports fits within a cross-linguistic pattern of evidential constructions.
Many languages have designated evidentials for claims based on perception
in general, or specifically on visual perception; but none have designated ev-
identials for the specific senses of taste, smell, or touch (Aikhenvald, 2004,
p. 64). The split that we have found, between the behavior of the general
perceptual ‘seem’, and the visual ‘look’, on one side, and the rest of the spe-
cific sensory verbs on the other side, conforms to this pattern. While some
languages have been found to have auditory evidential markers, many do not
distinguish amongst the non-visual senses. In having uniform behavior across
the sensory verbs other than ‘look’, English conforms to this pattern.26 Fur-
thermore, many languages have designated evidentials for claims based on
hearsay or testimony. Representation-based ‘sound’-reports seem to signal
something similar in English. If this is right, then ‘sound’ has two impor-
tantly different evidential meanings — the one auditory perceptual, and the
other testimonial.27
There is a great deal of variability in the perceptual requirements of ap-
25See e.g. Anand and Korotkova (2018); Mun˜oz (2019); Klempner (2018). For an
alternative approach along the lines I will elaborate in Chapter 4: Franze´n (2018), Charlow
(2018). Note that once our target is explaining the origins of these requirements, it actually
becomes implausible to ever build anything about perception into the semantics of the
vocabulary in question (Ninan, 2014). This is a critique of the perceptual source approach
to copy raising that is independent of those raised in this chapter, and I address it further
in the next chapter.
26Of course, the sensory verbs in English are specific to particular sensory modalities.
So in this way (as well as others — I’ll return to this more in the next chapter) they are
unlike the sensory evidentials identified cross-linguistically. The parallel that I am noting
is rather in patterns of similarity and difference. Where it is common across languages to
mark off the visual perceptual as distinct from the other senses, so we also see in English
distinct behavior of the appearance verb ‘look’, as compared with the others.
27And ‘look’ and ‘seem’ may also have testimonial meanings, given that reports can
be received visually as well as auditorally.
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pearance reports. But we find more order in the picture than there may
initially seem to be, once we appreciate parallels between appearance con-
structions in English and evidentials more generally.
3.6 Acquaintance, evidence, and evaluation
I began with an illustration of the acquaintance inference with assertions
about matters of personal taste. These are evaluative claims, in the sense that
they express a valenced judgment of the subject matter. I then transitioned
to a discussion of the acquaintance inference with appearance reports, which
are not necessarily evaluative in that sense. We saw that the acquaintance
inferences of appearance reports are variable in a way that has no analogue in
the evaluative cases. In particular, appearance reports call for a distinction
between the specific acquaintance inference (that the speaker is acquainted
with a specific individual), and the general acquaintance inference (that the
speaker is acquainted with something or other relevant to the embedded
claim). I have discussed in depth when each type of inference arises with
appearance reports, and have suggested that recognizing the evidential role
of appearance reports helps us to systematize and make sense of the observed
behavior.
Having arrived at this point, a natural question is whether we have learned
anything of relevance to the evaluative cases that we jumped off from. Here,
I would like to mention three broad possibilities, as avenues for further in-
vestigation. The first is simply that we have identified two distinct sources
of acquaintance inferences: evaluation and appearance-based evidentiality.
It may just be that, possibly for different reasons, speakers must rely on
their own first-hand acquaintance in making simple claims in both of these
domains. However, more unification is tempting, as well as plausible.
This brings me to the second possibility, which is that evidentiality is
the ultimate source of the acquaintance inference in all cases, evaluative
and non-evaluative. Some theorists have suggested that the acquaintance
inference has its origins in the speaker’s commitment to direct evidentiality.28
Then, the burden as far as the cases I’ve been focused on in this chapter are
concerned, is to get clearer on the contents of copy raising reports of various
kinds, to better understand why direct evidence for them takes different forms
in the various cases observed. And moreover, we would need to get clearer
on the comparison between the evaluative and appearance-based cases, in
28See e.g. Anand and Korotkova (2018); Mun˜oz (2019); Klempner (2018).
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order to understand why the former invariably have the specific acquaintance
inference. Perhaps this could be explained by assimilating them to perceptual
source appearance cases, but this remains an open question.
A third option, which would also aim to unify the acquaintance inference
across evaluative and non-evaluative language, is to find a “common cause”
responsible for both. Here, a natural option is experientiality — and this
is the view that I believe is most promising for accounting not only for the
acquaintance inference, but also for other puzzling behavior of appearance
language and the language of personal taste, such as the possibility of faultless
disagreement.29 The idea here is that simple assertions of all of these kinds
serve to express features of the speaker’s experience, and this experience in
turn can provide evidence or be the basis of evaluation. This is the view I
will develop in the next chapter.
29Other work that points in this direction to account for the acquaintance inference is
found in Franze´n (2018); Charlow (2018).
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Expressing experiences
We started by noting a parallel between certain appearance claims and simple
claims with predicates of personal taste: both give rise to the inference that
the speaker is acquainted with some specific individual.
(1) A: The cake is tasty.  A has tasted the cake.
(2) A: Ben looks like he’s cooking.  A has seen Ben.
In the previous chapter, I called this the specific acquaintance inference, and
contrasted it with the general acquaintance inference which is simply the
inference that the speaker is acquainted with something of relevance, left
unspecified. As we saw, some appearance claims, like those in (3) and (4),
license only the general inference.
(3) It looks like Ben is cooking.
(4) Beth looks like she’s well-organized.
While appearance claims are variable in terms of which types of acquaintance
inferences they license, all simple claims with predicates of personal taste
license the specific acquaintance inference.1 I want to zoom out for a moment,
away from thinking about the variability in acquaintance requirements across
appearance reports, and instead towards thinking about the status of these
1There is, however, a caveat that applies to both appearance and personal taste cases,
about more generic claims, like those in (i).
(i) a. Coconut cake is tasty.
b. The sky looks orange at dusk.
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inferences with appearance reports and how we should predict them with an
overall analysis of the language in question.
The simple semantics I worked with in the previous chapter is now no
longer satisfactory. There, in order to explore the specific/general contrast,
I followed others in hardcoding some kind of perceptual requirement into
the semantics. This is incorrect, though, as I flagged at the end of the
previous chapter (footnote 25). The acquaintance inference — either specific
or general — is not well captured as part of the literal semantic content of
appearance claims or claims about matters of personal taste. In this chapter,
I’m going to present an overall picture that does better, but that can still
incorporate the insights from the previous chapter.
Before getting to the substance of that discussion, however, I would like
to revise some of the terminology I’ve been using. The terminology of the
“general acquaintance inference”, while useful for contrast with the specific
inference, is not especially descriptive of what the inference actually is. Im-
portantly, appearance reports don’t just require acquaintance with some-
thing, but with something of evidential relevance to the truth of the embed-
ded clause. For this reason, I will now call these “evidential inferences” (and
“acquaintance inferences” will now simply refer to the specific acquaintance
inferences that theorists initially had in mind under this label):
(5) A: Ben looks like he’s cooking.
 A has seen Ben. Acquaintance inference
 A has visual evidence that Ben is cooking. Evidential inference
(6) A: It looks like Ben is cooking.
6 A has seen Ben. No acquaintance inference
 A has visual evidence that Ben is cooking. Evidential inference
Thus, all appearance reports2 give rise to evidential inferences. (A better
label might be “perceptual evidential inferences”, since the distinctive thing
about appearance claims is that they require perceptual evidence, through
In these cases, I would hold that the specific inference is still present, but the relevant
“specific” thing changes from an individual to a kind. Note that these are just ordinary
generic statements (though of course subject to all the challenges that genericity comes
along with, see e.g. Carlson and Pelletier 1995). This is independent of the possibility, sug-
gested for instance by Moltmann (2010) and mentioned above in §2.2.3, that experiential
claims involve something like generic quantification over experiencers.
2At least those with ‘like’-complements embedding finite clauses; I’ll return to other
syntactic forms in §4.5.3.
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the sensory modality associated with the matrix verb, for the embedded
claim. I will, however, stick with the shorter label.) Only some give rise to
acquaintance inferences. Furthermore, while all simple predications of predi-
cates of personal taste give rise to acquaintance inferences, none seem to give
rise to evidential inferences. But while evidential inferences are unique to ap-
pearance reports, the theoretical framework that I will present for capturing
them can also tell us something about the origins of traditional acquaintance
inferences.
Here is the plan for this chapter. I will turn in §4.1 to clarify the status
of the evidential and acquaintance inferences. This will make two related
points: first, that these inferences do not fit into standardly-recognized cat-
egories of inferences; second, that it is incorrect to build anything about
perception into the literal content of appearance claims. Then, in §4.2 I will
present an analysis of expletive subject appearance sentences, like that in (6),
that takes them to denote properties of subjects’ experiential states, rather
than propositions as traditionally understood. This analysis combines ele-
ments of the Kratzerian modal semantics for copy raising constructions due
to Doran (2015), with expressivist elements from Yalcin (2007, 2011); Char-
low (2018). In §4.3, I’ll explain how this approach straightforwardly predicts
the evidential inferences associated with appearance claims, and may also be
extended to capture the acquaintance inferences of both appearance claims
and claims about matters of personal taste. In §4.4, I’ll show how the expe-
riential state analysis can also elegantly capture the phenomenon of faultless
disagreement about both personal tastes and appearances. Finally, in §4.5,
I’ll discuss some remaining open questions for my approach.
4.1 Acquaintance and evidential inferences
Here, again, is our original example of an evidential inference licensed by an
appearance claim:
(7) A: It looks like John is tired.
 A has visual evidence that John is tired.
As outlined above, the content of this inference is distinct from the content
of traditional acquaintance inferences, as in (8).
(8) A: John looks like he’s tired.  A has seen John.
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But evidential inferences share with acquaintance inferences a puzzling sta-
tus: they appear not to fit into any of the following standard categories of
inferences: entailments, presuppositions, or implicatures. I will take these
in reverse order below, before also considering a final more plausible option
inspired by Ninan 2014 (with which my eventual proposal will share some
features) that we are dealing with a kind of Moorean epistemic inference.
4.1.1 Implicature
To begin, neither acquaintance nor evidential inferences are standard Gricean
conversational implicatures. These are inferences based on the literal con-
tent of a claim together with speakers’ assumptions that their interlocutors
are following maxims of cooperative conversation (Grice, 1975). Traditional
tests for these inferences is that they can be canceled without contradiction,
and reinforced without redundancy, as illustrated in (9) — showing that the
inference from ‘or’ to ‘not both’ is a conversational implicature.
(9) a. Ann ate ice cream or cookies. In fact, both. Cancellation
b. Ann ate ice cream or cookies, but not both. Reinforcement
Of course, it is crucial that the sentence have the default implication to
begin with: that is, that ‘Ann ate ice cream or cookies’ carry, as a default
the implication that Ann didn’t eat both. A justification of the inference
as a conversational implicature more specifically also requires a story about
why an ‘or’ sentence would naturally be taken to imply that the conjunction
is false. The standard explanation here makes use of the maxims of quality
and quantity: if the speaker believed the conjunction to be true, they should
have said that; since they didn’t, they probably think it’s false; assuming
they are well informed, infer that the conjunction is false. The point of the
cancellation and reinforcement tests is to show that this inference is not an
entailment of the ‘or’ sentence, but rather contributes distinct information,
which speakers will of course often wish to contribute with such an utterance,
but may also appropriately deny.
The acquaintance inference does not have this status. It cannot be felic-
itously canceled, as in (10).
(10) #John looks like he’s tired, but I haven’t seen him.
Indeed, this kind of sentence has been used precisely to motivate the existence
of the acquaintance inference. That would hardly work if the inference could
be canceled as with conversational implicatures.
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An attempt to reinforce the inference, as in (11), while not infelicitous,
is interestingly different from the reinforcement case in (9-b).
(11) John looks like he’s tired; I saw him.
Here, the second clause explains one’s basis for saying the first. This will
be expected, given the account I’ll go on to give. For now, the point is just
that even though “reinforcement” doesn’t clearly show that we don’t have
an implicature on our hands, it also doesn’t speak in favor of implicature. So
given the clear non-cancellability of the acquaintance inference, I conclude
that it is not a standard Gricean implicature.
The evidential inference also resists cancellation, as in (12).
(12) #It looks like John is tired, but I don’t have visual evidence that he
is.
And again, and attempt to reinforce it, in (13), has the flavor of giving one’s
justification for the first clause, as with the acquaintance case in (11).
(13) It looks like John is tired; I have visual evidence for it.
4.1.2 Presupposition
A presupposition of a given sentence is a species of “projected content,”
meaning that sentences carrying these inferences continue to carry them, even
when embedded in various environments in which ordinary entailments are
canceled. The presence of a presupposition is traditionally probed through
the “family of sentences” test (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Ton-
hauser et al., 2013). That is, these inferences are drawn not only from a
simple unembedded sentence, but also from its negation, a question formed
from it, and other embedding constructions. To illustrate, all of the sentences
in (14) imply that John used to smoke — showing that the pre-state of the
change-of-state verb ‘stop’ is projective.
(14) a. John stopped smoking.
b. John didn’t stop smoking.
c. Did John stop smoking?
d. John might have stopped smoking.
By contrast, only (14-a), implies that John no longer smokes — that is an en-
tailment of (14-a), but as it does not persist in the family of sentences (14-b)–
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(14-d), it does not project. There are many types of projective content with
different properties. For our purposes, the important point is that though
the acquaintance inference shares some behavior with projective content, it
doesn’t at all fit neatly into recognized categories of such content. And nei-
ther does the evidential inference.
There is some initial plausibility to the idea that acquaintance inferences
are inferences to presuppositions, and they are analyzed as such by Pearson
(2013). This is because the acquaintance inference appears to project in
negated contexts, as in (15).
(15) a. A: The cake isn’t tasty.  A has tried the cake.
b. #The cake isn’t tasty, but I haven’t tried it.
But as Ninan (2014) has shown, this is a misleading piece of evidence. Ac-
quaintance inferences aren’t plausibly presuppositions, as they fail to project
out of many environments out of which presuppositions ordinarily do project.
For instance, (16), with ‘tasty’ under epistemic ‘might’ is perfectly accept-
able, although it denies the content of the acquaintance inference.
(16) The cake might be tasty, but I haven’t tried it.
This doesn’t definitively rule out the acquaintance inference being a very
distinctive kind of projective content.3 However, this would not be a very
3In the taxonomy of Tonhauser et al. 2013, it is of a type that doesn’t have a “strong
contextual felicity” condition: it need not already be part of the common ground that Ann
have tasted the cake for her to say that it’s tasty. It also seems not to have an “obligatory
local effect”: in belief reports, as in (i), it is not always the case that the attitude holder
must (on pains of having inconsistent attitudes) believe the content of the acquaintance
inference.
(i) Ann believes the cake is tasty. . .
a. but she doesn’t believe she’s tried it.
b. but she (knows she) hasn’t tried it.
This last point, however, runs into challenging issues about the extent to which various
attitude reports carry a presumption of indirect evidence, which may then interact with
special features of experiential expressions. For note that while there may be no obligatory
local effect in a ‘believes’ attitude report, there clearly is with ‘find’:
(ii) Ann finds the cake tasty. . .
a. #but she doesn’t believe she’s tried it.
b. #but she (knows she) hasn’t tried it.
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helpful categorization. Rather than taking the acquaintance inference to be
an extremely constrained form of projective content, it is much more plausible
that it is not, at bottom, projective, but that features of negated sentences
for independent reasons are such as to preserve the inference.
In the same way, we can see that evidential inferences are not inferences to
presupposed content on the standard understanding, as it too fails to project
when embedded under the modal in (17).
(17) A: It might look like John is tired (you should check before deciding
whether to put more make-up on him for the show).
6 A has visual evidence that John is tired.
Note that unlike with acquaintance inferences, the presupposition hypothesis
doesn’t even get any initial plausibility from negated cases when it comes to
evidential inferences. The negated appearance claim in (18) does not preserve
the same evidential inference as the unnegated version. Indeed, it instead
licenses the inference that the speaker has evidence for the negation of the
embedded claim.
(18) A: It doesn’t look like John is tired.
6 A has visual evidence that John is tired.
 A has visual evidence that John isn’t tired.
This latter fact — that an evidential inference, though in negated form, per-
sists with the negated appearance sentence — may just be due to the fact
that appearance verbs like ‘look’ are “neg-raising”: the negation, which ap-
pears syntactically as matrix negation, is naturally interpreted as embedded
beneath ‘look’. That is, (19-a) and (19-b) are naturally heard as equivalent.
(19) a. It doesn’t look like John is tired.
b. It looks like John isn’t tired.
If we instead force the negation to be interpreted at the matrix level, as
in (20), then it’s unclear that any particular inference about the speaker’s
visual evidence persists.
(20) It’s not the case that it looks like John is tired.
I’ll say a bit more about attitude reports embedding experiential sentences in §4.2.2.
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4.1.3 Entailment
Acquaintance inferences are also not inferences to entailed content. The fact
that acquaintance inferences project out of negated contexts is enough to rule
this out, though we can also show it, as does Ninan (2014), by noting that the
falsity of the acquaintance inferences does not seem to affect our assessment
of the truth of the sentence giving rise to it. This can be seen through the
oddness of claims like (21-a) — showing that the fact that the acquaintance
inference is false doesn’t automatically make the taste claim that licenses
it false. And the same point can be made with counterfactual sentences,
like (21-b): the intuition that such a counterfactual can be true shows that a
supposition that the acquaintance inference is false doesn’t necessarily affect
the truth of the taste sentence.
(21) a. #The cake isn’t tasty, because I haven’t tried it.
b. Even if no one tasted it, this cake would still be tasty.
This same strategy shows that evidential inferences, though like entailments
in failing to project out of negated contexts, also do not have the status of
ordinary entailments.
(22) a. #It’s not the case that it looks like John is tired, because I don’t
have visual evidence that he is.
b. Even if no one had been around to see, it would still have looked
like that wall was about to fall down.4
Dependence of appearance or taste sentences on the truth of the acquain-
tance or evidential inferences seems wrong. Like acquaintance inferences,
the evidential inferences associated with appearance claims seem to be tied
to the felicity of utterances, rather than to definedness-conditions or truth-
conditions. This is the idea that leads to the epistemic proposal that I turn
to next.
4.1.4 Epistemic inferences
Ninan (2014) sketches one way of making good on the idea that acquaintance
inference are tied to felicity conditions. More specifically, he suggests that
acquaintance inferences are a sort of Moorean epistemic effect, arising from a
combination of two factors: first, a knowledge norm of assertion (Williamson,
4I change to a different embedded claim here so that we can imagine there are no
perceivers at all in the counterfactual scenario.
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1996, 2000); and second, a restriction on ways of knowing facts about matters
of taste (and, I would add, appearances). The idea is that one can’t come to
know that, say, the cake is tasty without having gustatory acquaintance with
the cake; and so one can’t assert that the cake is tasty without having had
such acquaintance, because there is a norm to only assert what one knows.
This idea can be extended to evidential inferences as well. Say appearance
claims convey that there is the appropriate kind of sensory evidence for the
prejacent. Perhaps we can’t know such a thing without experiencing that
evidence ourselves. If so, then the same epistemic story that Ninan suggests
to explain why the acquaintance inferences arise would also explain why the
evidential inferences do.
While I believe this story is on the right track in many ways, it is not yet
fully satisfactory. I will review three challenges it faces.
First, as Ninan himself acknowledges, the advocate of this view should be
able to say more about why knowledge of matters of taste and appearances
is restricted in this particular way. Franze´n (2018, p. 5) makes this challenge
more pointed by emphasizing that it seems that beliefs in these areas can have
all kinds of positive features associated with knowledge (e.g. justification,
certainty). So what’s the missing mysterious element preventing us from
bridging the gap from these strong epistemic states to knowledge? (Of course,
someone like Williamson, who takes knowledge to be unanalyzable, may not
be terribly moved by this worry.) Furthermore, as Klempner (2018) and
others have emphasized, it is perfectly felicitous to make epistemic ‘must’
claims, as in (23), even without the relevant acquaintance.
(23) The cake must be tasty (I haven’t tried it, but look at how quickly
everyone is gobbling it up).
Second, it actually seems — at least as far as linguistic evidence is con-
cerned — that we can have knowledge of experiential facts, even when the
acquaintance and evidential inferences are not satisfied. As Mun˜oz (2018)
points out, knowledge claims can be fully felicitous, even if one makes clear
that one has only indirect evidence for the experiential claim:
(24) I know that the tripe is delicious . . .
a. because Alfonse made it.
b. because it’s made from honeycomb beef. (Mun˜oz, 2018, p. 11)
And the same observation holds for the evidential inferences of appearance
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claims:
(25) I know that Smith’s paintings look like they were made by children. . .
because that’s what the review said.
Mun˜oz strengthens this point with data from Standard Tibetan, a language
that has distinct copulas for claims based on direct and indirect evidence.
He shows that so long as the indirect copula is used, experiential claims are
fine without acquaintance on the part of the speaker. And moreover, such
a claim is actually infelicitous when conjoined with the denial of knowledge.
This is a highly unexpected result, if the acquaintance inference is supposed
to originate due to the impossibility of gaining knowledge of experiential
matters without first-hand acquaintance.
Third, the epistemic approach faces the question of which predicates are
associated with the proposed knowledge restriction. There may be a variety
of possible answers here, but as Charlow (2018, p. 3) points out, a natural
one is that it is predicates used to “express [features] of one’s perceptual
experience of an object.” If something like this is correct, though, it seems
that the epistemic story becomes unnecessary. Instead of taking expression
of experience to explain facts about knowledge, and then facts about knowl-
edge to explain facts about when it’s appropriate to make certain assertions,
we might explain the assertion facts directly in terms of the facts about
experiential meaning. This, indeed, is the approach that I believe is most
promising.
The analysis I turn to in §4.2 will hold onto the idea that the acquaintance
and evidential inferences are tied to felicity of utterance. However, it cashes
this out in a different way from the epistemic approach, thus avoiding these
problems.
4.1.5 Explicitly relativized cases
This has so far all been about the acquaintance and evidential inferences
of bare appearance claims. To round out the empirical picture, it is worth
reviewing what becomes of these inferences when a claim is explicitly rela-
tivized with a ‘to’ prepositional phrase, as in (26).
(26) A: It looks to Beth like John is tired.
In such relativized cases, two key things change. First, the subject whose
experiences matter is not the speaker, as in the bare cases, but rather the
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one the claim is explicitly relativized to — Beth in (26). Second, the infer-
ences no longer have the unique puzzling status just discussed for bare cases.
Instead, there is a simple entailment that the experiencer’s perception yield
the relevant evidence.
(27) A: It looks to Beth like John is tired.
⇒ Beth has visual evidence that John is tired.
If Beth doesn’t have visual evidence that John is tired, then the utterance
in (27) is simply false. Moreover, that we don’t have a presupposition on
our hands can be seen from the fact that the inference is canceled under
negation in (28-a), as well as in other entailment canceling environments,
like the question in (28-b).
(28) a. It doesn’t look to Beth like John is tired.
b. Does it look to Beth like John is tired?
Notice also that not only does (28-a) fail to imply that Beth has any visual
evidence that John is tired, but it also is automatically true, if Beth doesn’t
have such evidence, as illustrated in (29).
(29) It doesn’t look to Beth like John is tired — because she has no visual
evidence that he is!
Whereas the unrelativized variant on (29) in (22-a) sounded clearly false,
this case comes out true.
By contrast, acquaintance inferences become ordinary presuppositions in
explicitly relativized cases (Anand and Korotkova, 2018, pp. 69–79).
(30) The cake is tasty to Beth. ⇒p Beth has tasted the cake.
This inference persists in the family of sentences related to (30), as ordinary
presuppositions do. For instance, in addition to the simple unnegated case
in (30), the negated and question sentences in (31) equally imply that Beth
has tasted the cake.5
5The following embedding constructions, however, do not seem to carry this acquain-
tance presupposition about Beth:
(i) a. The cake might be tasty to Beth.
b. If the cake is tasty to Beth, I’ll have some too.
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(31) a. The cake isn’t tasty to Beth.
b. The cake must be tasty to Beth.
c. Is the cake tasty to Beth?
The same transformation of evidential and acquaintance inferences into more
familiar types of inferences also occurs when the experiential constructions
are embedded in subjective attitude ascriptions, as in (32), with ‘find’.
(32) a. Beth finds that John looks tired.
b. Beth finds the cake tasty.
Though the acquaintance presuppositions and evidential entailments of ex-
plicitly relativized appearance claims are less puzzling than the inferences of
the bare claims, they are data points that our final analysis ought equally to
be able to capture.
4.2 The experiential state analysis
In this section, I will present an analysis of appearance claims that takes
them to denote features of subjects’ experiential states. Utterances of these
sentences are used, in conversation, to express the possession of such experi-
ential states. I build the analysis for expletive subject appearance sentences,
such as (33), saving the copy raising constructions for later.
(33) It looks like John is tired.
There are two key pieces to the analysis, which I develop in the following two
subsections in turn. First: a modal semantics for appearance constructions,
on analogy with attitude reports (drawing on Doran 2015). Second: an
Neither of these sentences seem to require that Beth have tasted the cake (at least, not
necessarily already).
There is also some delicacy in the case of the question in (31-c). The implication that
Beth has tasted the cake doesn’t seem to have quite the same status as presuppositions in
other cases, as the contrast between (ii) and (iii) shows (thanks to John MacFarlane on
this point).
(ii) Is the cake tasty to Beth?
I don’t know, she hasn’t tried it.
(iii) Has John stopped smoking?
# I don’t know, he hasn’t started.
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expressivist account of assertion (following Yalcin 2007, 2011 on epistemic
modals; also Charlow 2018). The result is that appearance reports are used
to express features of speakers’ experiential states (without having anything
about the speaker as part of their semantic content). This, as I’ll discuss
in §4.3, makes the right predictions about evidential inferences, and may be
extended to acquaintance inferences as well.
4.2.1 Modal semantics for appearance claims
To derive the right meaning for expletive subject ‘look’-sentences, like (33),
I propose the following semantic value for ‘look’.
(34) [[look]]w = λxe.λpst.∀w′ ∈ Bv(x,w)[[[p]]w′ = 1]
Where Bv(x,w) is the set of “best” or most typical worlds left open by x’s
visual experience at w. Bv(x,w) is determined with the help of a typicality
ordering:
(35) a. Typicality ordering: For set of worlds X and set of “typical”
propositions T , ∀w,w′ ∈ X,w <T w′ iff {p ∈ T : p(w′) = 1} ⊂
{p ∈ T : p(w) = 1}
b. Best visually accessible worlds: Where V (x,w) is the set
of worlds left open by x’s visual experience at w, Bv(x,w) :=
{w′ ∈ V (x,w) : ¬∃w′′ ∈ v[w′′ <T w′]}
In words, the set of best visually accessible worlds, for subject x at world w,
is the set of worlds compatible with x’s visual experience at w such that there
is no other world that makes more of the typical propositions true. And then
a sentence of the form ‘it looks to x like p’ is true at w iff p is true at all of
x’s best visually accessible worlds (at w). I’ll apply this idea to an example
shortly, but first, let me make a few other remarks about the approach.
First, while I develop this analysis with the example of ‘look’ throughout,
it should be clear how to modify it to apply to the other specific sensory
verbs. Whereas ‘look’ quantifies over the worlds compatible with a subjects
visual experiences, ‘smell’ will quantify over the worlds compatible with their
olfactory experience; and so on for the other sensory verbs. There is an open
question about what the right extension to ‘seem’ would be. A natural
thought, though, and one that it will be fine to have in the background for
now, is that ‘seem’ quantifies over the worlds compatible with a subject’s
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overall perceptual experience.6
Second, relativization to times in addition to worlds may also be called
for. For simplicity, I set that aside. I also leave out the tools needed to deal
with ordinary context-sensitivity, such as for indexicals.
Third, I will leave the notion of “typicality” largely intuitive. There is
some sense that some situations are more typical then others, even amongst
options all compatible with my current visual experience. Tons of very
strange worlds are, strictly speaking, compatible with a given visual expe-
rience. “Brain in vat” scenarios are only some of the more extreme that
philosophers like to imagine. But less existentially worrying, we can imagine
that A sees John with pale face and dark circles under his eyes. It’s compat-
ible with this that he’s wearing ghastly make-up for some costume, or that
this is his ordinary complexion — both scenarios in which, let’s assume, he
is not tired. Still, worlds in which either of those is the case are less typical,
intuitively, than worlds in which John looks the way he does due to tiredness.
This notion of typicality will clearly be affected by background knowledge,
and so is surely context-sensitive in some sense.
Furthermore, what is considered typical for the purposes of interpreting
some appearance clause may also be able to be affected by the linguistic
context. For instance, that people with dark circles under their eyes are
tired might be in the set of “typical” propositions at our context, but if we
counterfactually suppose something that makes this less typical, as in (36),
then the set of typical propositions used to interpret the appearance clause
in the consequent should perhaps not include it.
(36) If it were the fashion to paint dark circles under one’s eyes, then it
wouldn’t look like John was tired.
My intuition is not extremely clear on this point. It may be that we want to
keep the notion of typicality tied to the context of utterance, regardless of
shiftiness due to counterfactuals or other constructions.
Fourth, note that the clause in (34) takes ‘look’ to have an individual
argument (intuitively, the experiencer), and a propositional argument (what
things look to be like). I’ll say a bit about each of these in turn.
The status of an “experiencer” in sentences with predicates of personal
taste, as in (37), has been the subject of much debate — particularly about
6However, I must also add the caveat, also noted above §3.3.4 (footnote 11), that
‘seem’ as well as ‘look’ can be used in ways that doesn’t seem to be perceptual at all.
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the question of whether it should be thought of as a semantic argument or
instead as an adjunct (Stephenson, 2007; Glanzberg, 2007; Schaffer, 2011;
Collins, 2013).
(37) The cake is tasty to Mary.
I have made the choice, in (34), to treat the experiencer an argument in the
appearance cases. All of the reasons in favor of experiencer arguments with
predicates of personal taste carry over the appearance cases, and moreover,
some arguments are even stronger in the appearance cases. For one, the
acceptability of predicates of personal taste with experiencer prepositional
phrases varies, as shown in (38).
(38) a. The cake is tasty to Mary.
b. The roller coaster is fun ?to/for Mary.
c. ?That T-shirt is cool to Mary.
Of course, this isn’t definitive about the status of the experiencer in cases
where it is fully acceptable. I just note this because it stands in stark contrast
to experiencer phrases in appearance constructions, which are always one
hundred percent acceptable. I give just a few examples in (39).
(39) a. It looks to Mary like John is happy.
b. The cake smells to Mary like it contains cinnamon.
c. The cloth feels soft to Mary.
Furthermore, selection of particular prepositions has been identified as a
marker of argumenthood. For example, the clear requirement of a particular
preposition for the target of ‘proud’ and ‘pride’ in (40-a) and (40-b) respec-
tively, make a strong case for its being an argument. (As a reminder, I am
using ‘#’ as a general marker of unacceptability, neutral between various
reasons that may lie behind it.)
(40) a. I am proud of/#in Sue.
b. I take pride #of/ in Sue.
Stephenson (2007) in fact takes this kind of consideration to speak in favor of
experiencer arguments with predicates of taste, as she judges these predicates
to be selective about which prepositions they require, as in (41) (with her
judgments):
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(41) a. fun for Sue / # fun to Sue
b. ??funny for Sue / funny to Sue
c. boring for Sue / ?? boring to Sue (Stephenson, 2007, p. 520)
Somewhat ironically, though, in attempting to make this case for experiencer
arguments, she in fact illustrates how unclear the data supporting that view
are.7 By my own native speaker intuition, for instance, ‘for’ and ‘to’ are
about equally acceptable with ‘fun’, and ‘boring to’ is fully acceptable as
well. Again, I do not mean to use this as a definitive case against experiencer
arguments with predicates of personal taste. Instead, I wish to highlight the
contrast with appearance constructions: they uniformly require prepositional
phrases headed by ‘to’, and there is a stark unacceptability of ‘for’ — much
clearer, by my judgment at least, than any of the cases with predicates of
personal taste.
(42) a. It looks to/#for Mary like John is happy.
b. The cake smells to/#for Mary like it contains cinnamon.
c. The cloth feels soft to/#for Mary.
I’m not concerned to make an argument here about the status of ex-
periencers with predicates of personal taste. They may be arguments too,
albeit somewhat unusual ones. I review these points only to justify taking
experiencers in appearance constructions to be arguments of the appearance
verb. (Even this is not crucial to my overall theory, though rejecting it would
require some modification to the semantics given in this section.)
Also, as noted, I am taking ‘look’ to have a propositional argument —
the way things look to be (that John is tired, for instance, in the main ex-
ample I’ve been using). I have here followed Doran (2015) in taking this
propositional argument to be embedded in appearance reports in the same
way as the propositional arguments in attitude reports (Kratzer, 1981, 1991;
von Fintel and Heim, 2002). Thus, in a way similar to the approach to epis-
temic modality advocated by Yalcin (2007, 2011), bare appearance sentences
are something like attitude reports without attitude holders. And note that
the ‘like’-complement appearance sentences I’m focusing on at the moment
are plausibly “epistemic” in the sense discussed above in §2.4.1. Thus, the
connection between epistemic modal claims and epistemic appearance claims
suggested there lends some credibility to the idea that a roughly analogous
7Thanks to Patrick Mun˜oz for discussion here.
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modal analysis might work for both. Still, this is not the only way to ap-
proach the propositional argument in appearance sentences. I will discuss an
alternative in §4.5.3.
Let’s now turn to see the semantics for ‘look’ in action. First, it will be
useful to apply it in an explicitly relativized case, with an overt experiencer
prepositional phrase. After that I’ll turn to the bare case, which is most
central for the overall project of this dissertation.
(43) It looks to Beth like John is tired.
(44) [[(43)]]w = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ Bv(Beth, w)[[[John is tired]]w′ = 1]
In words, (43) is true at w iff John is tired at all the most typical worlds left
open by Beth’s visual experience at w. (Note that this has the result that
there is an entailment that Beth’s visual experience is of a certain kind. This
will be important for predicting the evidential inference to be an entailment
in explicitly relativized cases.)
Now, let’s move onto the more interesting case: the unrelativized, or bare
appearance claims like (33), repeated here.
(33) It looks like John is tired.
Given the clause for ‘look’ above, we seem to have a problem. Nothing in
this sentence is ready to saturate the individual experiencer argument. To
deal with this (and to set the stage for the expressivist account of assertion
to be given below), I follow Charlow (2018) in taking there to be abstraction
over this argument. That is, the following two structures are both equally
interpretable: (45) for explicitly relativized cases, (46) for bare ones. (Note:
I assume both ‘to’ and ‘like’ are vacuous.)
(45)
look
to x
like p
(46)
1
look
to t1
like p
The result, for the bare case, is the following:
(47) [[(33)]]w = λx.∀w′ ∈ Bv(x,w)[[[John is tired]]w′ = 1]
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This is the property of individuals of having a visual experiential state ac-
cording to which John being tired is typically true. In the next subsection,
I’ll turn to how these denotations enter into a theory of communication for
appearance sentences.8
4.2.2 Expressing experiential states
The assertoric content of appearance claims like (33) is not a worldly proposi-
tion. Instead, it’s a property of individuals, that constrains what their visual
experiential state is like.9 In uttering (33), the speaker expresses that their
visual experiential state has a certain property, namely, of being such that
John is tired is the most typical scenario, given that experience. Let’s pause
for a moment and think about what such a visual experiential state is like.
Recall, we are thinking of a visual experiential state as a set of worlds.
Think of this set of worlds as determined by a set of propositions — roughly,
8 What does this mean for coordination of experiential sentences with non-experiential
ones, for instance in (i)?
(i) John is lying down and it looks like he’s tired.
It is generally assumed that only elements of the same semantic type can be coordinated,
and I have suggested that the second conjunct in (i) is of property type, while the first
conjunct is presumably a propositional type. However, there is only a compositional
problem if we assume that the abstraction must take place at the single clause level.
There is no compositional problem with the structure in (ii). Applying it has the result
that (i) denotes the property of having an experiential state of a certain kind and also its
being the case that John is lying down.
(ii)
1
q
and
look
to t1
like p
I’ll return to this, and other more complex constructions involving bare appearance sen-
tences at the end of the next subsection.
9In addition to drawing on ideas in Charlow 2018, this approach is also similar to that
developed in Egan 2010 for predicates of personal taste, which in turn draws on ideas in
Lewis 1979.
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those propositions that some visual experience conveys.10 The visual expe-
riential state will be the set of worlds at which all those propositions are
true. Visual experiential states that have the property denoted by (33) will
include, for example, those determined by the following:
(48) a. {John is pale-faced, John has dark circles under his eyes}
b. {John is nodding off in his chair}
c. {There are several empty coffee cups left on John’s desk}
Each of these states is such that John is tired in all their most typical worlds.
When a speaker utters (33) they express that their visual experiential states
has this property. Note, as illustrated by (48-c), the visual experiential state
does not have to be one that includes information about John’s own appear-
ance.
Crucially, none of these visual experiential states entails that John is
tired. Visual experience can be misleading. (49) can be a felicitous, and
true.
(49) It looks like John is tired, but he’s not.
So, in uttering (33) a speaker expresses that their visual experiential state
is of a certain kind. But they do not assert that they are having a certain kind
of experience. As a comparison, take (50-a) and (50-b), on an expressivist
account of epistemic modal language.
(50) a. It might be raining.
b. My information doesn’t rule out that it’s raining.
On a certain theory of epistemic ‘might’, an utterance of (50-a) by a speaker
S expresses a feature of S’s information, namely that it has the property
specified in (50-b). But (50-a) and (50-b) are not equivalent, and we would
make incorrect predictions about the conversational impact of ‘might’ sen-
tences if we were to take them to be simple assertions whose content is about
the speaker’s information. The suggestion here about appearance claims is
10There is an interesting question here about the relationship between these states and
visual phenomenology. Note also that I am making the assumption here that we can get
some information through experience, so I’m setting aside extreme forms of skepticism.
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analogous.11
This approach to the assertoric content of simple bare appearance claims
has implications for our semantic theory more broadly. I will close this section
by sketching how a few cases might be approached in broad strokes. A more
detailed full analysis must await future work.
First, as flagged in footnote 8, the most straightforward approach to co-
ordinating constructions involving bare appearance claims, as in (51), would
take them too to express properties of the speaker: properties of being in an
experiential state of a certain kind, and also something else being the case.
(51) John is lying down and it looks like he’s tired.
The same idea can be extended to complex sentences involving bare appear-
ance clauses with other Boolean operators.
Second, there is the question of appearance verbs themselves embedding
complex constructions. The analysis I’ve given takes appearance verbs to
have a propositional argument, so complex complements denoting proposi-
tions are no problem. More challenging are cases where the complement
might itself be non-propositional, as has been suggested for epistemic modal
constructions as in (52-a), or even further appearance clauses on the present
analysis, as in (52-b).
(52) a. It looks like it might be raining.
b. It looks like the milk smells like it’s gone bad.
11That it would be a mistake to build anything about the speaker’s experiences into
the content of appearance claims can also be shown by the consistency of an appearance
claim with the supposition that one is having an experience different from that claim, as
in the cases in (i), by contrast with those in (ii).
(i) a. Suppose that it looks like it’s going to rain, but you’re hallucinating and it
looks clear to you.
b. Suppose that you’re hallucinating and it looks clear to you, when really it
looks like it’s going to rain.
(ii) a. #Suppose that your visual experience suggests it’s going to rain, but you’re
hallucinating and it looks clear to you.
b. #Suppose that you’re hallucinating and it looks clear to you, when really your
visual experience suggests it’s going to rain.
Still, though, there is the question of what exactly it is to undertake the suppositions in
the first clauses of these sentences. Thanks to Seth Yalcin here.
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In the embedded appearance case in (52-b), my sense is that the embedded
appearance verb, ‘smell’, is heard “exocentrically,” in the sense that it is
relativized to an experiencer other than the speaker. Indeed, I would not want
to rule out utterances of syntactically bare appearance sentences being used
to communicate the relativized propositions communicated by the explicitly
relativized cases. This is needed as much for appearance sentences, as in (53),
as it is for classic exocentric uses of sentences with predicates of personal
taste, as in (54) (Lasersohn, 2005).
(53) A explains why the dog can’t learn the difference between the red
and green balls.
A: They both look grey.
(54) A is observing her dog devouring his food.
A: This new brand of dog food is tasty.
If the embedded clause in (52-b) is (covertly) relativized, then it denotes a
proposition, and there’s no problem incorporating it into the analysis.
Still, however, I think we should be open to modifying the analysis so
that the embedded clause need not be a possible worlds proposition. Take
the appearance verb embedding the epistemic modal clause in (52-a). It
doesn’t really seem like the embedded ‘might’ is already covertly relativized
to some information state. We would like to to be able to say that (52-a)
expresses the experiential state such that its being possibly raining is most
typical. But then what is “its being possibly raining” here? Ideally, we would
not rule out it being itself a nonfactual matter, a feature of an information
state rather than a world. To do so, we would have to modify our semantics
so that the appearance verb can quantify not only sets of worlds (the best
visually-accessible ones, as we had it above), but over sets of any kind of index
relative to which the embedded clause might need to be evaluated. Then we
could get the result that (52-a) is felicitous when one’s visual experience
makes having an information state that leaves open rain most typical. And
this could happen even if one’s information happens to rule rain out. One’s
visual experience can suggest something that one knows in fact not to be the
case.
Third, there is the question of attitude ascriptions embedding appearance
sentences. Some attitude ascriptions, like those in (55), may be well-captured
if we take the attitude-holder to saturate the experiencer argument of the
appearance verb.
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(55) a. Mary finds that it looks like John is tired.
b. Mary thinks that it looks like John is tired.
Things are quite clear with the so-called “subjective” attitude verb ‘find’,
in (55-a). There, we want the attitude ascription to be equivalent to the
sentence where the experiencer in specified in a ‘to’-prepositional phrase,
and taking the subject of ‘find’ to saturate the experiencer argument gets
this result.12 And attitude ascription with ‘thinks’, in (55-a), also arguably
has a use where it is equivalent to the PP-relativized appearance sentence.
Only if ‘thinks’ is focused to we get the implication that Mary does not have
the visual evidence herself. In that case, the ‘think’-ascription is more like
one with ‘believe’, like (56).
(56) Mary believes that it looks like John is tired.
Certainly, it would be incorrect to predict that (56) is only true if Mary
believes that she herself has visual evidence that John is tired. (56) could be
true because someone Mary trusts told her that he looked tired. Furthermore,
we can consider non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, like (57).
(57) Mary wants it to look like John is tired.
It would be odd to say that (57) is true in virtue of Mary wanting to have
a certain kind of visual evidence about John. Mary might not want to see
John or anything related to him; and yet she could have the desire specified
in (57).
This is all to say that it would be a mistake to take all attitude verbs to
saturate the experiencer argument of appearance verbs. These verbs could,
of course, embed exocentric appearance sentences. But this also doesn’t seem
adequate for (56) and (57). Does Mary have to want it to look to someone
like John is tired, in order for (57) to be true? A full analysis of attitude
ascriptions embedding appearance sentences should probably provide a way
to embed bare appearance sentences, even understood non-exocentrically,
and without the attitude holder saturating the experiencer argument — or at
least, not in a way that predicts that they must have the relevant experience
12This is to take ‘find’-ascriptions embedding appearance clauses to be like ‘find’-
ascriptions embedding predicates of personal taste as on Sæbø (2009)’s view. Indeed, I
would want to say the same thing for the PPT cases. However, for an argument against
this approach see Kennedy and Willer 2016.
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themself. It may be that we want to predict that they are disposed to have
the relevant kind of experience (I’ll say a bit about a possible move to a
dispositional theory in §4.5.2).
4.3 Predicting the inferences
With the experiential state analysis in hand, we are now in a position to
predict some of the inferences licensed by appearance claims. I begin with the
evidential inferences in §4.3.1, before returning to the acquaintance inferences
in §4.3.2.
4.3.1 Evidential inferences
Return to our initial example of an evidential inference:
(58) A: It looks like John is tired.
 A has visual evidence that John is tired.
According to the experiential state analysis, with (58), A expresses that her
visual experience makes John being tired most typical. It’s a small step
from this to the evidential inference. For experiential states like these are
(among other things) sources of evidence about the world. To have a visual
experiential state with the property denoted by (58) is to have visual evidence
for a certain proposition (recall: we do not take evidence to be factive here).
So, in expressing her experiences, A at the same time communicates that she
has evidence of a certain kind. We express our evidence by expressing our
experiences.
On this approach, we capture the evidential inference as an inference to
a sincerity condition on the given utterances (Charlow, 2018). If a speaker
utters (58) without having visual evidence that John is tired, they present
themselves to be in a mental state that they are not in fact in.
Thus, the badness of (59), on this approach is on a certain level of a piece
with (60-a), given Gibbard 2003’s expressivism about normative language,
or (60-b), as well as the Moorean contradiction in (60-c).
(59) #It looks like John is tired, but I have no visual evidence for that.
(60) a. #φing is the thing to do in my present circumstances, but I don’t
plan to φ.
b. #Ouch! But I’m not in pain.
c. #It’s raining, but I don’t know it is.
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The cases are similar in that the infelicity is due to the second conjunct
denying a felicity condition on the first. However, the appearance case in (59)
is importantly different from the epistemic Moorean case in (60-c) — contra
the view discussed above in §4.1.4 — in that the sincerity condition violated
in the appearance case doesn’t involve the epistemic state of knowledge of
speaker, but rather their visual experience.
Crucially, such sincerity conditions do not project out of embedded con-
texts (where embedding is possible, at least). The sentences in (61), for
instance, do not imply that the speaker knows that it’s raining.
(61) a. Is it raining?
b. It might be raining.
We thus do not make the same incorrect predictions as the presuppositional
account discussed above in §4.1.2.
Sincerity conditions are also clearly not entailments, as shown in (62).
We thus also avoid the pitfalls of the entailment view from §4.1.3.
(62) a. #It’s not raining, because I don’t know it is.
b. Even if I didn’t know it, it would still be raining.
4.3.2 Acquaintance inferences
The expletive subject sentences analyzed so far do not give rise to the ac-
quaintance inference, in the sense that they do not give rise to the inference
that the speaker is acquainted with any particular individual. I now consider
how the approach outlined so far may be extended to cases that also give
rise to the acquaintance inference, as in (63).
(63) A: John looks like he’s tired.
 A has seen John. Acquaintance inference
 A has visual evidence that John is tired. Evidential inference
To predict the acquaintance inference in addition to the evidential one, we
need there to be some further constraint on the visual experience of the
speaker. They must not only have visual evidence for some proposition,
but they must have seen a particular individual. Furthermore, it seems it
must be the visual experience of that individual that provides the relevant
evidence. It would be odd to utter the sentence in (63) if one sees all the
empty coffee cups on John’s desk, but also sees John looking completely
energetic (and let’s say not in the hyper way induced by too much caffeine
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that is presumably also consistent with tiredness). In fact, I believe that this
seemingly required link — between the individual who must be perceived
due to the acquaintance inference, and the evidence that must be had due
to the evidential inference — might fall out of a plausible story that initially
just aims to account for the requirements independently. I’ll return to this
in a moment.
How might we extend the experiential state analysis so that it predicts
acquaintance inferences as well as evidential ones? An initial choice point
is whether sentences giving rise to the acquaintance inference have different
denotations than the expletive subject sentences. Compositionally, they are
clearly different, with (64-b) having a substantive matrix subject that must
somehow compose with the verb phrase. By contrast, we have assumed that
the ‘it’ subject in (64-a) is semantically vacuous and just there for reasons of
syntactic well-formedness (though see Rett and Hyams 2014 for an alternative
treatment).
(64) a. It looks like John is tired.
b. John looks like he’s tired.
But this compositional difference need not result in an ultimate difference
in denotation for the sentence. Landau (2011) makes use of this fact, giving
two entries for appearance verbs, like the following:
(65) a. [[look1]] = λp.looks
′(p) Expletive subject
b. [[look2]] = λx.λP.looks
′(P (x)) Copy raising
Both of these result in sentences that take ‘look’ essentially to be a propo-
sitional operator, and could therefore be unpacked according to the modal
analysis given above in §4.2.1 (this sets aside the experiencer for the mo-
ment). On the face of it, this approach is not well-suited to capturing the
acquaintance inferences of copy raising reports. It makes it challenging to
see why there should be a difference in acquaintance requirements across
the different syntactic forms. Indeed, Landau uses these two forms both for
cases without the acquaintance inference — in his terminology, without the
perceptual source requirement — and adds a third entry for the cases with
the acquaintance inference/p-source requirement, with an extra individual
argument (the p-source), as we saw in Chapter 3. We have also already seen
some evidence that we need to complicate the story — from the “copy free”
appearance sentences, like (66), which we saw above in §3.4.3.
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(66) Pavi looks like the baby didn’t sleep last night.
This ‘look’-claim is importantly different from the copy raising cases seen so
far, in that the embedded like-clause doesn’t contain a “copy” pronoun that
corefers with the subject. Thus, this kind of sentence cannot be captured with
the semantics for ‘look’ given so far; we need another individual argument (in
addition to the experiencer). It’s tempting to call this the “stimulus”, but
I’m hesitant to use that term, given that in bare cases, we don’t want to build
into the semantics anything that suggests that something is being perceived.
For the same reason, I distance myself from the label of “perceptual source”,
which has been used by many theorists in this context, as discussed in the
previous chapter (Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012; Landau, 2011). The relevant
individual here is the individual that has some appearance; and at least
pre-theoretically, having some appearance doesn’t require being perceived.
(Whatever the philosophers may end up saying, as far as natural language
is concerned, if a tree falls with no one around, it does make a sound.) So,
despite the somewhat awkward label, let’s call this individual the “appearer”.
Though we don’t want to build into the notion of an appearer that it
must be perceived, there is still an important and recognizable idea of an
appearance being manifested to a subject. The apple looks red even if no
one is looking at it (even if no one has ever looked at it); but the apple can
also look red to you. Its visual appearance can be manifest to you, in your
visual experience. (Indeed, even the labeling the appearance “visual” might
seem misguided. Perhaps something like “visually-accessible appearance”
would be better.) If we are to extend the experiential state analysis to cover
cases involving the acquaintance inference, we’ll have to make use of this
idea. Whereas an expletive subject report serves to express that one’s visual
experiential state gives evidence for some proposition, the copy raising report
expresses that one’s visual experiential state is one in which the manifestation
of an individual’s — the appearer’s — visual appearance gives evidence for
some proposition. If we describe the experiential state this way, then we build
in the connection noted above: it must be the appearer’s appearance that
yields the relevant evidence. It’s not enough that the appearance is manifest
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and that the subject has evidence, perhaps from some other source.13
The overall approach exploits the richness of experiential states. They
can be such as to give evidence; but they can also have other properties,
such as involving the manifestation of a particular individual’s appearance.
However, not all of these properties can be captured with a notion of an
experiential state as a set of worlds. It may have to be modeled as a set of
worlds with some further structure. For instance, we might take experien-
tial states to have both intentional and qualitative or affective components
(where the modal semantics from §4.2.1 only so far captures the intentional
side). This also harkens back to the distinction from Chapter 2, between
experience in a narrow, qualitative sense, and experience in a broader sense,
that also encompasses its informational import. The semantics developed
here, primarily with a view to understanding the evidential inferences of ap-
13This approach may make welcome predictions about some other cases. For instance,
it can happen that visual evidence from an individual’s appearance contradicts the visual
evidence from some more general scene. We mentioned such a case above, with the empty
coffee cups being seemingly misleading evidence about whether John is tired, given John’s
own energized appearance. In that scenario, (i) still feels marked.
(i) ?It looks like John is tired, but John doesn’t look like he’s tired.
One might think that this could be true. Indeed, it won’t be a necessary contradiction
on the approach taken here. However, we can explain why it would sound marked, as
long as we assume that with John himself looking a certain way, none of the most typical
visually-accessible worlds will be such that he isn’t tired. However, in other scenarios
this assumption may not hold. Sometimes, a particular individual’s appearance might be
trumped by surrounding features. For instance, perhaps John is sitting in his office. It’s
immaculate and everything on the desks and shelves are perfectly arranged. However, he
himself, is completely disheveled. In this scenario, perhaps (ii) can be true:
(ii) It looks like John is well-organized, but he doesn’t look like he’s well-organized.
(My sense is that focus on ‘he’ is needed.)
There are interesting questions about how this relates to issues discussed in Chapter 3.
For note that ‘tired’ is a stage-level predicate, while ‘well-organized’ is an individual-level
predicate. It seems not to be a coincidence that individual-level predicates affect the
acquaintance inference with copy raising ‘look’ sentences (as we saw in §3.3.4), and also
lend themselves more easily to scenarios like the one just described, where the surrounding
evidence, not including John’s appearance, can override the evidence from John’s own
appearance enough to make the first conjunct in (ii) true.
Though we also then run into the question of what exactly makes the second (copy
raising) conjunct true. It seems that the expletive subject report cannot entail the copy
raising one.
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pearance claims, focuses on the broader notion. But in order to account for
the range of features of appearance language, the qualitative will also need
a place.
The acquaintance inference with simple sentences with predicates of per-
sonal taste can be accounted for with the same tools. The idea is that a
sentence like (67) serves to express a purely affective feature of the speaker’s
experience (Franze´n, 2018; Charlow, 2018).
(67) The cake is tasty.
And the same may be said for the “phenomenal” appearance cases, as in (68),
that we discussed in §2.4.3.
(68) a. The cake tastes good.
b. The spread looks splendid.
One might wonder whether sentences as in (68) can be adequately analyzed
using a modal semantics for the appearance verbs along the lines of §4.2.1.
I’ll return to this in §4.5.3.
4.4 Returning to faultless disagreement
The experiential state approach is well-suited to capture the acquaintance
and evidential inferences licensed by utterances about appearances and per-
sonal tastes. However, a key selling point is that it can at the same time do
a good job of explaining why these utterances give rise to relativist effects
like faultless disagreement.14 In §2.2, I discussed how a number of theoretical
approaches can all account for faultless disagreement — they must just some-
how cook up the “recipe for relativist effects,” which can be accomplished in
a number of ways. The expressivist approach developed here explains rela-
tivist effects in terms of compatibility and incompatibility between experien-
tial states. Faultless disagreement arises when speakers express incompatible
experiential states.
This has the virtue of divorcing the conditions that license felicitous de-
nial (incompatible contents) from the conditions that make disagreement
feel worthwhile to engage in (for instance, that there is some push to co-
ordinate).15 No matter how idiosyncratic the differences in experience, one
14See also Dinges 2017 for a discussion about capturing acquaintance and disagreement
behavior in a unified way, for the case of predicates of personal taste.
15Related ideas are discussed in Egan 2010.
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can always felicitously, as far as the language is concerned, disagree with a
bare appearance or taste claim. This was very apparent with the infamous
dress dispute — who cares what colors the dress looked to be? Clearly dif-
ferent viewers saw the image differently! And yet, exchanges like (69) are
not linguistically marked, in the way that (70) is.
(69) A: The dress looks blue and black.
B: No, it doesn’t!
(70) A: The dress looks blue and black to me.
# B: No, it doesn’t look that way to me.
One might still ask why we would ever engage in these disputes, if all we
express is our differing experiential reactions. Here, the following thought
from Charlow is apt:
And, though there is something unfathomable — often palpa-
bly ridiculous! —about this, it would seem undeniable that hu-
man beings experience substantial (e.g., social) pressure to coor-
dinate — i.e., agree — on their subjective assessments of their
experiences. (Charlow, 2018, p. 19)
But I would add, further, that the kinds of appearance claims I’ve been fo-
cused on in this chapter actually make disagreement about appearances much
less ridiculous than those that Charlow himself mentions at this point —
namely the dress dress dispute, as well as a sightly less viral auditory dispute
about whether a certain recording sounded like ‘yanny’ or ‘laurel’ (Wikipedia,
2019). It’s important that the approach taken here can account for such
cases. However, when we think about appearance claims used to express
appearance-based evidence for appearance-independent matters, the sense
that different perceivers ought to converge makes a great deal more sense.
After all, the point of these appearance claims is arguably to try to figure
out what the world is itself like, and that is something that, for all I’ve said,
is the same for everyone.
4.5 Open questions
4.5.1 Comparison with direct evidentiality approach
An alternative approach to the acquaintance inference that has recently been
defended derives it from a commitment to direct evidence, either as part
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of the semantics of experiential vocabulary (Anand and Korotkova, 2018),
or as a pragmatic commitment that interacts with the semantics of these
expressions in a way that gives rise to the inferences (Mun˜oz, 2019). Applied
to predicates of personal taste the story goes something like the following.
The content of an utterance of ‘This is tasty’ is simply that some object has
some property. But for some reason, these kinds of assertions come along
with a commitment on the part of the speaker to having direct evidence for
this proposition. And direct evidence for the object having the property of
tastiness must involve gustatory acquaintance with that object. This is the
outline of the explanation for why simple claims with predicates of personal
taste give rise to the acquaintance inference.
This style of story can also be extended to explain why appearance claims
give rise to evidential inferences. The idea (alluded to above in §3.5) would
be that an utterance like, ‘It looks like John is tired’ just expresses the
proposition that there is visual evidence for John being tired. But this kind
assertion comes along with a commitment to direct evidence, and direct
evidence for this proposition must involve having that visual evidence oneself.
The main difference between this style of approach and the experiential
state analysis is that what the experiential state analysis explains through
a distinctive view of the assertoric content of experiential claims (properties
of subjects’ experiential states), the direct evidentiality approach explains in
terms of a commitment to direct evidence that can be attached to traditional
propositional assertoric contents. In this sense, the direct evidentiality ap-
proach can be more conservative about content and communication than the
approach I am advocating here.
This conservatism comes with an explanatory burden, however. The di-
rect evidentiality approach should have something to say about why the
commitment to direct evidentiality comes along with assertions involving ex-
periential predicates but not other kinds of predicates. For direct evidence
that, say, John is six feet tall, also requires some kind of acquaintance with
him; but an assertion of ‘John is six feet tall’ clearly does not give rise to the
acquaintance inference. It is a key part of the direct evidentiality approach
that not all simple assertions come along with the commitment to direct
evidentiality. It’s something special about experiential claims. This isn’t to
say that no story can be told here (Mun˜oz (2019) as well as Klempner (2018)
have some promising ideas).
Furthermore, the appeal to a more traditional view of propositions comes
with its own drawback. What is the property of tastiness, say, that this
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approach takes taste sentences to be about? Here, the direct evidentiality
view faces the challenge mentioned in Chapter 2 for objectivist accounts of
predicates of personal taste. What is the property of being tasty, full stop?
And can we make sense of faultless disagreement about it? One approach
here, roughly that of Mun˜oz (2019), is that speakers disagreeing faultlessly
about whether something is tasty differ in the meaning they associate with
the word ‘tasty’. Thus, faultless disagreement about experiential matters
becomes an instance of metalinguistic disagreement in the sense of Plunkett
and Sundell 2013. However, it is importantly different from the standard
cases of metalinguistic disagreement, where the disagreement is over matters
of meaning that can be settled by stipulation, as in (71).
(71) a. A: Pluto isn’t a planet, because the new International Astro-
nomical Union definition says it’s not.
b. B: I don’t care about that, Pluto is a planet!
c. A: Look, for the purposes of this conversation, let’s use the
IAU’s definition; so Pluto is a planet.
When it comes to experiential terms, as in (72), this kind of stipulative move
is bizarre.
(72) a. A: This cake is disgusting.
b. B: No, it’s tasty!
c. ??A: Look, for the purposes of this conversation, let’s use my
tastes as our guide; so this is disgusting.
The metalinguistic negotiation story, extended to cover disagreement over
experiential matters, must thus posit a norm that one only use experiential
terms, like ‘tasty’ or ‘disgusting’ to apply to things that give rise to the
relevant kind of experience in oneself. The experiential state analysis would
instead account for the oddness of (72-c) by the fact that speakers recognize
that experiential claims express features of their experiential states, and that
experiential states with these features cannot be imposed on others merely
by uttering some words. This follows straightforwardly from the nature of
experiential states, and requires no special norm to be recognized.
This is to highlight two main issues facing the direct evidentiality ap-
proach but not the experiential state analysis. I don’t by any means intend
it to settle the matter between them, though. More questions also face the
experiential state analysis, as I will discuss in the coming subsections.
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4.5.2 Communication and coordination
The experiential state analysis has the advantage of offering a very straight-
forward explanation for the infelicity of making an experiential claim without
having the relevant experiential acquaintance or evidence oneself. However,
this advantage also leads to the question of what the point of such claims are,
when there is seemingly no opportunity for coordination on these states.16
To bring this question out further, contrast the following two cases.
(73) A and B are both looking at an image of a dress, and experience its
color appearance differently.
A: This dress looks blue and black.
B: No, the dress looks white and gold.
(74) A is talking on the phone with B. A is looking at an image of a dress,
and it looks blue and black to her. B can’t see the image.
A: This dress looks blue and black.
B: Cool, it’ll fit with the color scheme at C’s wedding then. You
should buy it.
In (73), we have said, there is faultless disagreement because the two speakers
have incompatible experiential states: the one such that it makes the dress
being blue and black most typical, the other such that it makes the dress
being white and gold most typical.17 B will not accept A’s claim, because it
expresses an experiential state that is incompatible with B’s own. So far, so
good.
But what is going on in (74)? There, the idea of coordinating or failing
to coordinate on one’s experiences of the dress just does not seem to come
up. When B accepts A’s claim about how the dress looks, what does she
accept? It may be that she accepts that, were she to see the dress and have
a visual experience of it, that experience would be such as to make the dress
being blue and black most typical. But in accepting A’s claim, B does not
come to be in such a state. That can’t happen without her seeing the dress!
Here, we run into a potentially worrying disanalogy between the expres-
sivist approach being developed here, which appeals to the expression of
experiential states, and other recent expressivist theories from Gibbard and
16Thanks to Dilip Ninan for discussion here.
17Note, this is to assimilate these appearance claims, with only adjectival complements,
to the ‘like’-complement cases I’ve been focusing on in this chapter and the last. I’ll say
a bit more about these other forms of appearance sentences in §4.5.3.
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Yalcin, which appeal to the expression of states of planning and information,
respectively. For the latter sorts of mental states are ones that one plausi-
bly can enter into merely by accepting someone else’s assertion — one can
thereby come to accept new plans, or having new information. But one can’t,
merely by accepting an assertion, come to have new experiential states — at
least, not in all the cases where it does nonetheless seem like one can accept
what one is being told. And the more we might tweak experiential states
to be such that one might get into them more easily, the less we are able to
account for the close tie between those states and assertions of experiential
sentences.
This tension between accounting for the acquaintance inference while still
making sense of communication and coordination comes out in particular if
we consider one natural option to pursue in response to this worry: namely,
moving to a dispositional conception of the states in question. Perhaps the
experiential state one expresses with ‘The dress looks blue’ isn’t the state
of having a visual experience of the dress that makes it being blue typical,
but rather, of being disposed to have such an experience, were one to see
the dress. (Indeed, it is dispositional properties that Egan (2010) takes us
to self-attribute in making assertions about matters of taste and aesthetics;
and it’s thus probably not a coincidence that he is focused on explaining the
disagreement data and not the acquaintance inference.) We could of course
say that, for some reason, it’s infelicitous to self-attribute dispositions to
have certain experiences, without having had those experiences manifested
in oneself. This would bring into our story some elements that the direct
evidentialist, discussed in §4.5.1, also appeals to. However, this amendment
would avoid some of the metaphysical mystery of the direct evidential ap-
proach as sketched above; for here, we would not have to recognize properties
of tastiness or of looking blue, full stop, but rather only properties of being
tasty or of looking blue to experiencers, and experiencers being disposed to
be affected in those ways.
It thus remains an open question whether to keep the original character-
ization of the property expressed by appearance claims from §4.2, or modify
it in a way that may make the account of communication and coordination
more natural, but the account of the acquaintance inference less direct.
4.5.3 More appearance sentences
In §4.2 I have offered an analysis designed for a subset of appearance sen-
tences: those with ‘like’-complements embedding finite clauses, such as the
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expletive subject form in (75-a) and the copy raising form in (75-b).
(75) a. It looks like John is tired.
b. John looks like he’s tired.
Some appearance sentences that aren’t of these syntactic forms may also be
adequately covered by that analysis. These include cases where the appear-
ance verb embeds a ‘that’-clause, as in (76-a), as well as cases where the verb
has a nonfinite complement, as in (76-b).
(76) a. It seems that John is tired.
b. John looks to be tired.
These also include some cases, as in (77), where the appearance verb embeds
a small clause out of which the subject has been raised.
(77) a. John looks tired.
b. The cake tastes vegan.
While there does not perhaps appear to be a full propositional argument
embedded under the appearance verbs in these cases, they are adequately
analysed by assuming that there are such arguments. In other words, the
meaning of ‘John looks tired’ is well-captured if we take it say that John’s
visual appearance gives evidence that he is tired. In other words, there is a
felt equivalence between the sentences in (78).
(78) a. John looks tired.
b. John looks like he’s tired.
But not all appearance sentences are like this. Exceptions are cases falling
into the category of “phenomenal” appearance reports, from §2.4.3. In other
words, (79-a) is not felt to be equivalent with (79-b).
(79) a. The cake tastes good.
b. The cake tastes like it’s good.
(79-a) is most naturally heard to mean that the cake has a pleasing taste,
not that the cake’s gustatory appearance gives evidence that the cake is
good, as (79-b) is naturally heard. This contrast comes out especially if
we consider wine instead of cake, as wine more often than cake is judged
for quality at least somewhat independently of how pleasing its flavor is.
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Someone might hate wine but nonetheless have a very discerning palate,
capable of identifying fine wines by taste. Such a person could certainly say
that some wine ‘tastes like it’s good’. But it would be odd for them to say
that it ‘tastes good’. In the terms of Chapter 2, this is to say that, while
(79-a) is a phenomenal appearance claim (or at least, is most naturally used
in that way), (79-b) is an epistemic one. And while the modal experiential
state analysis is well-suited to epistemic appearance claims, it seems less
apt for phenomenal ones. The reason is that phenomenal appearance claims
do not seem to be accurately broken down into an appearance verb and
propositional argument, where that proposition is specified independently of
the appearance verb. The proposition that the cake is good just doesn’t seem
to be a constituent in the phenomenal appearance claim at all; and it is a
commitment of the modal analysis that some proposition about the subject,
but not yet involving the appearance verb, is a constituent.
There are two broad approaches we could take at this juncture to deal
with phenomenal appearance sentences.18 The first simply takes the modal
analysis to be restricted to epistemic appearance claims, and gives an alter-
native analysis for phenomenal ones. The structure in (80) (based on (45),
but with the addition of the appearer argument, y, and switching from ‘look’
to ‘taste’) applies to epistemic cases, while that in (81) is for the phenomenal
ones.
(80)
y
taste
to x
p
(81)
y
taste P
to x
With the structure in (80), a sentence like (79-b) will be interpreted
roughly to say that the cake has a gustatory appearance that makes the cake
being good most typical.19 It involves the verb ‘taste’ composing with two
individual arguments and a propositional argument.
By contrast, with the structure in (81), a sentence like (79-a) will be
interpreted roughly to say that the cake is good-tasting. I leave unanalyzed
18I first explored these two approaches in work presented at NASSLLI 2016 at Rutgers
University. An approach similar to the first option is also offered in Charlow 2018.
19This isn’t officially quite right, of course; for on the experiential state analysis, this
sentence isn’t used to state a proposition, but rather to express that the speaker’s gustatory
experiential state is such as to make the cake being good most typical.
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what exactly “good-tasting” amounts to here, and how it is a function of
the meanings of ‘good’ and ‘tastes’. They key point is that the verb ‘taste’
first composes with a property-type argument, ‘good’, to form a complex
(relational) property of being good-tasting (to an experiencer). Never does
the proposition that the cake is good enter into this composition.
A second approach would not posit such a structural difference across ap-
pearance sentences, but instead locate all the difference in the interpretation
of the embedded adjective. We said that the most natural interpretation of
(79-a) is not well captured by taking the proposition that the cake is good to
be a constituent. However, that is a bit quick. The adjective ‘good’ has an
extremely flexible meaning. Depending on the context, one could say (82)
to mean that the cake tastes good, or that it is lavish enough to satisfy the
wealthy person whose party it is for, who, we may imagine, doesn’t really
care about its taste, or that it has any other feature that for some reason we
are currently looking for in a cake.
(82) This cake is good.
Perhaps, then, we can leverage this flexibility already present with adjectives
like ‘good’ to account for the felt difference between epistemic and phenom-
enal appearance sentences in a way that doesn’t need to posit any structural
ambiguity. The idea would be that in the phenomenal case, the embedded
adjective is most naturally interpreted such that the relevant dimension —
of goodness, in this case — is with respect to the appearance corresponding
to the verb, so that ‘tastes good’ in (79-a) is naturally heard as equivalent to
‘tastes like it’s good in way of tastes’. The phenomenal appearance sentence
in (79-a) can thus after all be accurately analysed by taking the appearance
verb to have a propositional argument; it just must not be a proposition
about appearance-independent goodness. But the adjective ‘good’ doesn’t
have to be used to talk about appearance-independent goodness.20
While this approach has the advantage of structural uniformity, it also
faces challenges. At least as stated so far, it’s mysterious why there should
be such a felt difference between the small clause and ‘like’-complement sen-
20To get a phenomenal appearance claim, is it enough to specify the relevant respect
or dimension? For instance, consider:
(i) You’re sampling cakes for your friend Mary’s birthday. She loves chocolate, but
you dislike it. You try a very chocolatey cake.
You: This cake tastes good.
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tences in (79). The approach just sketched shows how the phenomenal read-
ing could arise, given the structure in (80); but it doesn’t have anything
to say about why the two surface syntactic structures result in different in-
tuitive understandings. There may be a story to tell here, perhaps about
competition between the different, more or less complex, surface syntactic
forms.
However we end up accounting for the difference between phenomenal and
epistemic appearance claims, the broad expressivist approach to the acquain-
tance and evidential inferences defended here can apply. On the structural
ambiguity view, an open question will remain about how to specify the ex-
periential states expressed by phenomenal appearance claims. A promising
idea, though, is that they are similar to those expressed by simple claims
with predicates of personal taste in being more purely qualitative or affective
than intentional (§4.3.2). To the extent that this predicts the acquaintance
inference with predicates of personal taste, it will also predict it with phe-
nomenal appearance claims. On the other hand, if we opt for structural
uniformity, assimilating all appearances sentences to the structure in (80),
then the explanation will go by analogy with the epistemic cases. An utter-
ance of (79-a), for instance, will express that one’s gustatory experience gives
evidence that the cake is good (in way of tastes). And this also plausibly
means having an experience of the cake with a certain pleasant quality.21
Another form of appearance sentence that I haven’t discussed yet is that
in (83), where there is a ‘like’-complement, but embedding not a finite clause
but instead just a noun phrase.
(83) John sounds like a frog.
Clearly, it’s goodness is respect of taste that is relevant here. And yet, I feel an intuitive
difference between this case and paradigmatic “phenomenal” appearance claims. Perhaps
we should also include in the definition of the phenomenal case that the person whose
standards are relevant for the application of the adjective must be the same as the person
whose experiences are relevant to the interpretation of the appearance verb. And perhaps
once all the relevant distinctions are identified, “phenomenal” turn out not to be a very
useful categorization anyway.
21At this point, though, we run into the further interesting of how to understand expe-
riential predicates embedded in (epistemic) appearance constructions. If the appearance
construction is interpreted as I’ve suggested, then we must ask what it is to have evidence
for the presence of an experiential property — when that too is understood expressivisti-
cally.
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These are importantly different from the ‘like’-complement cases I focused
on in earlier in this chapter and in the previous one. This comes out, for
instance, by noting that the expletive subject and copy raising cases ‘like’-
complement cases are equivalent with sentences with ‘as if’-complements, as
shown in (84). By contrast, the noun phrase cases are ungrammatical with
‘as if’, as seen in (85).
(84) a. It looks like John is tired. ≈ It looks as if John is tired.
b. John looks like he’s tired. ≈ John looks as if he’s tired.
(85) John sounds like a frog. 6≈ #John sounds as if a frog.
Instead, (83) is felt to be equivalent to a paraphrase about similarity, as
in (86).
(86) John sounds similar to a frog.
However, this kind of paraphrase doesn’t always seem quite right for appear-
ance sentences with NP embedding ‘like’-clauses, as shown in (87).
(87) You describe your friend John to A, who has never met him.
A: John sounds like a nice guy.
6≈ John sounds similar to a nice guy.
≈ John sounds like/as if he’s a nice guy.
Appearance sentences of this form that are felt to be equivalent with their
finite ‘like’-complement variants, as in (87), may easily be assimilated to the
modal experiential state analysis from §4.2. But what of the others — those
that instead seem to be pointing to a judgment of similarity like (83)?22
These cases fall into the category of “comparative” appearance claims, as
discussed in §2.4.2. It would be a stretch to apply the analysis from §4.2 to
them. For instance, say one utters (83) because John has a croaky voice, as
if he’s getting over a bad cold (it is completely obvious and common ground
that John is a human being). It would be bizarre to suggest that (83) is true
in this scenario because one’s auditory experience of John makes John’s being
a frog most typical. Instead, one wants to say that it’s true because John’s
22To deal with cases like these, Lasersohn (1995) suggests an ambiguity in the word
‘like’ — one version of which is semantically empty, the other that means basically “similar
to”. My question is now what to do with the latter cases in the framework I’ve been
developing.
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auditory appearance resembles, in some respects but of course not others, the
auditory appearance of a frog. Bledin and Srinivas (2019) offer an analysis
along these lines, and in fact apply it explicitly only to appearance cases with
‘like’-complements embedding finite clauses. For instance, on their view, the
copy raising sentence ‘Tom looks like he’s cooking’ is true, roughly, just in
case Tom’s appearance is in some relevant respect similar to how he (or his
counterpart) looks in the most normal worlds where he is cooking. This
takes the proposition that Tom is cooking to enter into the analysis of the
copy raising sentence in quite a different way from how I have it above. It
no longer takes the appearance sentences to be a sort of species of attitude
report, and instead assimilates them to comparative claims about things
other than appearances, like ‘Dev swims like he’s a professional’. (A similar
approach is taken by Breckenridge (2018).) It is thus an avenue worth further
exploring that “epistemic” appearance claims may be viewed as special cases
of comparative ones.23
Overall, then, a major avenue for future investigation is the extent to
which the experiential state analysis can apply across the whole variety of
appearance constructions.
23A virtue of this approach is that it may be in a good position to incorporate the
machinery needed to account for gradability in appearance constructions, as illustrated in
(i) (also noted above in §2.4.2, footnote 40) — as similarity is already a gradable notion.
(i) Tom looks more like he’s running than (like he’s) walking.
However, it is also worth exploring other approaches to gradable modality that might keep
the connection with attitude ascriptions more intact, e.g. Koev 2019; Lassiter 2017.
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Conclusion: experience and
evaluation
The project here has centered on appearance language — of interest in its
own right, as well as crucial for probing what’s really at issue in previous
discussion focused on evaluative language, such as the language of personal
taste. As I discussed in Chapter 2, there is a natural class of experiential
predicates, which encompasses both predicates of personal taste and appear-
ance predicates. And the experiential state analysis presented in Chapter 4
predicts both puzzling features of these expressions that I began with in
Chapter 1: first, their ability to be involved in faultless disagreement, and
second, their licensing of the acquaintance inference. I suggest that the focus
on predicates of personal taste, which fall in the intersection of the sets of
evaluative predicates and experiential ones, has muddied the waters, leading
to disproportionate focus on evaluative language in the context of debates
about possible revisions to traditional semantic frameworks. Really, I con-
tend, the puzzling features are due to the role of subjective experience in
these areas of discourse. Faultless disagreement arises when speakers express
incompatible experiential states; and the acquaintance inference arises be-
cause it’s infelicitous to communicate being in an experiential state that one
is not in fact in.
In this brief concluding chapter I would like to take a broader look back
at evaluative language, and consider how doing so may inform the prospects
of the experiential approach I’ve developed.
Certainly, I am not claiming that all evaluative language is experiential.
Moral language is not, and aesthetic vocabulary arguably isn’t either, as it
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fails to have all the markers of experiential language discussed in §2.3. For in-
stance, modification by experiencer prepositional phrases is often infelicitous
with aesthetic adjectives, as in (1).1
(1) ??The vase is beautiful to me.
But morality and aesthetic value have also been claimed as the subjects of
faultless disagreement.2 And aesthetic judgment was the original source of
discussion about the acquaintance inference, tracing back as far as Kant
1790. While no one has to my knowledge claimed that moral claims are infe-
licitous without perceptual acquaintance, there has been much debate about
the status of testimony about morality, and skepticism about the appropri-
ateness of arriving at moral judgments on the basis of testimony.3 There is
the sense that certain grounds, sufficient for making ordinary factual claims,
are lacking when it comes to evaluative claims of all kinds, including about
morality.4
We seem to have faultless disagreement about appearances, matters of
personal taste, aesthetic matters, and morality. And we have the acquain-
tance inference licensed also with claims about appearances, matters of per-
sonal taste, and aesthetic matters; and we have something somewhat simi-
lar — namely, resistance to relying solely on testimony — with claims about
morality. If we have a unified phenomenon on our hands here, then that
might seem to cast doubt on my focus on experientiality, as it only uncon-
troversially applies to the first two items on the list.
To respond, let me first reemphasize that in this project I have been
primarily interested in the sources of faultless disagreement and the acquain-
tance inference with appearance language. And I hold that, having found
such sources in the experiential meaning of appearance terms, we should also
extend the analysis so that it equally locates these sources for the same fea-
tures with predicates of personal taste. Experiential meaning — in the form
1See McNally and Stojanovic 2017, who also note that “despite the existence of various
songs with the title ‘Beautiful to Me’, a Google search yields very few examples of ‘to’-
phrases with ‘beautiful’ in ordinary text” (p. 31).
2See e.g. Ko¨lbel 2002. And just as in the experiential domains, some argue that the
data is consistent with moral objectivism, e.g. Hills 2013a.
3See e.g. Hopkins 2007; McGrath 2009, 2011; Hills 2013b.
4See Klempner 2018 for detailed treatment of the phenomenon in the aesthetic case,
that also includes discussion of the cases of morality, personal tastes, and some appear-
ances.
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more specifically of the experiential state analysis and its possible extensions
discussed in Chapter 4 — is the key to understanding faultless disagreement
and the acquaintance inference with experiential language — a category that
includes appearance vocabulary and predicates of personal taste.
This picture does not rule out faultless disagreement or the acquaintance
inference with other vocabulary arising for other reasons. Non-experiential
language very plausibly gives rise to faultless disagreement, and it can do so
for a variety of reasons — differences in information with epistemic modals,
or differences in stakes for knowledge ascriptions, or differences in thresholds
for gradable adjectives, just to name a few cases that have been discussed in
the literature. Along these lines, then, if there is faultless moral disagreement
due, for instance, to differences in moral standards or norms, that is perfectly
consistent with my claims about the source of faultless disagreement with
experiential vocabulary.
Likewise, my claims are fully consistent with the existence of the acquain-
tance inference, or acquaintance inference adjacent phenomena like testimony
resistance, with non-experiential vocabulary — perhaps arising for epistemic
or evidential reasons. When it comes to testimony resistance with morality,
there is a clear case to be made that we are dealing with a phenomenon that,
while similar in some respects to the acquaintance inference with experien-
tial terms, is nonetheless to be explained quite differently. For one, the data
are much less clear. In many contexts that have been prevalent in human
history, for instance in religious communities, testimony is viewed as a fully
acceptable — indeed, perhaps, the dominant — basis for moral claims.
Furthermore, the kind of testimony resistance that we find about morality
seems to be of a piece with testimony resistance in cases where the objectivity
of the domain in question is not in doubt. First, there is a general oddness
in relying solely on testimony when it comes to issues that are known to be
controversial; and the moral issues used in presenting the phenomenon of
testimony resistance, like the moral status of meat-eating, for instance, tend
to be controversial. Second (though also not distinct from the point about
controversy), there is testimony resistance about philosophical matters in
general. It would be odd to accept, say, modal realism, solely because one
knows that an expert in metaphysics believes it. If moral inquiry is an
instance of philosophical inquiry more generally, then it’s not surprising that
127
Chapter 5. Conclusion: experience and evaluation
the same testimony resistance would show up.5 There isn’t much reason
to think that testimony resistance about general philosophical matters, or
about controversial matters in general, are due to the role of experience in the
discourses in question. So if testimony resistance in morality is of the same
kind, then I can happily recognize it, while, however, keeping its explanation
distinct from that of the acquaintance inference with experiential language —
where an explanation drawing on subjective experience is compelling.
Things are more delicate with the acquaintance inference with aesthetic
matters. There is a much closer parallel between the acquaintance inference
with aesthetic claims and the acquaintance inference with experiential claims.
Across all these cases, it is straightforwardly a certain kind of experience
that the speaker has to have in order to felicitously make the claims in
question. Moreover, the lack of the relevant experience is compatible with
full confidence, and likely even knowledge (as we saw in §4.1.4) of the claims
in question. There is really just something about the bare assertion that is
marked if the acquaintance requirement is unsatisfied. By contrast, my sense
is that in the moral cases (and others that are arguably of a piece with them,
as just discussed), the resistance to making a simple assertion also comes
along with some other kind of doubt or at least hesitation about the issue in
question. In other words, it’s easy to imagine scenarios where the first but
not the second sentences in (2) and (3) would be appropriate to utter. It’s
harder for me to imagine the same situation for the sentences in (4).
(2) I’m sure the cake is tasty.
The cake is tasty.
(3) I’m sure the painting is beautiful.
The painting is beautiful.
(4) I’m sure eating meat is wrong.
Eating meat is wrong.
I will close by mentioning two broad options here for how to think about
aesthetic language within my approach. The first is to restrict the experi-
ential state analysis only to the clearly experiential language of appearances
and personal tastes, leaving the related phenomenon with aesthetic language
to be explained in a way that is more unified with the moral cases. While this
5This line of reasoning is inspired by Shafer-Landau 2006. Thanks also to Dilip Ninan
for discussion.
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would leave the linguistic scope of my project clearly delineated, it may lead
to some doubt about my approach. For if we can give an adequate explana-
tion of faultless disagreement and the acquaintance inference with aesthetic
claims in a way that doesn’t appeal to experiential meaning in the way I’ve
done for appearance predicates and predicates of personal taste, then per-
haps this approach could just be extended to cover the clearly experiential
cases as well. So, unifying the aesthetic cases with the moral may turn out
to be a first step towards undoing the reliance on experientiality that I have
proposed.
The second option is to bring aesthetic language into the fold of the
experiential state analysis that I’ve proposed for the clearly experiential cases.
This would leave us with an intuitive view, on which experientiality explains
faultless disagreement and the acquaintance inference in precisely those cases
where the judgments in question are related to subjective experience in the
ways introduced in Chapter 1. However, the linguistic unity of the vocabulary
in question is not extremely clear. On this line, a main topic for further
research is how to understand the experientiality at issue in a way that still
respects important differences between aesthetic language and the language
of personal tastes and appearances.
Evaluative language has great variety, just as experiential language does —
as has been on display throughout this dissertation. Theorists have already
made a lot of progress on evaluative language, and unpacking how all the
variety there interacts with all the variety within experiential language is a
task left very much unfinished in this work.
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